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ABSTRACT
As of late, political theory, research, and practice have taken a deliberative turn,
extolling the benefits of public discourse guided by norms such as inclusion, respect, and
open-mindedness. Can these ideals, though, be approximated in the current era of
partisan polarization? If so, what factors contribute to high quality, productive discourse?
These are the questions this project addresses, assessing how partisanship and
polarization impact the public’s propensity to adopt the key deliberative attitude of
reciprocity (or mutual respect) towards political argumentation. Drawing on social
identity theory, the project conceptualizes partisan attachment as containing interrelated,
yet separate ideological and social identity dimensions. Through a series of survey
experiments, it then shows that partisan social identity attachment—in other words, the
extent to which one views being a Democrat or a Republican as an important part of
“who one is”—weakens one commitment to reciprocity in a variety of ways. Partisans
with strong social identity attachments are more likely to heed party cues, as opposed to
argumentative substance, in considering whether to afford reciprocity towards political
disagreement. Partisans with strong social identity attachments are also less likely to
support displays of reciprocity by an inparty political representative. The same effects,
however, are not present for partisans with strong ideological commitments to their party.
Moreover, the effects are not weaker for partisans who have regular social contact with
outparty members.
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Recent research shows that the partisan public has increasingly polarized not
based on ideology or issue positions, but based on growing negative outparty affect and
cross-party social distance. The research here thus shows that mass “social” polarization
is creating a fundamental barrier to productive cross-party discourse, one that will need to
be addressed if we want to establish a more deliberative democracy.
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CHAPTER 1
OVERVIEW
"The political parties created democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable save in
terms of the parties."
-

E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government, 1942

“Identification with a party raises a perceptual screen through which the individual tends
to see what is favorable to his partisan orientation. The stronger the party bond, the
more exaggerated the process of selection and perceptual distortion will be.”
-

Campbell et al., The American Voter, 1960

During the run-up to the 2012 Presidential Election, the radio show This
American Life produced an episode entitled “Red States Blue State,” where they declare
that “everyone knows that politics is now so divided in our country that not only do the
sides disagree on the solutions to the country’s problems, they don’t even agree on what
the problems are.” The episode then profiles a host of average Americans who have had
their families torn apart and close friendships ruined due to opposing, polarized politics.
In one particularly evocative example from the show, interviewer Lisa Pollack profiles
Frank Mills and Ron Sexton. The two men were close friends who repeatedly discussed
political issues on the phone. This is until, as Pollack describes on-air in their interview,
“Ron urged Frank to support a Republican candidate for Congress. Frank balked. Didn't
Ron know he supported Democrats?
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Frank Mills: And he (Ron) said, ‘Who did you vote for for president?’ And I said, ‘I
voted for Obama.’
Lisa Pollak: Apparently this had not come up before.
Frank Mills: And then he said, ‘You must be a Socialist.’
Lisa Pollak: He said this seriously or jokingly?
Frank Mills: No, seriously. ‘You must be a Socialist.’ And I said, ‘How can you make
that assumption?’ He says, ‘Well, you voted for Obama. He's a socialist, and
therefore you are.’ And then I took it as if he had called me a dirty name. And we got
into an argument. And then after a while, he said, ‘Well, I'm writing you off my list,
Frank. Don't ever talk to me again. You're no longer a friend of mine,’ is how that
conversation ended,” (Glass 2012).
The story of Frank and Ron may be common in America, and, for many, it is
troubling. With the rise of partisan polarization debated by academic and popular
commentators alike (Abramowitz 2010; Haidt and Hetherington 2012), many point to a
link between divergent political views and an incivility and breakdown of political
discourse (“Civility in America 2013”). Dating back to the ancient Greeks, political
theorists have extoled the virtues of deliberative democracy, predicated on the ability of
the public (or at least their representatives) to see divergent perspectives as legitimate and
to be open to opinion change (Rawls [1993] 2005; Gutmann and Thompson 1996;
Dryzek 2010). The closed-mindedness and lack of consideration evinced by Frank and
Ron calls this possibility into question.
It is also perhaps puzzling, as many public opinion scholars demonstrate that,
while conservatives and liberals may have increasingly sorted into their “correct” party
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based on ideology, the public writ large is as moderate as it has been in the past half
century (Fiorina 2011). The acrimony may be real, but it may be relatively untethered to
ideological or issue position conflict; in other words, it is comprised of “a nation that
agrees on many things but is bitterly divided nonetheless,” (Mason 2015, 128). To help
explain this puzzle, a body of recent research in political psychology (Iyengar, Sood, and
Lelkes 2012; Iyengar and Westwood 2014; Mason 2015; Huddy, Mason, and AarøE
2015) has drawn a distinction between the ideological and social identity bases of
partisanship to suggest that it is not Democrats’ and Republicans’ political views, but
social identities, that are polarizing. Drawing from social psychological theories of
identity (Tajfel et al. 1971; Turner 1987), these authors posit that the motivation to
establish a positive differentiation between one’s inparty and outparty drives the anger
and conflict that is suggested between Frank and Ron.
Drawing on this concept of “social identity” polarization, the goal of this project
is to explain the effect of partisan attachment on the quality of political deliberation in
American democracy. The founding fathers, as well as many modern political theorists,
extol the virtue of open-minded public discussion and consensus building. Both
theoretical and empirical research on deliberative democracy, however, underexplore the
impact of partisanship on the propensity of the public to engage in meaningful, highquality deliberation. Moreover, while recent research into “social identity” polarization
examines the impact of partisan identity on emotional responses to politics (Mason
2015), political activism (Huddy, Mason, and AarøE 2015), and even non-political
attitudes such as marriage or hiring decisions (Iyengar and Westwood 2014), it has not
made the connection to the discussion characteristics or citizen attitudes that deliberative
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theory prioritizes. Today, there is continued academic and practical interest in fostering
deliberative discourse and institutions. Thus, examining how the social psychology of
partisanship impacts these efforts, and bridging deliberative political theory with research
in political psychology, is of vital importance.
This chapter lays the theoretical groundwork for the project. After a discussion of
deliberative democracy and the key role that the concept of reciprocity plays in
deliberation, the chapter explores the ambivalent role parties play in historical and
modern American political thought. As the academic debate over partisanship and
partisan polarization today has focused on its effect on representation and electoral
accountability, this literature does an inadequate job connecting polarization to its effect
on deliberation and political discourse. In turn, empirical deliberative democracy
research tends to focus on whether deliberation produces normatively positive benefits; it
does not adequately examine prior characteristics (such as partisanship) which encourage
or preclude individuals from engaging in deliberation in the first place. From this point,
the chapter advances social identity theory (SIT) as a way to connect the debate on
polarization with the concerns of deliberative theory. Then, the chapter draws on SIT to
lay out the theoretical expectations guiding the project. Finally, the chapter will conclude
with a plan for the rest of the project.
1.1 DELIBERATION AND RECIPROCITY
In the 21st century, democracy is generally seen as a good thing; Americans take
pride in having the oldest democratic Constitution in the Western world, and both
domestically and internationally, we prefer to see political change that creates more,
rather than less, of it. However, like other valence terms such as “freedom” or “justice,”
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“democracy” is a universal good with many and at times conflicting interpretations. For
example, some see democracy as primarily a competition between groups (Dahl 1956),
and others see guaranteeing rights or liberty (Nozick 1974) as essentially “democratic.”
Many scholars and citizens, though, conceptualize democracy primarily in terms of “the
electoral connection.” As one example, both normative theory (Mill [1861] 1991; Pitkin
1967) as well as empirical political science (Miller and Stokes 1963; Ansolabehere and
Jones 2010) view the ideal democratic representative as one who directly enacts the
wishes of his or her constituency. If the representative fails to do so, the constituency
holds him or her accountable come election time. Indeed, from public opinion research
cataloging the “uninformed” and “irrational” voter (Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and
Keeter 1996; Lodge and Taber 2013) to Congressional research discussing the
incumbency advantage (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and
Stewart 2006) and capture by moneyed interests (Gilens and Page 2014), much of the
American politics literature consists of an exploration of the breakdown of the “electoral
connection” as well as institutional changes that could be made to fix it.
The view of democracy as primarily an “electoral connection” has roots in a
“minimalist” conception typified by Schumpeter (1942 [2003]) as well as the assumption
latent in much public opinion research that it would be difficult to demand much more
from the American citizenry. However, democratic theorists have of late increasingly
moved beyond the electoral connection and have considered the discursive requirements
of democracy (Dryzek 2010; Young 2000; Gutmann and Thompson 1996). These
deliberative democratic theorists do not focus on specific institutions or election
procedures, and they moreover do not argue that deliberation should replace an electoral
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connection. They do argue, though, that the quality of political communication that
connects citizens both with each other and the ruling class matters. Dryzek lays out a
complete, succinct definition of the core elements of deliberative democracy:
“A system can be said to possess deliberative capacity to the degree it has structures
to accommodate deliberation that is authentic, inclusive, and consequential. To be
authentic, deliberation ought to be able to induce reflection upon preferences in
noncoercive fashion… and involve communicating in terms that those who do not
share one’s point of view can find meaningful and accept…To be inclusive,
deliberation requires the opportunity and ability of all affected actors (or their
representatives) to participate. To be consequential, deliberation must somehow
make a difference when it comes to determining or influencing collective outcomes,”
(2010, 10).
Thus, at its core, deliberative democracy is about reason giving (Thompson
2008); decisions are not made by fiat, but with collective, interactive discussion, and with
justification towards those disagree. Normative theorists vary in their requirements for
the quality of reasons given, the role (if any) of power or bargaining, the proper site for
this discussion, as well as the place for consensus as a discursive goal (Bächtiger et al.
2010). In a seminal work, though, Gutmann and Thompson (1996) argue that this reason
giving should be guided by a norm of reciprocity, or offering justifications that others,
even if they disagree, can find legitimate. As such, the back and forth of political
discussion comes from a place of mutual respect and open, good faith consideration of
alternate views (Fishkin 1995). While some confine deliberation to power brokers such
as legislators or jurors (for example, Rawls [1993] 2005), many deliberative theorists see
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the necessity for “everyday talk” of the public to hew to these norms (Dryzeck 2010,
Mansbridge 1999), in a way that places a primacy on inclusion (Young 2000).
The connection between deliberative discussion and democracy has roots in
Athenian democracy, where speechmaking and discussion in the Assemblies was viewed
as integral to decision making processes (Held 1987, Ch. 1). The focus on deliberation in
modern times, though, has only taken in the past few decades. Since, though, it has
become a central focus of political theory (Rawls [1993] 2005; Gutmann and Thompson
1996), empirical social science (Barabas 2004; Mutz 2006), and practical political reform
(Gastil and Levine 2005). Democratic theorists argue that deliberation comes with a host
of benefits for political power and decision making, including a greater normative and
empirical legitimacy, a more informed citizenry, better and more consistent attitude
formation, higher tolerance for diverse viewpoints, greater engagement and social capital
building, and higher quality, more consensual decisions (Mendelberg 2002, 153-4).
While empirical research has shown mixed results (for reviews, see Thompson 2008;
Mutz 2008), and the benefits of deliberation hinge on the individual and environmental
context (Delli Carpini, Cook, and Jacobs 2004), there is enough evidence to suggest that,
at times, the public can buck the assumptions of irrationality and apathy that dominate
public opinion research. For example, while some have found that the public prefers a
low level of political involvement (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002), Delli Carpini,
Cook, and Jacobs (2004, 323-4) find that the public is willing to talk about the issues with
their peers, with 58% of their national survey respondents engaging in at least two
“discursive activities” in the past year. Prior and Lupia (2008), moreover, use a survey
experiment of a representative, national sample to show that the public can draw on

7

higher levels of political knowledge if given the time and motivation to do so. Many
studies employing “deliberative forums” or “deliberative polls” also show that, with time
and motivation, citizens can engage in “reciprocal” decision making through deliberation 1
(Fishkin 1995; Stanford University 2013). For example, Barabas (2004) finds through a
forum on Social Security reform that, even for those with strongly held prior opinions,
deliberation produces opinion change in a way “ordinary discussion” about the issue does
not. Moreover, List et al. (2012), using data from nine deliberative polls, finds that
deliberation can create “meta-agreement” or “single-peakedness” in policy preferences,
particularly for issues that have a natural left-right dimensionality. Thus, they argue,
deliberation can create opinion constraint and avoid social choice problems (Arrow 1951)
that arise with multi-dimensional preferences.
Beyond being simply a theoretical and empirical research endeavor, deliberative
democracy has also made in-roads into real-world politics. Certainly, efforts at fostering
greater public participation in decision making are nothing new; for example, the
Administrative Procedures Act has required that agencies solicit public comments on
rulemaking for half of a century. More recently, though, governments have either
instituted or consulted institutions founded explicitly on deliberative democratic
principles. The most prominent example of this is the “deliberative polling” done by
James Fishkin and Stanford’s Center for Deliberative Democracy. Since 1988, Fishkin
and the Center have organized dozens of deliberative forums across the world focused on
a myriad of issues, where results have been used to inform policy processes (Fishkin

1

With these forums, “the basic design involves interviewing a good-quality random sample; gathering its
members for a weekend to deliberate in randomly assigned small groups; allowing them to put questions
arising from the small group discussions to panels of competing policy experts and policy makers; and
reinterviewing them at the end,” (List et al. 2012, 81).
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1995; Stanford University 2013). Another example is the Australian Citizens’
Parliament. A national convention of 150 citizens modeled on the ancient Athenian
assemblies, the Citizens’ Parliament was tasked with proposing reforms to the Australian
political system through online and face-to-face deliberations. Even beyond the content
of their proposals, Dryzeck argues that it shows that “if you give people the opportunity
to deliberate, they see the political system as something that is theirs and worthwhile,”
(Dryzek 2009, 4). Warren and Gastil (2015), moreover, highlight the potential role of
deliberative “minipublics” in serving as intermediaries bridging complexities in the
policy process and the limited information citizens often bring to bear on political
decisions. They point to the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly and Oregon’s
Citizens’ Initiative Review—two deliberative institutions comprised of a near random
sample of the citizenry—as successfully serving as impartial, transparent, and
knowledgeable trustees for helping citizen decision making. These are just a few of
many instances of deliberative ideals making inroads into practical political reform.
1.2 DELIBERATION AND PARTISANSHIP
The deliberative ideal of reciprocity extols a “universalization” of political
discourse; at its fullest expression, politics does not consist of winners and losers, but a
community trying to figure out what is in the common good through productive
discussion2. As such, there is a historical concern over the group considerations brought
about by political parties. Prior to the ratification of the Constitution, in Federalist #10
Madison sees political parties as fostering the “mischiefs of faction,” creating “instability,
injustice, and confusion” in popular government ([1787] 2003). Nearly a decade later,

2

Indeed, deliberative democratic theory is often criticized for ignoring the aspects of power and conflict
that, it is asserted, are essential to understanding politics. For example, see Shapiro 1999.
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Washington warns in his Farewell Address of “the spirit of party,” as it “agitates the
community with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms, kindles the animosity of one part
against another, (and) forments occasionally riot and insurrection” ([1796] 2008).
Only four years after Washington’s warnings, Jefferson and the DemocraticRepublicans were vying against Adams and the Federalists for control of the new United
States government. And for the two centuries that followed, the two-party system has
been ensconced in the American political landscape. Formal theory suggests that it must
be so; Duverger and others contend that the institutional and electoral structure of the
government drives the creation and maintenance of two broad, national parties (1954;
Cox 1997; Aldrich 2011). What’s more, Downs’ (1957) spatial theory of voting suggests
that, given that the bulk of the United States populace is ideologically moderate (Fiorina
2011), the party system will converge on two parties ideologically near the median voter.
In addition to the formal necessity of two parties in the American democratic system,
many have suggested that they play a normatively positive role in translating citizen
preferences into government action. By establishing a clear, consistent “brand,” they
provide an important cueing function to voters, allowing the average citizen with a low
level of political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) to effectively participate in
politics (Lupia 1994). Responsible party theorists, moreover, argue that healthy
competition between two parties can serve to offer distinct choices to voters and ensure
that, once voters make their choice, electoral change is translated into policy change.
Indeed, in Southern Politics in State and Nation, V. O. Key shows how the Democratic
party in the post-Reconstruction South maintained a one-party dominance through
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various means of voter suppression. Without viable competition from the Republican
party, Key argues that the Southern states did not have a functioning democracy (1949).
Key is correct that competition is necessary for democracy; deliberative theorists,
too, argue that a healthy democratic discourse needs a diversity of competing claims.
They argue, though, that the nature and tone of this competition also matters. As such,
many popular commentators, political activists, and the public writ large, in line with
these theorists and echoing the historical warnings of Washington and Madison, have
expressed concern with the current era of mass partisan polarization. Opinion makers
across media outlets, for example, claim that polarized parties “neither trust nor
understand each other” (Dionne 2013), and that “the number of persuadable voters has
shrunk to a tiny segment of the electorate” (Cohen 2016). A recent Pew Center report,
moreover, claims that “Republicans and Democrats are more divided along ideological
lines – and partisan antipathy is deeper and more extensive – than at any point in the last
two decades,” (2014, 5). The report points to not only more points of policy conflict, but
a partisan-based antipathy “bordering on sense of alarm” as well as an increasing
disinclination to marry, have friendships with, or live near out-partisans. Bishop likewise
reports the public’s increasing aversion to out-party neighbors, arguing that, as
Americans increasingly migrate into ideologically homogenous, “balkanized”
communities, the result is “a growing intolerance for political differences that has made
national consensus impossible” (2008, 14).
Furthermore, the gridlock and disaffection produced by 21st century partisan
politics has prompted political organizations such as No Labels to actively promote
greater compromise and consensus among party leaders. It has also produced movement
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politics, as exemplified by then-Daily Show host Jon Stewart’s 2010 “Rally to Restore
Sanity and/or Fear” (Tavernise and Stelter 2010). While some critiqued the rally as less
of a call for civil discourse and more of a rally for the Democratic party, Stewart himself
saw it as a repudiation of the divisive partisan punditry of all stripes, a divisiveness that
makes one question:
“Why would we work together? Why would you reach across the aisle to a pumpkin
assed forehead eyeball monster? If the picture of us were true, of course, our inability
to solve problems would actually be quite sane and reasonable. Why would you work
with Marxists actively subverting our Constitution or racists and homophobes who
see no one’s humanity but their own? We hear every damn day about how fragile our
country is—on the brink of catastrophe—torn by polarizing hate and how it’s a shame
that we can’t work together to get things done, but the truth is we do. We work
together to get things done every damn day!... Most Americans don’t live their lives
solely as Democrats, Republicans, liberals or conservatives. Americans live their
lives more as people that are just a little bit late for something they have to do—often
something that they do not want to do—but they do it--impossible things every day
that are only made possible by the little reasonable compromises that we all make”
(quoted in Examiner.com 2010).
1.3 SHORTCOMINGS OF EXTANT RESEARCH
In addition to Stewart and other popular commentators, political scientists have
paid increasing attention to partisan polarization; scholars, however, tend to study
polarization as an ideological construct, examining whether Democrats and Republicans
are increasingly comprising ideologically homogenous, ideologically distinct camps.
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From this literature, there is a clear consensus that political elites – politicians, activists,
donors, and media, are more polarized today than they have been in the past century
(McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Theriault 2008; Prior 2007). With this
observation, some scholars have argued that the public is now similarly polarized,
harboring homogenous, distinct worldviews and issue positions (Abramowitz 2010;
Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). The majority consensus, though, is that while partisans
in the public may be better “sorted” (Levendusky 2009), they are just as ideologically
unconstrained as Phillip Converse and his colleagues surmised in the 1960’s (Campbell et
al. 1960; Converse 1964). Fiorina contends that much of the hand-wringing over “culture
wars” or “polarized America” incorrectly conflates closely contested elections with deep
public divisions over the issues (2011); the public, instead, is much more centrist and
amenable to compromise than the political class (2009). Hill and Tausanovitch (2015),
moreover, construct a measure of public ideology similar to the NOMINATE scores used
for Congress, based on 67 policy questions asked in the ANES over a 50-year period.
They find that, while the public has always been less ideologically extreme than their
elected leaders, the disconnect has gotten stronger in recent years. Along the lines of this
dialogue, too, scholars debate whether the public is polarized on economic and/or
sociocultural issues (Frank 2004; Gelman et al. 2008; Carsey and Layman 2002) as well
as whether ideological mass polarization has a geographic dimension (Gimpel and
Schuknecht 2003; Gelman et al. 2008; Bishop 2008).
The literature examining ideological mass polarization (or the lack thereof)
provides vital, yet incomplete, insight into the impact of 21st century partisanship on the
quality of American democracy. This literature is primarily motivated by a normative
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concern over the quality of representation in America, and the electoral connection
between representatives and the represented. As Pitkin states, in a representative
government there must be “machinery for the expression of the wishes of the represented,
and that the government respond to these wishes unless there are good reasons to the
contrary,” (1967, 232-3). Given the clear ideological rift between parties in government,
if the public is not similarly split ideologically, there is a clear breakdown in this
machinery. Fiorina (2009, 72-4) argues that this is precisely what is happening today.
He points out that while some theories of representation suggest that the representative is
supposed to be reasonable, moderating the passions of the public, today’s representative
is exaggerating the moderate differences of a reasonable public. If, on the other hand, the
public is ideologically polarized, the electoral connection is then healthy. As
Abramowitz states, “the conditions for responsible party government have largely been
met” (2010, 159), and overcoming governmental gridlock will require either extended
dominance from one party or reforming institutional checks and balances.
Concern for the quality of representation is not misplaced; if Schattschneider says
that American democracy is “unthinkable” without political parties, it is also unthinkable
without representation. Direct democracy is impossible given a large, heterogeneous
society like the United States. However, considering partisan polarization solely in the
context of ideology and representation is incomplete. To do so would presume a
minimalist or aggregate vision of democracy, where public involvement in the
democratic process is limited to an occasional “competitive struggle for the people’s
vote,” (Schumpeter [1942] 2003). Election procedure and outcomes would take
precedence over the processes of political discussion and opinion formation, as well as
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input and justification of policymaking processes between elections. The sites of
democracy would be limited to the polling place, excluding the media, public forums, or
the streets. The citizenry, moreover, would be assumed to be motivated by a “thin and
individualistic form of rationality” (Young 2000, 20), where preferences are immutable
and the collective good (outside of its effect on one’s self interest) is not taken into
account. According to this view, if the ideological elite polarization matches polarization
of the public, democracy “works” as citizen interests are reflected through election. The
concerns voiced by deliberative theorists as well as popular commentators like Stewart—
of incivility, aggression, and a lack of reciprocity in elite and lay political discussion, and
of gridlock and lack of consensus in the policymaking process—do not factor in.
If polarization studies often miss the concerns of deliberative theorists, empirical
and theoretical work in deliberative democracy often glosses over the potential impact of
partisanship on deliberation that our founders worried about. While more attention to
empirical work on deliberation will be paid in Chapter Two, broadly, much of this
literature takes a “forum” approach (eg. Fishkin 1995; Barabas 2004), where a
deliberative situation is carefully constructed out of whole cloth, or a “case based”
approach (eg. Mansbridge 1980; Gastil 2000), where insights are gleaned from observing
real-world deliberative situations. These studies tend to take deliberation as an
independent variable, assessing its effects on dependent variables such as trust, tolerance,
consensus, etc. They also operationalize deliberation holistically, arguing that the
package of conditions theorists prioritize (reciprocity, reason-giving, non-domination,
accurate information, etc.) create the effects they study. There is certainly value in taking
this approach; many argue that, as deliberation is a synergistic, communal process,
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breaking the characteristics of deliberation down to their component parts means
studying something that is not deliberation (Thompson 2008).
This being said, the holistic case based and forum based studies of deliberation
are incomplete. For one, the forum based studies of Fishkin and others suffer from issues
of endogeneity. Is the open-mindedness, opinion change, greater understanding, etc.,
created by the deliberative process in these forums, or is it driven by the type of people
that choose to participate in the extensive forum process? To address this issue, many of
these studies employ random sampling of the population (List et al. 2012), stratified
sampling of the population to ensure that key race, class, and gender subgroups are
represented (Dryzek 2009), or post-hoc statistical adjustment such as matching (Barabas
2004). However, this does not fully deal with the issue, as unobservable characteristics
(such as personality—see Chapter Six) can motivate some, as opposed to others, to
participate even if a random sample of participants is contacted.
What’s more, Ryfe is correct in positing that “researchers have been less
interested in deliberation itself than in measuring its effects” (2005, 54). In other words,
what specifically produces the salutary benefits that case based and forum based studies
of deliberation find? Is it the access to accurate, expert information? The encouragement
of open-mindedness? Social contact with persons of a different opinion? By setting up a
holistic deliberative process and not subjecting each of these components of the process
to scrutiny, Mutz thus contends that deliberation becomes a “moving target,” which
“insulate(s) the theory from falsification” (2008).
Mutz is correct that studying the specific components of deliberation in isolation,
with an eye towards internal validity, is a necessary addition (but not replacement) to the
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extant holistic research that case based and forum based studies provide. Indeed, her
work (2006) as well as other work (eg. Jackman and Sniderman 2006; Druckman and
Nelson 2003; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002) takes such an approach, using survey
experiments and other experimental techniques to examine isolated characteristics of
deliberation such as interpersonal network diversity or exposure to counterargument.
However, like case based and forum based research, this experimental work, with few
exceptions, takes characteristics of the deliberative setting as independent variables,
examining if they produce the salutary effects theorists contend they do. Less research
from this subfield takes the deliberative setting as the dependent variable, exploring its
preconditions. This is unfortunate, as Thompson argues that “the aspect of deliberation
about which empirical inquiry has potentially the most to say is the set of conditions that
are necessary for, or at least contributory toward, good deliberation,” (2008, 509). He
posits that more research into the cultural and institutional preconditions that lead to
higher-quality deliberation can help to explain the mixed results of the effects of
deliberation studies find. To wit, despite the extended popular and academic debate over
the rise of partisan polarization, little work has examined the role of parties in fostering or
inhibiting deliberation. However, recent work examining the partisan social identity can
provide a useful tool with which this project can do just that.
1.4 THE DUAL BASES OF PARTISAN IDENTITY
Fiorina, Abramowitz, and other polarization scholars tend to work with an
“ideological” concept of polarization, where partisan affiliation is (or is not) linked to
ideological and/or policy preference. In a recent paper, however, Iyengar, Sood, and
Lelkes (2012) argue that negative affect towards an “outgroup” party, not ideological
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difference, is the most important dimension of partisan polarization. They draw on social
identity theory (SIT) to explain how, as partisanship has become an increasingly salient
social identity in American culture, dislike towards, and stereotyping of, partisan
outgroups has increased in survey responses. This phenomenon is not evident for other
groups; there is not a similar antipathy between liberals and conservatives, and outgroup
hatred/stereotyping has increased for partisans even as it has (overtly) decreased for
ethnic, religious, and other traditionally-maligned groups over time. They also show that
ideology is only, at best, a very weak predictor of “affective” partisan polarization, which
suggests that the salience of the partisan social grouping is primary, and it is not caused
by a prior ideological or issue-based difference.
The study of “affective” or “social” partisan polarization, may be relatively novel,
but it ties into a canon of research that suggests partisanship is a long-term, psychological
attachment (Campbell et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). It also
resonates with psychological research on attitude formation and group identification.
Social identity theory has long posited a “minimal group paradigm,” where even the most
insignificant and arbitrary of group categorizations can have a substantial effect on
cognition and behavior (Brewer 1979; Tajfel et al. 1971). Socially-constructed group
identification is a necessary part of human experience, as “an undifferentiated social
environment makes very little sense and provides no guidelines for action,” (Tajfel et al.
1971, 153). Experimental research has also shown that subjects focus on the relative
difference in resource between one’s ingroup and outgroup, even when alternatives that
are to the absolute advantage of all are present (see Brown 2000 for a review).
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“Minimal” groups, however, are not very relevant in real-world settings. Humans
inhabit a dense, overlapping network of group categories (and potential group
categories); a central insight from self-categorization theory (SCT), given this fact, is that
only certain group categorizations will be salient at certain times. In defining SCT
(which builds directly from SIT, and is often used interchangeably) 3, Turner emphasizes
that humans do not identify a “personal” self that is independent of group relations;
instead, one’s self-concept is defined by an interrelated continuum of personal and group
self-categorizations (1987, 43-4). One’s group categorization, as opposed to a personal
categorization, becomes a salient self-categorization when the group category is easily
accessible in one’s mind, and environmental stimuli fit well with the categorization (Ch.
6). How much the group category is valued or prioritized by the individual, as well as the
perceived differences between the ingroup and outgroup, also help explain salience of
group categories (Yzerbyt and Demoulin 2010, 1029). With their salient groups, though,
individuals develop a host of behaviors, including engaging in “self-stereotyping” by
changing attitudes and behavior (Terry and Hogg 1996), exaggerating ingroup similarity
and outgroup difference (Brown 2000), and favoring the ingroup and bias toward the
outgroup (Tajfel et al. 1971; Brown et al. 2001).
Iyengar et al. (2012) provide valuable insight into the social psychological nature
of partisan polarization via SIT; it would be wrong, however, to suggest that ideological
polarization is completely irrelevant or unrelated to this affective identity formation
process. If affect is all that matters, it would be difficult to explain how individuals are
increasingly sorting into the “correct” party ideologically (Levendusky 2009). It would
3

The key difference is that SIT focuses on the motivational drivers of in-group formation (in particular,
building esteem), while SCT focuses on the cognitive processes of group categorization in a given
intergroup setting (Huddy 2001). Both lines of theory predict similar behavioral outcomes, though.
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also be difficult to explain how the public is increasingly knowledgeable about partisan
differences in policy, and can place Democrats to the left of Republicans on a variety of
issues (Hetherington 2001; Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006).
Lodge and Taber, moreover, argue that humans are “motivated reasoners,” facing
implicit pressure to bring their ideological worldview in line with their affective feelings
of partisan support (2013; see also Kunda 1990). This pressure is evinced from studies
demonstrating that citizens will change their views on specific policies solely based on
their partisan attachment (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Carsey and Layman
2006). It is also suggested from SIT research that shows individuals engage in “selfstereotyping” activities concerning salient in-group norms (Branscombe et al. 2002;
Mason 2015). However, this phenomenon is not universal, as the need for consistency
between affect and ideology varies across personalities, across time, and across culture
(Nisbett et al. 2001; Kitayama et al. 2004)
In short, with regards to partisanship, it is important to look at social identity and
ideology, not one or the other. Figure 1.1 presents a proposed schematic for individuallevel partisanship, which consists of two dimensions of one’s attachment to his or her
party. On the x-axis is “ideological” partisanship, or how close one’s policy views are
from the median individual in his or her inparty. The right side of the axis represents one
who is ideologically similar from his or her inparty, the left side represents one who is
ideologically dissimilar. On the y-axis is “partisan social identity,” or the level of group
identity-based attachment one registers for his or her inparty. The top of the line
represents a strong partisan social identity, and the bottom of the line represents party
being a weak part of one’s identity.
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Figure 1.1 Dimensions of Partisan Identity
While specific hypotheses drawing from social identity theory will be developed
in Chapters Four through Six, the general argument for this project is that partisan
identity salience is negatively related to deliberative attitudes and the key attitude of
reciprocity in particular. This connects to the insight from SIT that, for salient group
identities, one finds outgroup bias and exaggeration of difference from the ingroup (why
engage in good faith discussion with someone who’s opinion you hold in low regard?). It
also connects to recent research on partisan psychology that suggests that, far from openmindedness, one’s partisanship conditions the quality and hue of information that he or
she receives from their environment (Iyengar and Hahn 2009; Ramsay et al. 2010), as
well as how that information is processed and interpreted (Gaines et al. 2007; Lodge and
Taber 2013). I expect separate effects for both partisan social identity and ideological
partisanship. While I expect the strongest effect for the social dimension of partisanship,
since “self-stereotyping” and adopting in-group norms is also an indicator of social
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identity salience (Mackie 1986; Mason 2015), I expect one’s ideological partisanship to
be a secondary contributor to a negative relationship to reciprocity.
1.5 PLAN FOR PROJECT
Chapter Two expands on the discussion of deliberative democratic theory,
including the debate on its possibility and its normative desirability. It also offers a full
conceptualization of reciprocity and its place in political discourse. It further delves
deeper into the empirical literature on deliberation and addresses a key critique from
Mutz (2008) that, even in ideal deliberative situations, rational decision making cannot
result. Chapter Three discusses the methods used to assess the impact of partisan
attachment on reciprocity. This includes a justification of the experimental approach
primarily used, a description of all the data sources used and how the data were collected,
and a discussion of the structure of the original survey instruments used as well as the
operationalization of key concepts such as reciprocity, partisan social identity, and others.
Chapters Four through Six present the empirical results of this project. Chapter
Four explores the impact of the social and ideological aspects of partisan identity on
one’s willingness to engage in reciprocal political discussion with peers, as well as one’s
desire to see reciprocity displayed in his or her elected representative. The experimental
results show that those for whom partisan social identity salience is high are particularly
likely to respond to party cues in determining whether to seek out reciprocity. This is true
both in interpersonal political discussion and for considering whether to support
representatives’ deliberative efforts. These results suggest that the deliberative capacity
of the public is eroding with modern mass “social” polarization. Chapter Five explores
how one’s political discussion network impacts the effect of social partisanship on
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reciprocal attitudes. This chapter builds off the work of Mutz (2002; 2006), who broadly
suggests that cross-cutting political discussion is beneficial for deliberative public
attitudes but detrimental for public political engagement. The chapter will thus see how
Mutz’s insights relate to the “social” and “ideological” dimensions of partisans. Chapter
Six explores the relationship between reciprocity and one’s personality. The theoretical
foundation for this chapter draws largely from Mondak (2010), and it will rely on a tenquestion “Big Five” personality scale (Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann 2003). In line with
Mondak’s work, here both the direct effect of personality on reciprocal attitudes, as well
as the indirect effect of personality mediated through “social” and “ideological” partisan
identity, will be examined. Chapter Seven concludes, discussing the results in the context
of the academic and popular debate on polarization as well as the theoretical and
empirical research in deliberative democracy.
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CHAPTER 2
RECIPROCITY AND ITS ROLE IN PUBLIC DISCOURSE
“When citizens and accountable officials disagree, and also recognize that they are
seeking deliberative agreement, they remain willing to argue with one another with the
aim of achieving provisionally justifiable policies that they can recognize as such”
-

Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, 1996

According to the New York Times’ David Brooks, American politics today
nothing more than “good-versus-evil bloodsport” (2016a). Echoing sentiments widely
shared across much of the pundit class, the conservative columnist feels that modern
campaigns are marked by “single storyism,” where policy differences are viewed by
others as having “false allegiances” and being “complicit in a system of oppression,”
(2016b). In a similar vein, Frank Bruni argues that current political discourse is imbued
“with a vulgarity that’s absolutely breaktaking,” including “surreal” and “sickening” ad
hominin attacks and red herring references to genitalia size (2016a). For him, American
politics is moreover in an “era of irresolution,” where electoral processes yield “cries of
illegitimacy and a determination to neuter the victor,” not compromise or acceptance
(2016b). What’s more, William Galston contends that the hallmark of politics is now
“legislative gridlock and damage[d] trust and confidence in political institutions,” causing
“observers question America's ability to govern itself as the times require,” (2014).
These commentators give varying perspectives on the cause of these troubles, who or
what should be blamed, and how to fix them. They all contend, though, that there is a
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bellicosity, crudeness, and moral certitude in our political discourse that needs to be
changed.
Changed to what, though? In contrast to the vitriolic rhetoric decried by Brooks,
Bruni, and Galston, the “deliberative polls” developed by James Fishkin (1995; 2011)
and colleagues offer an alternative, seeking to establish a more cooperative tone for
collective political reasoning. Deliberative polls are multi-day forums, where randomly
sampled participants engage in intensive discussion of a set of policy issues. Participants
are given issue briefing materials and access to experts for questioning. Moderators are
trained to facilitate “informed and balanced discussion” and “establish an atmosphere
where participants listen to each other in a safe public space [where] no one is permitted
to dominate the discussion” (Fishkin 2011, 26). The participants are polled both before
and after the deliberative event; the poll results afterwards, Fishkin argues, reflect “the
considered judgment of the public” (1995, 162). In the dozens of deliberative polls he
has conducted, he consistently finds with participants significant opinion change, greater
consensus, more knowledge of the issues at hand, and greater respect for different
perspectives (2011).
Others have constructed similar deliberative forums, with similar discussion
guidelines for participants. For example, in a 1998 deliberative forum entitled Americans
Discuss Social Security, organizer Dr. Carolyn Lukensmeyer articulated that “every
person’s voice is heard who’s in this room,” “everyone is listened to and respected,” and
that participants should adopt a “spirit of open-heartedness and open-mindedness,”
(Barabas 2004, 691, emphasis in original). For another example, in facilitation materials
available from the National Issues Forums Institute (which supports community-led
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deliberative forums across the country), moderators are told to instruct participants that
“everyone is encouraged to participate” and “examine the pros, cons, and potential tradeoffs of each approach,” and that “listening is an important as talking” (NIFI 2014).
Fishkin contends that the discursive guidelines give the results of deliberative forums “a
recommending force,” as they “are the conclusions people would come to, were they
better informed on the issues and had the opportunity and motivation to examine those
issues seriously” (1995, 162).
These forum guidelines—inclusiveness, open-mindedness, full examination of an
issue, etc.—all point broadly to the general concept of reciprocity. Reciprocity is a key
discursive ideal in deliberative democratic theory, and reciprocity is the conceptual focus
of this project. Thus, this chapter explores its form, potential, and potential limitations.
After defining the term and situating its role in the expansive literature on deliberation,
this chapter defends a “fuzzy” conceptualization of reciprocity, where debates on how
permissive or strict it should be as a discursive standard need not be completely settled.
From there, it defends the importance of reciprocal norms in particular for citizen
discussion. The chapter then explores the theoretical and empirical literature pointing to
the benefits of reciprocity in political discourse, as well as key theoretical and empiricalbased critiques of the concept. The chapter closes by looking at one particular salient
critique offered by Mutz (2008)—that ideally “reciprocal” discussion does not produce
considered, higher-quality decision making, as proponents of deliberative democracy
believe. Here, a discussion of social psychological literature on persuasion can give us
more optimism for the potential of reciprocity than Mutz allows.
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2.1 THE CONCEPT AND BOUNDARIES OF RECIPROCITY
As stated in the previous chapter, deliberative democracy is, at a minimum, about
reason giving. In contrast to an “aggregate” view, where democratic decision making
amounts to individualistic preferences summed through election procedures, deliberative
theory prioritizes collective decision making through processes of claim making,
discussion, and reflection. What’s more, when an empowered entity makes a decision, it
requires justification given to those affected. The normative rationale here is that if Max
Weber is correct that the state is a “monopoly of legitimate physical force” ([1919] 1946,
78), democracy requires some sort of rationale given towards the citizens whom
presumably control and acquiesce to that force.
However, deliberative theorists argue that not just any reason giving or political
discussion will do. “More political talk” is not normatively desirable when, for example,
it is confined to like-minded enclaves, fueling sectarian division rather than consensus
(Sunstein 2003). Neither is more talk beneficial if it reflects existing power dynamics
and further marginalizes minority groups, or if the discourse is effectively ignored once
governmental decisions are made. Instead, political discussion according to these
theorists must be guided by a set of (at times conflicting) values. For example, a basic
discursive prerequisite is the articulation of a diversity of viewpoints. Echoing J.S. Mill’s
contention that intellectual diversity implies that “we have neglected nothing that could
give the truth a chance of reaching us” ([1859] 1978, 20), Manin argues that a clash of
conflicting claims helps citizens “to clarify information,” “sharpen their own
preferences,” and perhaps even “modify their initial objectives, should that prove
necessary” (1987, 351). Closely following the ideal of ideological diversity, Young
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argues that political discourse should be as inclusive as possible. She contends that
deliberative theorists should, in fact, relax stringent communicative standards to allow in
debate forms such as “greeting,” “narrative” and “rhetoric” (2000, Ch. 2), in order to
allow voice for individuals and groups that may be disadvantaged by a strict adherence to
rational argumentation. Other theorists spell out the need for additional requirements,
such as that the discussion has a consequential effect on decision making (Dryzek 2010,
Ch. 1), or that decision making be open to further revision if conditions change (Gutmann
and Thompson 2004).
In a seminal work, though, Gutmann and Thompson (1996) argue that the primary
ideal to guide deliberation should be a norm of reciprocity. This basic moral concept
broadly means that “we should return good for good, in proportion to what we receive,”
(Becker 1986, 4). A complete operationalization for this project is given in Chapter
Three, but broadly, Gutmann and Thompson apply it to the realm of democratic politics
by stating that “when citizens deliberate, they seek out agreement on substantive moral
principles that can be justified on the basis of mutually acceptable reasons,” (1996, 55;
see Ch. 2 of same work for a full account). Recognizing the collective nature of
democratic decision making, political reasoning is given in terms that those that disagree
could, at least in theory, accept. A consensus is sought, but in recognizing the reality of
often-intractable moral disagreement (particularly in contemporary American politics; see
Jacoby 2014), reciprocity only requires the honest effort to forge moral agreement, and
mutual respect for competing legitimate viewpoints when consensus fails. There is thus a
balance in reciprocal discourse between pure self-interest and pure altruism. Unlike
stricter formulations of ideal deliberation (Habermas 1983), Gutmann and Thompson’s
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ideal does not bar personal morality or self-interest from political reason giving.
However, it must be tempered by the requirement of mutual justification to, and mutual
respect for, other citizens. Furthermore, reciprocity applies to empirical claims, allowing
only those that can be mutually seen as acceptable based on “relatively reliable methods
of inquiry” (56). While (as with decision-making broadly) there is not one single
standard here, it does preclude empirical claims that cannot be verified or are strictly
made on authority.
Beyond Gutmann and Thompson (1996), the idea of reciprocity can be found
across the work of deliberative theorists. Its roots are in Habermas’s work on
“communicative rationality,” where ideal discourse (shorn of power dynamics, exclusion,
and strategic behavior) creates understanding and consensus based on the “unforced force
of the better argument,” (1993, 163; see also Habermas 1983). The idea of mutual
acceptability is also found in Rawls’ concept of “public reason” ([1993] 2005); for
Rawls, political discussion should be confined to areas of “overlapping consensus,”
where claims are offered with reasons that can be seen as justifiable to all 4. Dryzek,
similarly, calls for “communicating in terms that those who do not share one’s point of
view can find meaningful and accept,” which encourages “reflection upon preferences in
noncoercive fashion” (2010, 10). Moreover, Mansbridge et al. state that “mutual respect
and equal concern” are “central” to any formulation of deliberative theory (2010, 65-6).
Like Gutmann and Thompson, they also contend that individual values and self-interest,
constrained by principles of reciprocity, can play a role in the deliberative process.
4

This similarity aside, deliberative democrats such as Gutmann and Thompson disagree with Rawls on the
procedure for determining the content of “public reason.” As a “constitutionalist,” they contend, Rawls
only has us figure out what qualifies as public reason through private reflection, while Gutmann and
Thompson insist that “if we are to increase our chances of resolving moral disagreements, we must not
check our deliberative dispositions at the door to the public forum,” (1996, 38).
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In their work (1996), Gutmann and Thompson situate reciprocity between two
other norms of political decision making—“impartiality” and “prudence.” With
reciprocity, there is not one standard for political agreement; the content of consensus
depends on the particular parties (and their vantage points) involved. With impartiality,
however, decisions are made based on a single moral standard and apply universally. In
other words, it implies that there is a “right answer,” and all we need to do is find it;
anything short of this is a deliberative failure. Following an ideal of impartiality, thus,
requires citizens to have pure altruism and prevents one from drawing on not just selfinterest but also a personal moral worldview with political reason giving. On the other
end of the spectrum, a discursive ideal of prudence acknowledges the reality of moral
pluralism, but it forgoes any effort to explore these differences or forge a consensus on
shared values. While reciprocity requires the acknowledgement of the legitimacy of
moral disagreement, and a good faith consideration of countervailing views, prudence
only asks for us to merely tolerate diverging opinion. Those we disagree with, in other
words, are and remain wrong, and the only concessions given to them (beyond mere
toleration) are through a strategic bargaining process.
Moving too closely to impartiality fails to acknowledge the legitimate differences
in moral values citizens have. With regard to very divisive issues of the day (abortion,
transgender rights, gun control, etc.), it thus asks us to either take a universalistic (and
dogmatic) position, or to not deliberate these issues at all. Gutmann and Thompson do,
though, acknowledge that there is a role for prudence and bargaining in the broad
spectrum of real-world political discourse. When deliberation reveals a pre-existing
value consensus, there is no need to bridge moral differences, and bargaining to resolve
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disputes on details is appropriate. Moreover, when deliberation reveals irreconcilable
moral claims, such as for very divisive issues, prudential bargaining is again necessary; to
do nothing at that point would arbitrarily privilege the status quo (Warren and
Mansbridge 2013; Gutmann and Thompson 2012). With differences too great to bridge,
Gutmann and Thompson (1996) contend that decision makers should, while maintaining
their moral convictions, seek “an economy of moral disagreement” through negotiation,
and remain open-minded to the possibility for greater future consensus. Likewise, many
deliberative scholars more recently have acknowledged the necessity of “deliberative
negotiation” when reciprocal efforts at forging consensus fail (Mansbridge et al. 2010;
Warren and Mansbridge 2013). They argue that deliberative consensus should always be
the first option, but barring this voting or negotiation procedures are acceptable ways to
resolve disagreement. These “non-deliberative” procedures, scholars now argue, can be
seen as components of a deliberative framework if they are guided by the same
principles—mutual respect, open-mindedness, limiting of power disparities, etc.—that
guide reciprocal moral deliberation.
Indeed, the line between “deliberative” and “not deliberative” is fuzzy at best,
drawn at different places by different scholars. As deliberative democracy is
increasingly being used as a theoretical lens to examine real world communication (Ryfe
2005), many scholars have in turn stretched the concept of deliberation, incorporating
seemingly non-ideal aspects of decision making such as fair bargaining (Warren and
Mansbridge 2013), self-interest, power, and voting procedures (Mansbridge et al. 2010).
Warren even argues that deliberative institutions should not focus on open-minded and
good-faith argumentation—values fundamental to reciprocity. He instead claims that
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“from the point of view of democratic institutions and systems, we should be more
interested in outcomes of communication than communicative intent” (2007, 278,
emphasis added). In contrast, as Bächtiger et al. (2010) point out, other scholars have
remained truer to the strict standards of communicative rationality that earlier
deliberative theorists posited. An example of this is the Discourse Quality Index, which
is designed to compare legislative deliberation against a counterfactual of discursive
ideals articulated by Habermas. Steenbergen et al. (2003) develop this measure and
envision its use in both assessing how deliberative institutions could be improved as well
as how deliberation affects policy outcomes.
Bächtiger et al. suggest that this “dual tendency to construe deliberation both too
broadly and too narrowly can lead to serious confusion” (2010, 33). More cynically,
some suggest that this makes deliberation a “moving target” and unproductive as a field
of study (Mutz 2008, 527). As such, theorists will continue to develop and refine their
normative standards. That being said, for much of the recent work on deliberative theory,
completely clearing up this confusion is not necessary. Over the past couple of decades,
deliberative democratic theory has “'come of age' as a complete theory of democracy
rather than a simple ideal of legitimacy” (Bohman 1998, 401). Scholars have
increasingly moved beyond a focus on theoretical development, examining empirically
how deliberation manifests in policy forums, governmental institutions, and
communication between citizens (Dryzek 2010, Ch. 1) 5. This line of research certainly
must, as Bächtiger et al. insist, avoid the extremes of both over specification and under
specification of deliberative standards. Deliberation cannot be simply “all talk.” At that
5

For examples of this empirical inquiry, see Fishkin 1995, Barabas 2004, Jackman and Sniderman 2006,
Mendelberg and Karpowitz 2007, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002, and List et al. 2012, among others. For
reviews of this literature, see Ryfe 2005, Delli Carpini, Cook, and Jacobs 2004, and Thompson 2008.
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point it ceases to be an ideal and simply describes something that already exists; political
communication happens every day. At this extreme, one fails to see how the benefits of
deliberation theorists have articulated, vis a vis “everyday talk,” would materialize. At
the other extreme, ideals of deliberation cannot be too overly specified, demanding
standards of rationality, selflessness, and non-coercion that are impossible or nearly
impossible to meet. Even as a critical ideal, it would be difficult to obtain empirical
traction with a conceptual standard that demands, to quote James Madison in Federalist
#51, that citizens become “angels.” It also runs the risk of excluding marginalized modes
of communication and perspectives that fail to meet an “angelic” standard—perspectives
that need to be included if deliberation is to maintain its democratic legitimacy (Young
2000).
In addition, as Thompson insists, “researchers must be clear about what practice
they are investigating,” (2008, 501). It is acceptable (and even likely) to have differing
empirical results for “looser” or “stricter” definitions of deliberation, as long as scholars
acknowledge that their results apply to their conceptualization. Ideal deliberation is a
nuanced idea, and differing conceptualizations of what it means can help produce a
nuanced, collective picture of its role and potential for society. Overgeneralizations
based on a single operationalization of deliberation (or even a single study) obfuscate this
nuance. These caveats aside, while there is still plenty of room for theorists to refine
deliberative standards, some diversity and “fuzziness” of deliberation as a working theory
is perfectly acceptable for empirical inquiry.
More to the point of this project, the general standards of reciprocity outlined
earlier, even if they remain “fuzzy” at the edges between “impartiality” and “prudence”,
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also suffice. We can, for example, take the reciprocal ideal of “public reason”—the
effort to offer claims that can be seen as legitimate by all reasonable citizens—seriously
without an exact specification of which individuals or groups are “reasonable” or
“unreasonable.” Likewise, we can have reciprocity demand tolerance towards diverse
perspectives without stipulating specifically at what point a perspective ceases to be
worthy of tolerance. This is particularly true with regard to studying deliberation in the
public, the scope of this project. Given the fact that the American public often falls short
of even loosely defined deliberative ideals (even the strongest supporters of deliberation
would admit as such), reciprocity can remain a concept “fuzzy” at the edges while
providing empirical traction for inquiry into what factors contribute or detract from its
realization.
2.2 DELIBERATION AND THE PUBLIC
Often, scholarship on deliberation focuses on discursive norms for small scale,
formal political institutions. A reason for that is, for deliberative democracy to matter, it
cannot be just “idle talk;” it has to be, as Dryzek argues, “consequential” in government
decision making. Many empirical studies on deliberation thus either examine decision
making practices of legislative bodies (Bächtiger et al. 2007) or specific empowered
public bodies such as juries (Schkade, Sunstein, and Kahneman 1999) and advisory
boards (Warren and Gastil 2015). This being said, most scholars correctly argue that
deliberative democracy is an idea that applies to elites and citizens alike. Dryzek (2010),
for example, argues that a key part of a deliberative system is a vibrant, inclusive “public
space, ideally hosting free-ranging and wide ranging communication,” which plays a
consequential role in influencing the “empowered space” of policymaking (2010, 11).
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The “public space” consists of all manner of formal and information political
participation, including policy forums, traditional and social media, and face to face
political talk. If it is unfeasible for the public writ large to deliberate directly in
policymaking decisions, engaged “public space” political discussion can nonetheless
work to ensure that all legitimate perspectives are represented in policymaking processes
(Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008). In a similar vein, Mansbridge and colleagues (2012) take a
“systematic” approach, seeking to reconcile ideals of collective deliberative discourse
with the reality of large-scale, representative democracy. A “deliberative system” is
comprised of many points of political communication—legislative bodies, media,
campaigns, and interpersonal public political talk are all included. For them, the point is
less to measure each component against a uniform set of discussion ideals, but to assess
the quality and inclusiveness of discourse and decision making for the system as a whole.
Even seemingly non-deliberative discourse can contribute to the overall health of the
system. For example, partisan media, they argue, can facilitate deliberation in other
venues, as this media can clarify policy differences and facilitate engagement in the
political process.
In addition, normative calls for reciprocity have a place in guiding public, not just
elite, rhetoric. “Everyday talk,” certainly, is different from deliberation in governing
bodies; while the latter is focused on a binding consensus and decision making
implemented with the force of law, public discussion leads to “decision making” that is
collective but not consensual, and it influences government action only indirectly
(Mansbridge 1999). Thus, it is unrealistic to expect the same standards of public reason,
open-mindedness, and noncoercion in the public as with the legislature. That being said,
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the difference between ideals of reciprocity in these two domains is “not in kind but only
in degree” (Mansbridge 1999, 228), and the “fuzzy” standards for reciprocity outlined
above have a place guiding citizen political talk in a deliberative democracy. This is
because, for one, the public and the political elite inhabit the same social and cultural
context, and widespread open-mindedness or intransigence in public political culture can
impact future elites’ attitudes towards dialogue and decision making. The “rhetorical
cue” elites can take from the public is further enhanced by the formal dependence of
elites on the public’s support via the electoral connection (Mayhew 2004 [1974]) as well
as the demonstrated responsiveness of elites to public opinion (Erikson, MacKuen, and
Stimson 2002). If representatives engage in pork barrel spending or adopt policy
positions to demonstrate responsiveness to their constituents (Mayhew 2004 [1974]), it is
reasonable to suspect they adopt their constituents’ preferred rhetorical style or attitude
toward ideological difference as well.
Further, despite presumptions to the contrary, the public does engage in political
discussion more than commonly presumed (Cook, Delli Carpini, and Jacobs 2007). If
deliberative discussion norms can lead, as theorists posit, to better informed, higher
quality opinions and decisions for elite policymakers, they can certainly do so for the
majority of the public that engages in political talk. Public opinion can then encourage
elites to produce better informed, higher quality policymaking. Given the literature’s
dismal portrayal of the average American’s political reasoning ability (Converse 1964;
Achen and Bartels 2016), and the often ad-hoc nature of the policymaking process
(Kingdon 2011), this is no small benefit. Finally, as a critical ideal, a deliberative
democracy that takes both the word “deliberative” and the word “democracy” seriously
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requires widespread, and reciprocal, public political participation. While there is a clear
tension between fostering both engaged participation and ideal standards of deliberation
(Mutz 2006), it is up to deliberative theorists and empirical researchers to explore how
institutional reform and changing cultural context can help move us closer to this ideal.
2.3 BENEFITS, AND CRITIQUE, OF DELIBERATION
The “deliberative turn” in political theory and empirical political science is driven
by a strong belief in the benefits it can bring to a polity. For one, theorists argue that
deliberative decision making has greater normative legitimacy than decisions made by
fiat (Benhabib 1996). Policies that are collectively made by, and accountable to, the
governed through discussion and justification are inherently more “democratic” that
policies made by fiat through empowered leaders or representatives (even if they are
elected). Citizens also perceive a greater legitimacy in the decisions when they are
“treated not merely as objects of legislation…but as autonomous agents who take part in
the governance of their own society” (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 3). This is
particularly valuable in heterogeneous societies like the United States, where scarcity of
resources, reasonable moral pluralism, and the necessity of collective action make
political disagreement inevitable. Deliberation can reveal lines of consensus across
individuals’ moral values, and clarify differences as well as create “an economy of
disagreement” when consensus is not possible (Gutmann and Thompson 1996). Through
the consideration of a diversity of perspectives, moreover, decisions made are in an
important sense “better” because they incorporate more information and follow the most
meritorious arguments (Gastil 2000, 23-5). Theorists also argue that citizens engage in
learning with this deliberative process and become more knowledgeable and civic
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oriented (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, Ch. 8). They moreover contend that citizens
become tolerant and empathetic (Mendelberg 2002).
Some of the claims made above are purely deductive and not amenable to
empirical testing. The empirical evidence assessing the other contentions is, to be sure,
mixed and context dependent (Delli Carpini, Cook, and Jacobs 2004; Mendelberg 2002).
Some studies show that deliberation can at times, instead of producing consensus,
exacerbate disagreement (Mendelberg and Oleske 2000), produce attitude polarization
(Jackman and Sniderman 2006), or encourage attendance to group norms rather than
argument strength (Mendelberg and Karpowitz 2007). However, there is enough
research to suggest that, at least at times, citizen deliberation can produce salutary
outcomes. For example, a key testable claim from theorists is a tendency towards (but
not necessarily requirement of) consensus. Fishkin’s numerous deliberative polls attest to
the viability of this empirical implication (Fishkin 1995; 2011), as he finds that
participants often reach greater consensus, as well as have a significant change in their
opinion, as a result of deliberation. Critically, these deliberative polls also find that
citizens are more knowledgeable about the issue at hand as a result of deliberation; this is
a finding echoed by a similarly constructed deliberative forum set up by Barabas (2004).
In Barabas’ research, participant consensus is accompanied by significant learning, in a
way that ordinary discussion is not. As a result, he contends that deliberation produces
“enlightened consensus,” not merely groupthink or group polarization. Moreover,
barring complete consensus or erstwhile substantive agreement, List et al. (2012) show
that discussion through deliberative procedures can help overcome social choice
dilemmas that can hamper voting-based decision making (see Arrow 1951). Through a
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meta-analysis of polling from nine deliberative forums, they find that deliberation
increases the “proximity to single-peakedness” on the preference ordering of issue
alternatives, particularly for forum participants engaging in the most amount of learning.
Other examples of benefits found through empirical research on deliberation include
greater political efficacy (Nabatchi 2010), increased tolerance (Mutz 2006), and
resistance to manipulation from elite framing (Druckman and Nelson 2003).
This all being said, there have been a number of critiques, both normative and
empirical, leveed against deliberative democracy and its call for reciprocal standards of
discourse. Broadly, the main normative critique is that deliberative ideals ignore the role
power plays in political life, and how power and hierarchy can disrupt efforts at noncoercive decision making. The roots of this critique are in the work of Foucault, who
insisted that the omnipresence of power can be obfuscated by seemingly benign or
objective language and social norms. For him, “power is not something that is acquired,
seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip away; power is
exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of non-egalitarian and mobile
relations,” (1978, 94). In the context of political decision making, then, this point
suggests that standards such as “rationality” or “mutual respect” are more effective at
squelching dissent than fostering legitimate, inclusive consensus. This suppression,
critics have asserted, happens on both the left and the right. For instance, many argue
that deliberative democracy disadvantages already marginalized groups that lack the
resources to access deliberative decision making institutions, or the tools and training to
effectively (“rationally”) participate in these institutions (Sanders 1997; Young 2000). It
thus preserves a conservative status quo. Others, in turn, assert that requirements of
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reciprocity and mutual respect disadvantage religious claims (or any other claims not
amenable to reflection and revision) in deliberation, thus privileging a liberal, secular
status quo (Fish 1999).
Deliberative theorists themselves even acknowledge that power is unavoidable;
Mansbridge et al. point out that politics without coercion “is not only impossible to
achieve but even hard to envision. We are all the products of power relations and exercise
power by our very presence in the world” (2010, 82). These authors suggest that some
use of power-based decision mechanisms, such as voting or bargaining, can be
compatible within a deliberative system that seeks to minimize the influence of power.
Others, however, argue that, as long as there is any significance difference in opinion,
power and self-interest are going to overshadow any efforts at forging moral consensus
(Shapiro 1999). The necessity, and theoretical challenge, of power and coercion in
deliberative democracy is magnified when one moves from small-scale settings, like
forums or town meetings, to a large-scale “deliberative system” conceptualization offered
by Mansbridge and colleagues (2012). Here, “non-deliberative” institutional features
such as representation, voting, and bureaucratic implementation necessarily take a larger
role. Indeed, some as a result argue that deliberation can only work successfully in small,
homogenous community settings (Bryan 2004).
Empirical social scientists have critiqued the “deliberative turn” in political
science as well, arguing that the ideal of deliberative democracy is too unrealistic as to be
useful. Certainly, as a critical ideal, it is acceptable to set deliberative standards that are
attainable but not often met in reality. If those standards are flatly impossible to achieve
in real political settings, however, the relevance of deliberative theory can be called into

40

question. This is what many scholars contend, pointing to the public’s lack of the
requisite knowledge or well developed political preferences necessary for productive
deliberation (Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Achen and Bartels 2016).
Indeed, lampooning the lack of knowledge of the public is a cottage industry for public
opinion scholars and late night comedians alike. Even beyond this, Hibbing and TheissMorse (2002) point to survey and focus group evidence suggesting that the public has a
basic lack of interest in participating in deliberative decision making processes. Their
findings suggest that the U.S. public is uninterested in policy outcomes and averse to
political conflict; instead, it would prefer “a stealth democratic arrangement” led by
“neutral decision makers who do not require sustained input from the people” (7).
Summing up this line of critique, Achen and Bartels (2016) suggest of deliberation that
“most ordinary citizens do not want politics to be more like a philosophy seminar,” (302,
emphasis in original).
M potentially damning to deliberative theory, though, is the assertion that even if
a Habermasian “ideal speech situation” is achieved, the benefits many theorists purport
would not materialize. Mutz, for example, makes the point that persuasive
communication hinges on “characteristics of the listener or message recipient, the
speaker, the message itself, and the context in which the deliberation occurs. Notably,
only one of these sources of influence (the message) should matter in a theory where ‘the
force of the better argument’ is assumed to carry the day,” (2008, 533). She then
catalogues a host of cognitive biases that can carry a discussant away from consensus
based on “the message itself” and towards influences of the listener, the speaker, or
context characteristics. She draws from an extensive literature in social and political
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psychology on selective exposure (Iyengar and Hahn 2009; Levendusky 2013), biased
interpretation of objective information (Lord, Ross, and Lepper 1979; Gaines et al. 2007),
the primacy of affect in cognition and attitude formation (Zajonc 1984; Lodge and Taber
2013), among other biases. In an earlier work (2006), she also suggests that achieving a
more deliberative discourse may come at the cost of encouraging public political
participation. Drawing on a pair of national surveys, she demonstrates that, while
exposure to disagreement through one’s social network (a requisite for deliberative
discourse) fosters greater tolerance, it also depresses the likelihood of voting as well as
participating in other political activities. Based on this and the other disconfirming
previous evidence she reviews, Mutz concludes that deliberative democracy does not
meet the standards for “productive social theory,” (2008, 535).
2.4 RECIPROCITY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF PERSUASION
In sum, both theorists and empiricists have offered strong arguments against both
the viability and desirability of political discourse guided by ideals of deliberation. A full
discussion of these authors’ critiques is beyond the scope of this chapter. Although more
in the way of normative assessment is offered in the conclusion, the goal of this project is
to analyze how partisan polarization impacts the public’s willingness to embrace the
deliberative ideal of reciprocity, not to assess the ideal as such. That being said, Mutz’s
(2008) critique is particularly urgent, as it calls into question the value of any research on
deliberative democracy. It also reflects a decades-old cynicism of citizen reasoning that
guides most public opinion inquiry. However, as I will discuss below, social psychology
research on persuasion can provide some optimism that deliberative democracy may be
“productive social theory.”
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While consensus is not required from the ideal deliberative setting advanced here
or by theories from most “post-Habermasian” deliberative theorists (Bächtiger et al.
2010), and ideal deliberation has a host of purported benefits beyond opinion change or
greater likelihood of consensus, Mutz is correct that, as a critical ideal for deliberation,
the standard of reciprocity must open up the possibility of consensus. She is also correct
in pointing to the difficulty in fostering rational, persuasive consensus, given what we
know about the irrational biases that can influence attitude formation. Drawing from
concepts in social psychology literature, she is questioning whether deliberation can
allow discussants to overcome prejudice and induce potential (non-coercive) persuasion.
The formidable power of group prejudice has been long documented (Allport 1954;
Sherif 1966), and strong prejudices can be fostered in even arbitrary or “minimal” group
pairings (Tajfel et al. 1971). Prejudice can also often work at an unconscious, implicit
level (Nosek et al. 2007), and the research on automaticity suggests it is very difficult, if
not impossible, to control an implicit prejudice once it is activated (Bargh 1999).
This all being said, dual processing theories such as the elaboration likelihood
model (ELM) suggest that, in certain contexts, the effortful thinking encouraged by
deliberative settings can overcome these prejudices (see Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Petty
and Brinol 2008). The ELM conceptualizes processing of arguments as simultaneously
occurring along two cognitive routes—the “peripheral” route and the “central” route.
When one’s ability to process an argument is low (i.e.—one is distracted or has a time
constraint) or one’s motivation to engage in contemplation is low (i.e.—the issue is not
important, or one is not vested in an accurate conclusion), the periphery route dominates,
and individuals primarily use cues such as group prejudice, groupthink, overall source
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credibility, or personal mood to form an opinion. When motivation or ability to process
an argument is high (for example, if one is vested in “the right answer”), the central route
dominates, and one will reflect carefully on the argument at hand 6. When one is engaged
in central route processing, one is more likely to respond to the message strength of an
argument, moving her opinion towards a relatively strong claim (Petty, Cacioppo, and
Goldman 1981)7. Moreover, when persuasive opinion change occurs primarily through
central route processing, the opinion change is longer lasting and more resistant to
subsequent counterarguments (Petty, Haugtvedt, and Smith 1995).
The motivation and ability to engage in central route processing can vary based
on a number of situational factors, many of which ideal deliberation, and reciprocity in
particular, seek to promote. For example, research shows that decision makers are more
likely to engage in accuracy-motivated reasoning, as opposed to peripheral or
“confirmatory” reasoning, when they will held accountable to others who are interested
in accuracy (Lerner and Tetlock 1999). Many deliberative institutions actively foster this
sort of accountability that is sufficient for accuracy-focused, “central route” reasoning;
one such institution is Oregon’s Citizen Initiative Review (CIR). The CIR convenes a
random sample of state citizens to, over the course of five days, deliberate over and offer
an advisory statement on ballot initiatives subsequently given to voters. CIR statements
are mailed to all registered voters in advance of the election; opinion polling of residents

6

This does mean that only the message matters; speaker or context variables still influence the
persuasiveness of a message, but these factors are processed as arguments themselves, not as valence cues.
For example, if a professor is arguing for a policy change, a listener engaging in “central route” processing
would consider the relevance of the professor’s credentials to the claim being made, while a listener
engaging in “peripheral route” processing would rely on the cue of a positive or negative valence towards
professors or intellectuals.
7
Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus (2013) provide evidence of this in a political setting, showing partisans
responding primarily to the strength of a policy-related argument in the absence of partisan cues, and
primarily to partisan cues when they are present.
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shows that the CIR statements both increase the knowledge of and influence the opinions
of voters on the initiatives (Warren and Gastil 2015, 569-571). By requiring a binding
statement that can influence the outcome of ballot initiatives, participants in CIR
deliberations are encouraged to engage in learning and accuracy-motivated thought. In
fact, in an assessment of the CIR efforts to meet ideal standards of deliberation,
participants uniformly reported having “enough information” to make an informed
decision and did “an excellent job of weighing the pros and cons of the measure [at
hand]” (Knobloch et al. 2013, 114-5). What’s more, panelists exhibited mutual
consideration and respect towards opposing views, and many experience a (non-coercive)
change in opinion due to the process (Knobloch et al. 2013). In sum, by engaging in
“consequential” deliberation, CIR participants rely on exploratory thought and central
route information processing, as opposed to relying on cognitive biases, to reach a
collaborative decision.
Research on perspective taking also suggests that the ideal of reciprocity can
overcome prejudice and encourage long-lasting persuasion through Petty and Cacioppo’s
(1986) “central route” argument processing. Reciprocal listening and reason-giving
demands “the active consideration of alternate viewpoints, framings, hypotheses, and
perspectives” (Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000, 708). Studies have found that this sort of
active perspective taking encourages seeing commonalities between one’s self and the
cognitive target (Davis et al. 1996) and discourages stereotyping biases towards both
outgroup and ingroup members (Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000). Moreover, a recent
field experiment by Broockman and Kalla (2016) shows that even a short exercise in
perspective taking can create a long-term reduction in prejudice towards outgroups (in
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their case, the transgender community). In their study based in Miami, canvassers
representing LGBT rights groups went door-to-door to inform voters about a recent, local
anti-discrimination ordinance and efforts to repeal the ordinance through a ballot
referendum. After informing the voter about the ordinance and playing a video giving
pro/con perspectives, the canvasser:
“asked each voter to talk about a time when they themselves were judged negatively
for being different. The canvassers then encouraged voters to see how their own
experience offered a window into transgender people’s experiences, hoping to
facilitate voters’ ability to take transgender people’s perspectives. The intervention
ended with another attempt to encourage active processing by asking voters to
describe if and how the exercise changed their mind” (221).
While this is framed as a “perspective-taking” intervention, here one finds a clear
connection to the deliberative ideal of reciprocity. The canvasser is asking the voter to
connect their own experience to the experience of transgender individuals, and by doing
so is asking the voter to move beyond a self-interested take on the anti-discrimination
ordinance. It encourages the voter to consider what would be viewed as legitimate by the
transgender community, even if her gender identity or values differ from that community.
The canvasser is, in other words, attempting to establish moral common ground between
the voter and the transgender community, or, failing common ground, the canvasser is
encouraging mutual respect across moral difference. And it works; the results show that
those exposed to canvassing had substantially more positive attitudes towards transgender
individuals and more support for the non-discrimination ordinance than a control group
even three months after the intervention. This effect is consistent for both Republican
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and Democrat identifying subjects, and it holds up even after a subset of the treatment
group was shown a television ad attacking the ordinance. The authors theorize that, for
the voters canvassed, reciprocal perspective taking helped to produce the active, “central
route” claim consideration that Petty and colleagues show leads to long-lasting, resistant
attitude change8.
2.5 CONCLUSION
Thus, while Mutz (2008) is correct in pointing to the cognitive biases that impede
deliberation-driven consensus, she is wrong to argue that deliberative democracy is not
“productive social theory.” While the benefits the theory claims do fly in the face of
much previous evidence on attitude formation, other evidence supporting the elaboration
likelihood model of cognition suggests that, with the ability and motivation to do so,
individuals can overcome prejudices and other heuristic biases and experience lasting
opinion change through effortful, “central route” thinking. While context and arguer
characteristics still matter, the strength of a claim plays a more prominent role in central
route processing. And, indeed, a reliance on “central route” thinking seems to be what
the “ideal speech situation” is trying to create. As the Broockman and Kalla (2016) study
demonstrates, incorporating aspects of reciprocity into even a short political discussion
mitigates the biases potentially produced by listener, the speaker, or context—biases
Mutz characterizes as inevitable—and produces lasting persuasion in opinion towards a
maligned outgroup. Certainly, cognitive biases are not easily washed away, and even in

8

Broockman and Kalla, though, are careful to note that their field experiment cannot fully establish which
cognitive mechanisms are at work; subsequent research will be needed to completely support the
mechanism of the change they theorize is at work.
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the most ideal setting they may still appear9. However, research on persuasion suggests
that deliberative settings can give “the message” a fighting chance.
Deliberative settings, however, do not come automatically. This can be seen by
comparing the findings of of Broockman and Kalla (2016) with the generally dour
description of group prejudice and motivated reasoning that comes from most public
opinion research; it can also be seen by comparing Fishkin’s deliberative polls to what
David Brooks calls the “good vs. evil bloodsport” of modern politics (2016a). If there
are benefits to be had, reaping them requires a structural, cultural, and political context
amenable to deliberation. However, research on the conditions that contribute or hinder
public deliberation, while it would create a “clearer sense of its place in democratic
theory and practice,” is underdeveloped (Thompson 2008, 500). For example, how does
the recent rise of partisan polarization impacts the public’s propensity to adopt
deliberative attitudes toward discussion, such as an orientation toward reciprocity? After
a discussion of methods used, this is where the project now turns.

9

In fact, Broockman and Kalla’s research shows that, unlike with transgender issues, perspective taking
does not lead to persuasion on the issue of abortion. More research needs to be done, but they postulate
that this may be because abortion has been a salient social issue for decades, and opinions may be more
crystallized (Glass 2016). Using the framework of Gutmann and Thompson, abortion then may be an issue
where moral disagreement is too strong, and prudential bargaining may be more appropriate.

48

CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
This chapter outlines the data sources and methodological approach of this
project. It also provides a detailed description of the survey instruments and
experimental manipulations employed, as well as a discussion of the analytical approach
that will be used. Subsequent empirical chapters will reference the information in this
chapter. Overall, through the use of an online survey experiment, a telephone survey
experiment of a representative state-based sample, and observational survey data from
representative national surveys, the project maximizes both the internal validity and the
external validity of the results.
3.1 OVERALL APPROARCH
The primary means by which this project assesses the impact of the ideological
and social identity components of partisanship on deliberation is through a series of
survey experiments. After a pilot test, the first is an online experiment of 1,619
respondents conducted during the summer of 2015. The online survey was developed
and administered through Qualtrics web-based survey software, and respondents were
recruited through Amazon’s mTurk human intelligence task service. Each recruited
respondent was paid $0.90 to complete the survey. While this portion was conducted for
a relatively inexpensive cost, there is strong debate as to whether mTurk experiments are
externally valid (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012; Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling
2011; Krupnikov and Levine 2014). Thus, the second experiment was conducted with
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representative telephone sample (802 respondents) of the South Carolina population in
the fall of 2015, partnering with the University of South Carolina’s Institute for Public
Service and Policy Research. Marrying experimental techniques with a representative
sample addresses simultaneously both concerns of internal and external validity (Mutz
2011); as such, replicating results in this way attests to their reliability.
The first experiment is a framing experiment. Here, the relevant considerations
the respondent receives are manipulated, then the respondent answers a series of
questions on political attitudes. Issue or emphasis framing effects experiments like this
have been well developed in studies on partisanship and political communication, notably
by Druckman (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Druckman 2001; Druckman and
Nelson 2003). There is a long lineage of political communication research on framing; a
typical example is framing a question on whether a hate group has the right to conduct a
rally as a “free speech” versus a “public safety” issue, and measuring the difference in
aggregate opinion (Chong and Druckman 2007, 105-6). According to Chong and
Druckman (2007, 115), emphasis framing is conceptually similar to priming in social
psychology literature (eg. Miller and Krosnick 1996; Bargh, Chen, and Burrows 1996),
where what occurs is “a procedure that increases the accessibility of some category or
construct in memory,” (Sherman, Mackie, and Driscoll 1990, 405). Here, I am
suggesting that, for Democrat or Republican respondents, manipulating partisanship as a
consideration one receives (or does not receive) in a frame will affect the salience of
partisanship to them as a social identity. This in turn (per social identity theory) will have
a negative effect on reciprocal attitudes.
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The second set of experiments are interpersonal vignette experiments (see Mutz
2011, Ch. 4). The first two vignettes ask the respondent about a political issue, and then
introduce a counterargument to the respondent’s position on the issue. This approach
draws from Jackman and Sniderman (2006); the key manipulation, though, is that the
counterargument is attributed to either a Democrat, a Republican, or a person without a
party identifier (the respondent will randomly be assigned one of these three groups).
Respondents are then asked a series of questions to see how they responded to the
argument; the hypothesis is that partisans are more likely to respond deliberatively to an
inparty counterargument, and less likely to respond deliberatively to an outparty
counterargument. The final experiment is a representative vignette; a question that
gauges the respondents’ support for candidates that exhibit deliberative behaviors. It
presents a scenario which manipulates whether an inparty candidate (either a Democratic
or Republican) “worked across the aisle” to pass legislation, or simply “worked” to pass
legislation. I expect partisans to be less likely to support inparty candidates that work
across the aisle, and more likely to support candidates that work in opposition to the
opposing party. Text for all three sets of experiments can be found in the Appendix.
The results of these three survey experiments—the framing experiment, the
interpersonal vignettes, and the representative vignette—are compared to over-time
observational data from the American National Election Study (ANES). Conducted
periodically since 1948, these face-to-face interviews of a representative national
population have been a gold standard for public opinion and voting behavior research for
decades. The ANES contains multiple measures for partisanship, political discussion, as
well as other variables of interest such as efficacy and personality. Supplementing
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experimental results with analysis of this data will thus speak to the robustness of the
findings. Also, as discussed in the sections below, many of the items incorporated in the
online and telephone survey experiments have been asked by the ANES over multiple
years. As such, using over time ANES data allows me to speak to how the effects found
in the experiments have manifested over time, as partisan polarization and ideological
sorting/polarization has waxed and waned in the electorate. The project thus makes a
valuable contribution to the debate on mass polarization.
3.2 ON THE CONCEPTS OF RECIPROCITY AND PARTISANSHIP
A pivotal task is to construct valid measures for the key concepts used in the
project, the foremost being reciprocity. While empirical work in deliberative democracy
has been impeded by a failure to agree on what makes a discursive act “deliberative,”
nearly all scholars insist on a basic level of reciprocity (as it is defined here). Adcock and
Collier’s methodological insights can help in fleshing out this concept. In their seminal
paper (2001), they contend that, while the field of political science has advanced
tremendously with regard to research sophistication and attention to causal inference,
inadequate attention has been paid to the foundational issue of measurement validity, or
“whether operationalization and the scoring of cases adequately reflect the concept the
researcher seeks to measure” (529). Obtaining measurement validity for any concept
requires developing a “systemized concept” that reflects on shared understandings of the
concept, developing indicators that consistently and in an unbiased manner measure the
systemized concept, and developing an accurate (qualitative or quantitative) scoring
system for the indicators chosen. Inaccuracies in the connection between systemized
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concepts and indicators, or indicators and scores, result in systematic measurement error
(bias) or random measurement error.
The “systemized concept” of reciprocity used here is, in short, a willingness to
engage in good faith argumentation with those that morally disagree. This is a minimal
standard that most deliberative theorists, even those with weaker requirements for
discussion (Bächtiger et al. 2010), can agree. Drawing from the work of Gutmann and
Thompson (1996; 2004), Thompson (2008), Dryzeck (2010), Bächtiger et al. (2010), and
others, the core components of the concept of reciprocity used here include:


Tolerance of viewpoints one disagrees with (as a necessary, but not sufficient,
aspect of reciprocity)



Acknowledgment of the legitimacy of other viewpoints



A willingness to consider, in good faith, countervailing arguments



Giving reasons/justification in political debate that all, even those that disagree,
can see as legitimate



Having the goal of consensus (while maintaining one’s moral convictions; in
other words, no ‘compromise for compromise’s sake)
The concept of citizen reciprocity consists of two dimensions; first, citizens can

debate issues or receive arguments in everyday life in a reciprocal way. Second, they can
vote or support candidates that are committed to working towards consensus or willing to
change their mind through discussion. Given the necessity of representation in modern
democracy, as well as the emphasis on producing “consequential” (Dryzeck 2010) or
“binding” decisions in deliberation, it is important to consider the extent citizens seek out
deliberative qualities in their political leaders, as well as with everyday talk.
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The “systemized concepts” of partisan identity—ideological partisanship and
partisan social identity—draw on recent literature in partisan social psychology and
“affective” or “social” partisan polarization (Huddy, Mason, and AarøE 2015; Mason
2015; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). While previous studies have debated the extent to
which partisanship is an instrumental or a psychological construct, this recent research
rightly contends that an either/or approach is incomplete, and it conceptualizes and
measures the effects of both aspects of party identification. Ideological partisanship is
the extent to which an individual adopts an overall political ideology that consistently and
strongly adheres to either the Democratic or the Republican party platform. One is, for
example, a “strong” Democrat with regard to ideological partisanship if he or she
consistently expresses strongly liberal opinions on the issues.
Partisan social identity, on the other hand, is the extent to which one thinks of his
or her party as a key part of “who they are,” as well as the extent that affinity with one’s
party (and against the other party) is a primary group affiliation. According to Mason,
partisan social identity:
“means that a partisan behaves more like a sports fan than like a banker choosing an
investment. Partisans feel emotionally connected to the welfare of the party; they
prefer to spend time with other members of the party; and when the party is
threatened, they become angry and work to help conquer the threat, even if they
disagree with some of the issue positions taken by the party. The connection between
partisan and party is an emotional and social one, as well as a logical one” (2015,
129).
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While this construct may be a relatively new one in the literature, it connects to
the description in The American Voter of partisanship as primarily a psychological
attachment (Campbell et al. 1960; see also Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). It also
connects to a long line of political psychology work on the role of partisanship in
information processing and opinion formation (eg. Lodge and Hamil 1986; Lodge and
Taber 2013; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Gaines et al. 2007; Rahn 1993).
3.3 ON OPERATIONALIZING RECIPROCITY AND PARTISANSHIP
In assessing the validity of the link between systemized concepts and
indicators/scores, Adcock and Collier (2001, 538-543) propose three criteria. First is
“content validation,” or the extent that measures used gather the “full content” of the
systemized concept. Second is “convergent/discriminant validation,” or the extent which
measures predicted to be correlated converge on the same result, and measures expected
to be divergent diverge. Finally, there is “nomological/construct validation,” or the
extent to which the measures confirm well-supported hypotheses about the systemized
concepts. This latter validation can only be assessed at the end of this project (and is only
appropriate with hypotheses that have a strong prior backing). “Content” and
“convergent/discriminant” validation, though, were closely considered in choosing
measures for the concepts of reciprocity and partisanship in this project.
With regard to reciprocity, the basic strategy is to employ multiple measures that
tap into aspects of the concept in different ways. With the framing experiment, some of
these measures include multiple choice questions that gauge general attitudes towards
open-mindedness and the value of discussion. In addition, a series of “forced choice”
questions were also included, in an effort to mitigate any social desirability bias that
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comes from wanting to be “open-minded” or “deliberative” (who doesn’t want to be like
that?). Another series of questions measure political tolerance, a necessary condition for
reciprocity, with a measure developed by Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982).
With the interpersonal vignettes, the surveys measure how the respondents
perceive a counterargument to opinions they hold with regard to immigration and civil
liberties. Questions will measure whether the respondent feels that the counterargument
is reasonable and/or worth considering, as well as if the respondent’s opinion moves
towards the counterargument position (or, in other words, towards consensus). These
measures, it is fair to acknowledge, do not capture completely the concept of reciprocity;
they are focused on how individuals receive and respond to political argument, while
much of the deliberative democracy literature focuses on the reason-giving process of
argument. This focus is due to a decision to maximize internal validity, creating clean,
close-ended survey questions and an ability to employ clear, quantitative experimental
analysis10. That being said, the vignettes across two policy domains, tapping into
different facets of the process of receiving and processing political argument, can make
for a strong case for “content validation” and “convergent validation.” Finally, with the
representative vignette, the survey goes beyond the “everyday talk” of the interpersonal
vignettes and measures attitudes toward reciprocity in elite policymaking.
With regard to both ideological partisanship and partisan social identity, multiple
different, yet related measures were also employed in an effort to maximize content
10

Whereas adding measures of the reason-giving aspect of reciprocity would be very complicated,
requiring open-ended questions asking respondents why they hold the opinions they do, or creating a
discussion situation and measuring the reasoning respondents provide in argumentation. While this may be
possible, and it would certainly be an interesting avenue for future research, given concerns of the
subjectivity of argument coding, concerns of social desirability bias in responses, and the fact that other
methods besides a survey experiment are likely better to measure the reason-giving process, the decision
was made with this project to focus primarily on the reason-receiving aspects of reciprocity.
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validation. First, for ideological partisanship, one way this is measured is through the
respondents’ ideological self-identification. Another way is through a series of 11
questions, used to create an ideological index score. Six of these 11 items are items that
have been asked every year in the American National Election Study Times Series study
since 1982. As such, using these questions will allow for the comparison of changes in
ideological partisanship over time with how, in the experiments, ideological partisanship
impacts deliberation. There is also precedent for using these six items to construct
indices of respondent ideology (Mason 2015; Abramowitz 2010; Abramowitz and
Saunders 2008). Moreover, using issue questions to assess ideological extremity, in
addition to an ideological self-identification question, is advantageous because, often,
individuals are attracted to ideological labels for their symbolism rather than their value
as opinion summaries or constraints (Ellis and Stimson 2012). The five additional
questions beyond these six were added based on the 2012 ANES survey data. Principal
component factor analysis was conducted on every pre-election survey item in that
survey that asked a question concerning policy. The questions that loaded highly on the
first factor (which loaded primarily on economic and scope of government questions) and
the second factor (which loaded on gay rights and abortion questions) were included.
Following a technique employed by Carsey and Layman (2002) as well as
Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes (2012), the 11 policy items were then used to create
ideological partisanship scores for each respondent using confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA). This measure assesses respondents' commitment to their party's ideological
platform. For Republicans, a higher score indicates a more conservative ideology, and for
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liberals, a higher score indicates a more liberal ideology. More information on index
construction and CFA results can be found in the Appendix.
Beyond the standard, ANES measure of party identification, partisan social
identity is measured in a number of ways. For instance, the Online Survey has a series of
three questions that come from a 1999 Roper Starch National Survey conducted by Green
and colleagues (see Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002, 37-8). These questions assess
directly how much the respondent sees his/her inparty as part of their identity, or “who
they are.” As in the Roper Starch survey, these three questions will be used to create an
index of partisan social identity. The telephone survey will use a different, yet similar
series of four questions to assess feelings on partisan identity developed by Huddy,
Mason, and AarøE (2015). By using two different measures in the Online and Telephone
Survey, content validation is maximized, as the project can assess whether results hold up
across survey mediums as well as across operationalizations of partisan social identity 11.
In addition to these social identity indices, there are a series of questions in the
Online Survey that measure the felt emotion toward the Democratic and Republican
parties. These are almost directly based on the “candidate affect” questions that are
found in the ANES. This is useful as a second operationalization, as emotion
(particularly, outgroup anger) is a signifier of group identity salience (Mackie, Devos,
and Smith 2000). Moreover, as these questions are also asked in the ANES, these
questions can be used to compare the experimental results here with the observational
ANES data through time.

11

Pure replication will not be sacrificed, though, as both the online and telephone survey ask the standard,
ANES partisan identification measure. As such, I can see if the online survey results for partisans (based
on the ANES measure) replicate based on identical questions in the telephone survey.
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3.4 ONLINE SURVEY INSTRUMENT
The ordering of the questionnaire is listed in Table 3.1 below:
Table 3.1 Structure of Online Survey Questionnaire
Section Order
1. Ideological Partisanship Questions
2. Partisan Social Identity Questions
3. “Big Five” (TIPI) Personality Scale
4. Screener Question
5. Efficacy Questions
6. Discussion Group Questions
7. Framing Experiment - Manipulation
8. Framing Experiment – Reciprocity Questions
9. Interpersonal Vignette
10. Representative Vignette
11. Demographic Questions
1. Ideological Partisanship Questions: This ideological self-identification question, and
the 11 issue questions, are discussed in the section above. They are asked first in
order to prevent any of the questions about partisanship from causing the respondents
to sort their answers with the “correct” party view (see Druckman, Peterson, and
Slothuus 2013; Levendusky 2009, Ch. 5), biasing the results.
2. Party Social Identity questions: This includes, first, the standard ANES partisan
identification measure, and then a three-question measure of partisan social identity
developed by Green et al. (2002). The exact questions the respondent receives hinges
on his/her response to the ANES measure. For those that identify or “lean”
Democratic, they get questions concerning their social identification with the
Democratic Party. For those that identify or lean Republican, they get Republican
social identification questions.
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These questions are discussed further in the section above. It is important to
ask these questions, as well as all other questions that could be influenced by the
experimental manipulation, early. If these questions were later in the survey, there
would be concern that the experimental stimuli would influence how these questions
are answered (see Gerber and Green 2012, Ch. 2). Thus, asking about partisan social
identity here maximizes the chance of getting an unbiased response.
3. Efficacy Questions: These are standard questions for efficacy used by the ANES.
Efficacy is a key construct to measure; a “deliberative democracy” requires a
citizenry that is not only participating in politics in the “right” (ie – reciprocal) way.
It requires that the citizenry actively participates in a consequential way (see Young
2000, Dryzeck 2010); Mutz (2006), however, suggests that there is a direct tension
between deliberation and participation. A key prerequisite for participation that Mutz
and others, though, do not explore is efficacy, or believing that your voice will make
a difference. I expect that “socially polarized” respondents will have higher levels of
efficacy, as previous research shows they have higher levels of political engagement
(Huddy, Mason, and AarøE 2015). As such, “discriminant validation” hinges on the
extent that this measure negatively correlates with the measures of reciprocity below.
4. Discussion Group questions: This question text draws from Mutz (2002; 2006), and
are designed to see if the impact of partisan social identity on reciprocal attitudes is
mitigated by exposure to out-partisans in one’s discussion network. The questions
ask respondents to name up to three people they often discuss politics with, as well as
the respondents’ perception of their political affiliation.
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5. Ten-Item (TIPI) “Big Five” Personality Measure: Next will be a brief index
developed by Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann (2003) to assess the respondent’s
personality along the “Big Five” personality dimensions. This will serve two
purposes; first, it will allow one to assess the differences in responses to treatment
across personality types. Drawing on Mondak 's discussion of personality and
tolerance (2010), I expect that respondents that score high on the “openness to
experience” personality trait will be more likely to exhibit reciprocal attitudes.
Second, they serve as a buffer between the party social identity questions and the rest
of the questionnaire. The non-political personality questions may erode any priming
effect the party ID questions create. If the erosion does not work or is only partial,
though, that would only weaken my results, as the impact of the experimental
manipulation would be weaker in that case.
6. Screener Question: Here, and once again at the end of the survey, there is a screener
or “paying attention” question. Following Berinsky, Margolis, and Sances (2014),
those that fail the screener will not be thrown out of the analysis, but the analysis can
show results for a full sample and a sample not including the “screened out”
individuals.
7. Framing Experiment, Experimental Manipulation: Before the next set of questions,
the questionnaire will include a preamble/information page. Following work from
Druckman et al. (2013) and Levendusky (2009, Ch. 5), there will be three versions of
the preamble—a “non-partisan,” “partisan,” and “partisan polarization” version.
Three equal sized groups will be randomly assigned to each version. Moving from
the “nonpartisan” towards the “partisan polarization” frame, I expect to see the frame
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creating weaker attitudes of reciprocity. With the mTurk survey, there are other
potential ways to introduce partisan frames, including using pictures and multimedia.
However, the end goal for this survey was to replicate, as closely as possible, findings
with a telephone survey. Thus, here I opt for a simple, text-based frame, where the
text can be easily read by a telephone interviewer down the line.
8. Framing Experiment, General Reciprocity Questions: These questions seek to tap the
respondents’ general attitude towards reciprocal political discussion. Admittedly,
social desirability bias looms large here; of course, everyone will want to say that
they keep an open mind. However, if there is a response to treatment from high
partisan social identity salience (High PSI) respondents, despite the bias in the
answers, that still creates a valid result. The reciprocity questions will be asked in
three ways;


First, there are four “agree/disagree” statements concerning general
predispositions



Second, there are four “forced choice” responses. These may be better than
the “agree/disagree;” they present two desirable options that the respondent
must choose from, and thus mitigate social desirability bias



Finally, there are a series of questions that tap into political tolerance using the
“least liked” approach developed by Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982).
As mentioned earlier, tolerance is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of
reciprocity.
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These questions were developed to tap into as many of the aspects of the
construct of reciprocity as possible. I expect that High PSI respondents will respond
the most to the treatment of partisan frames.
9. Interpersonal Vignettes: The vignettes are discussed in the “Methodological
Approach” section above. While specific hypotheses are discussed and tested in the
next chapter, I expect the strongest response to the vignettes will come from High PSI
respondents. The counterarguments for the “immigration” vignette draw from recent
newspaper articles (Gearen 2015; Hook 2015). The “civil liberties” vignette draws
from a recent Pew Research Center survey (2014).
10. Representative Vignette: With this vignette, the respondent is given a scenario where
her representative is working to increase domestic energy production. It is a 2x2
vignette design; the manipulations consist of whether it is a Democratic or
Republican representative, and whether the representative is “working across the
aisle,” or simply “working” toward this policy goal. This vignette prompt is
developed wholly by the author. Text for both the interpersonal and representative
vignettes can be found in the Appendix.
11. Demographic Questions: The few basic demographic questions here will help to
assess the comparability of the treatment and control groups, as well as the
comparison of this survey to the telephone survey. Analyzing the results using these
controls can also increase the efficiency of the results.
3.5 TELEPHONE SURVEY INSTRUMENT
The telephone survey will be conducted in partnership with the University of
South Carolina’s Institute for Public Service and Policy Research. Since the spring of
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1990, twice a year the Institute conducts a representative telephone survey of roughly 800
South Carolina residents (incorporating both a landline and a cell phone sampling frame),
where questions are included by clients for a fee 12. The clients include researchers,
policymakers, nongovernmental organizations, businesses, and anyone else that has an
interest in the opinion of South Carolina residents. Data collection occurred from April
to June in 2016.
Due to budget constraints, only a handful of key items could be included in this
telephone survey. Thus, the Telephone survey only replicates the “civil liberties”
interpersonal vignette, as well as the representative vignette. The latter was included in
the Telephone Survey verbatim. The question wording and experimental manipulation of
the “civil liberties” interpersonal vignette was included verbatim; the only change made
here was to the response choice. To facilitate ease of response via telephone, the “0-10”
scale in the Online Survey was changed into a 5-point, “Strongly Agree” through
“Strongly Disagree” scale. Thus, responses for partisans (measured through the ANES
party ID scale) can be directly compared to responses in the Online Survey. In addition,
instead of the Green et al. (2002) partisan social identity scale, the telephone survey
incorporates four questions on partisan social identity developed by Huddy, Mason, and
AarøE (2015). In addition to providing a different operationalization of partisan social
identity, the Huddy et al. scale assesses social identity with regards to being
“independent” as well as to third parties. Thus, it can assess whether the hypothesized
effect of partisan social identity apply to independents13 and those outside the two-party

12

The Institute also asks a series of demographic questions, as well as incorporates the ANES partisan
identity scale that is included in the Online Survey in this project.
13
Unlike in the online survey, in the telephone survey independent “leaners” will be asked about the
independent partisan social identification. As such, while the online survey will assess the extent to which

64

system. Finally, the ideological partisanship scale is not included in the Telephone
Survey; only the results as they pertain to partisan social identity could be replicated.
3.6 ANALYTICAL STRATEGY
I am primarily interested in the conditional average treatment effect (CATE) for
different partisan subgroups, based on the measures of partisan social identity salience
and ideological partisan attachment. In both the Online and Telephone surveys, both the
PSI and ideological partisanship measures are used to divide partisan respondents into
binary “high” and “low” subgroups at the medians. Following Gerber and Green (2012),
this approach is taken because, as opposed to being evenly distributed across the range of
values, most respondents are near the median of these measures (see Appendix for
details). A simple, clean comparison across two subgroups thus avoids an unwarranted
assumption of linear effects that would come with treating the measures as continuous.
As the measures of reciprocity are all ordinal, analysis is primarily conducted
through ordered logistic regression. Again following Gerber and Green (2012; see also
Rothwell 2005), treatment effect heterogeneity is assessed through the use of interaction
terms. Indicators of vignette group are interacted with dummy PSI and ideological
partisanship measures; a 1 on these measures indicates that a respondent’s score is above
the median. These interaction terms provide a formal test of the significance of differing
responses to the vignettes across subgroups. The regression models also include a host of
control variables to improve the efficiency of treatment effect estimate; more information
on these variables can be found in the Appendix. Any additional analysis not done
through regression is conducted through simple comparison of means or proportions

independent “leaners” behave like closeted partisans (Keith et al. 1992), the telephone survey will assess
the extent to which “being independent” is a psychological group identity.
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across experimental groups, with significance assessed through nonparametric tests such
as χ2 tests.
The experimental results are also assessed against observational data analysis
from the ANES. This observational analysis is in part descriptive (for example, what do
the experiment results imply about mass polarization over time, given changes in the
levels of social identity and ideological polarization?) as well as replicative (for example,
do regression-based analyses of ANES data tell a similar story as compared to the
experimental results?).
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CHAPTER 4
DELIBERATE WITH THE ENEMY?
“There’s nothing short of Trump shooting my daughter in the street and my
grandchildren — there is nothing and nobody that’s going to dissuade me from voting for
Trump.”
-

Lola Butler, Donald Trump supporter from Mandeville, LA (quoted in
Barbaro, Parker, and Martin 2016)

Throughout the 2016 Presidential election campaign, it appeared that Donald
Trump is doing everything he could to lose the Presidential Election. To give a partial
account (off the top of the author’s head), just in this election season Trump has periodshamed a debate moderator, alluded to his penis size in a debate, mocked a disabled
reporter, feuded with a Gold Star family, refused to immediately disavow support from
ex-Klansman David Duke, tweeted an anti-Sematic picture of Hillary Clinton, suggested
that “Second Amendment people” could stop Hillary Clinton, argued that Barack Obama
is the “founder of ISIS” and had a role in a mass shooting in Orlando, suggested that
Muslim Americans cheered the 9/11 attacks, suggested that a federal judge could not
possible be impartial due to his Mexican-American heritage, repeatedly encouraged
violence against protestors at his rallies, and has had a tape leak where he brags about
committing sexual assault. He has refused to release his tax returns (standard practice for
candidates since the 1970’s), and PoliFact found that 78% of his campaign statements are
false, “mostly false,” or “pants on fire” (Sharockman 2016). Beyond these statements,
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the pillars of his policy platform are either unconstitutional (i.e., his proposal to ban
Muslims from entering the United States) or immoral and unworkable (i.e., Muslim ban,
proposal to deport all illegal immigrants and build a wall across Mexico). Moreover,
while Trump needed the Republican base to turn out in droves to have a shot at winning
the election, Trump’s other policy proposals sharply cut against Republican orthodoxy.
While he does have some typical Republican positions, his anti-free trade and isolationist
foreign policy stances are closer to Bernie Saunders than Paul Ryan.
And yet the Republican electorate voted for him. In a Fox News Poll conducted
the first week of October 2016, 81% of Republican registered voters said they will vote
for Trump in November, comparable to the 83% of Democrat registered voters who said
they will vote for Clinton (who, safe to say, has flaws of her own) (Fox News 2016).
Trump and Clinton were both historically rare for Presidential candidates for their low
favorability ratings; as of the first week of August 2016, 39% of the adult public had a
favorable view of Clinton, and 32% had a favorable view of Trump. Despite this, 73% of
Democrat identifiers and leaners had a favorable view of Clinton, and 68% of Republican
identifiers and leaners had a favorable view of Trump (Newport 2016). As Lola Butler
opines above, short of shooting a family member, it seems that Republican public was
happy to support Trump. As a result, while high-profile Republicans such as Mitt
Romney and the Bush family did not support Trump in the election, few Republican
politicians who faced serious election competition in November followed suit.
There are a host of potential explanations for how a candidate (or candidates) so
loathed by the public is so loved by their party. There are institutional factors, such as
gerrymandering and primary processes, that allow for candidate that solely appeal to a
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party’s base. There is the fragmentation of the media and the psychological propensity
toward selective exposure, which help partisans to see a rosier picture of their candidate
than they otherwise would. There is the process of motivated reasoning, our natural
cognitive inclination to defend prior beliefs (and thus beliefs about candidates).
Partisans, moreover, may simply like what their candidate is saying and the platform
he/she espouses. However, a key explanation also has to be polarization, and in
particular the “social” or “affective” polarization experienced by the partisan electorate.
As discussed earlier, scholars have shown that, in recent years, the partisan public has
polarized. However, what characterizes this era of mass polarization is less divergence
on ideology or issue opinion, and more an increase in the social identity salience of party;
for partisans, being a Democrat or Republican is a more important part of “who they are”
as a person. As social identity theory suggests, this increase in the salience of partisan
social identity has come with greater pride and boosterism for one’s party, as well as
greater prejudice and negative affect towards the “other party.”
In this chapter, I will assess whether this same partisan social identity attachment
also drives the public away from the deliberative ideal of reciprocity. The chapter starts
with a discussion of the extant research on mass partisan polarization and its connection
to social identity theory. Then, through both online and telephone vignette survey
experiments, I show that partisanship impacts the amount of reciprocity one evinces
towards disagreement. This effect is particularly pronounced for partisans from whom
party is more salient to their social identity. Partisan social identity also has a substantial
effect on whether one wants their representative to evince deliberative attitudes. These
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results point to the impact of modern partisan polarization as well as the possibility of a
more deliberative democracy in the United States.
4.1 PARTISAN POLARIZATION AND SOCIAL IDENTITY
The popular punditry argues that polarization is at a high-water mark, with
Democrats and Republicans having little in common ideologically, culturally,
demographically, or geographically. These pundits are certainly tapping into a real
phenomenon, although the details are still in debate today. Researchers do agree that the
ideological distance between partisan elected leaders is at the highest levels for the past
century (Theriault 2008; Hill and Tausanovitch 2015). What’s more, division across
parties in Congress goes beyond ideology, spilling over to contentious debates on even
valence and procedural issues (Lee 2009). A number of explanations are offered for this.
McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal attribute elite polarization, across history and today, to a
rise in economic inequality and a subsequent move to the right by the Republican Party to
prevent redistributionist policy (2006). As such, they claim that elite polarization is an
asymmetrical phenomenon (see also Barber and McCarthy 2013). Fiorina (2011, Ch.
10), however, points to a change in the party donor and activist base, where party
careerists interested in patronage have been replaced by “purists” interested in ideological
fidelity. This has only increased given the increasing demands campaign financing has
placed on candidates in the 21st century (Lessig 2011). This explanation can also help
account for, in contrast to the trends documented by McCarthy and colleagues,
Democrats’ move to the left in the past few years (Campbell 2016); in 2012, for instance,
the average Congressperson (both Democrats and Republicans) had to spend $10.2
million to win a Senate seat and $1.5 million to win a House seat. Increased fundraising
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demands create greater reliance on, and fidelity to, ideologically “pure” donors.
Additional explanations for elite polarization focus on institutional features such as
gerrymandering and direct primary elections, as well as a breakdown of informal norms
of bipartisanship (for a discussion, see Barber and McCarthy 2013, 23-35).
Somewhat less clear, though, is the extent of polarization in the partisan public.
Some such as Abramowitz (2010) claim that the electorate is splitting apart ideologically
in much the same way partisan elite are. While much of the popular polarization
narrative has focused on culture wars (Frank 2004), Abramowitz contends that
Democrats and Republicans are farther apart on economic, cultural, and racial issues.
Campbell (2016), in turn, contends that deep ideological rifts have existed in the public
since the late 60’s, and the ideological polarization in the public has driven elite party
polarization (not the other way around). In contrast, Fiorina contends that the electorate
today is “closely” but not “deeply” divided (2011, 14). He argues that, once one digs
past “red state” vs. “blue state” voting patterns, the public is ambivalent on even
controversial issues such as abortion, gay marriage, and the war in Iraq. What’s more,
differences in opinion are minimal across parties and across racial, gender, and other
demographic groups. Representing the majority view in the literature (Ansolabehere,
Rodden, and Snyder 2006; Bafumi and Herron 2010; Levendusky, Pope, and Jackman
2008; Fiorina 2009, 2011), Levendusky (2009) likewise contends that the public is no
more ideologically polarized than in the past; the partisan public is, though, “sorting,”
with Democrats increasingly more likely to adopt liberal positions and Republicans
increasingly more likely to adopt conservative positions. This partly occurs through
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citizens choosing a “correct” party based on their beliefs, and partly by citizens shifting
their beliefs based on their party attachment (Carsey and Layman 2006).
While the consensus is that the partisan public is “sorted” but not necessarily
more ideologically extreme, recent research has pointed to a growing social and affective
mass partisan polarization. This research draws on social identity theory (Tajfel et al.
1971; Oakes 1987) and its insights as to how salient social identities are primary drivers
of attitude formation and behavior. Social identities are not the same as simple group
membership or identification; the term refers to psychological attachments to groups that
make an important contribution to how one sees herself, or “who one is.” Thus,
individuals can be white (or any other race) but have varying levels of white identity (or
any other racial identity) salience. While other theories of ingroup bias and intergroup
conflict focus on instrumental motivations for group association and behavior (Sherif
1966; Rabbie, Schot, and Visser 1989), the motivations for identity formation with SIT
are primarily expressive and symbolic in nature. The goal with SIT is to build selfesteem through comparison with relevant outgroups. Social identity formation has thus
been found in experimental settings where only minimal and arbitrary groups are created
(Tajfel et al. 1971). SIT has also been used to study group-based attitude formation and
behavior for racial and ethnic groups (Horowitz 1985; Pettigrew and Meertens 1995),
nationalities (Feshbach 1994), allegiance to sport teams (Taylor and Doria 1981), college
majors (Spears, Doosje, and Ellemers 1997), and many other group affiliations.
Beyond one’s individual-level commitment to a group, social identity salience can
change based on social context. Given the fact that individuals identify with many
different groups, if a particular ingroup stimuli or intergroup conflict is present, then that
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identity moves to the cognitive fore and becomes a primary motivator for attitude
formation and behavior. Other structural factors, such as the similarity of members
within groups and the level of permeability between groups, influence the salience of a
social identity for an individual (Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje 2002). With salient
groups, though, individuals develop a host of behaviors, including:


Engaging in “self-stereotyping” by changing attitudes and behavior: The strength
of a group member’s affinity with a group is positively related to the adoption of
group norms (Terry and Hogg 1996), driving a process of attitude polarization
across groups (Mackie 1986). In a series of survey experiments, Suhay shows that
this process is driven by “self-conscious” emotions. Adoption of ingroup norms,
as well as rejection of outgroup norms, creates pride in perceived ingroup
approval; in contrast, non-adoption of ingroup norms, and adoption of outgroup
norms, creates embarrassment (Suhay 2015).



Exaggerating in-group similarity and out-group difference: Evidence of outgroup
stereotyping as a “cognitive monster,” unable to be tamed (Bargh 1999) is more
prevalent than evidence of ingroup stereotyping. However, research in SIT shows
that group identity salience creates intragroup homogeneity perceptions for both
ingroup and outgroup members (Brown 2000), particular in the presence of
intergroup competition (Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje 1997)



Favoring the in-group and prejudice toward the out-group: With the motivational
basis for forming social identities being positive esteem (Tajfel et al. 1971), in a
review of research Brewer finds that intergroup discrimination is more often
motivated by ingroup favoritism rather that direct hostility towards an outgroup
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(Brewer 1999). Despite this positive motivational basis, prejudice and negative
attitudes towards salient outgroups still do result (Allport 1954; Brown et al.
2001; Vignoles and Moncaster 2007).
The observation that political behavior is connected to group or social identity is
certainly not new (Bentley 1908; Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964). However, as
Achen and Bartels (2016, Ch. 8) assert, since the 1970’s both political science and
psychology have more away from a group focus towards more individualistic studies of
political cognition and behavior. This is in part a reaction to the radical group-based
politics of the late 60’s, and part a result of the advent of random digit dialing surveying
of individuals in studying public opinion. Beginning in the 1990’s, however, political
science scholars have drawn on social identity theory to take a renewed look at group
processes (Huddy and Norris 1997; Deaux et al. 1995; Dawson 1994; Huddy 2001).
Recently, scholars have pointed to the role of racial social identity in driving increasing
polarization in party identification and issue positions (Tesler 2016; Magnum 2013).
Other scholars have illustrated the role of white identity salience in fueling conservative
ideology and movements such as the Tea Party (Craig and Richeson 2014; Skocpol and
Williamson 2012). At a more general level, Kinder and Kam draw on SIT to develop a
theory of ethnocentrism in American politics. They then illustrate how ethnocentrism
plays a role in ingroup favoritism and outgroup denigration across a variety of group
contexts and issues, such as immigration, affirmative action, public assistance, and gay
rights, among others (2009).
While social identity theory has been used to examine group identification and
politics for a myriad of groups, studies of partisan identification have not used it until
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recently. Huddy (2002) suggests that this is because partisanship is long perceived as a
stable attachment (see Converse 1969; Sears 1983), while social identity and selfcategorization theory suggest that group identity salience is fluid and can vary given
context. Polarization scholars, though, have lately just begun to draw on SIT, suggesting
that the partisan public is indeed polarizing. But despite the stability of partisan
identification, it is a polarization of social identity salience. Iyengar et al. (2012), for
example, find that partisans' outparty dislike and stereotyping has increased significantly
since the 1970's, and that ideology is a weak predictor of this trend. Mason also finds
that partisans increasingly display anger and bias towards their outparty (2015); she
moreover finds an increase in “social sorting,” where partisans will align other relevant
group identities to match their partisanship (2016). Iyengar and Westwood show that
partisans harbor implicit biases against outparty members, which manifests in even
nonpolitical attitudes and behavior such as hiring decisions (2015). Hetherington, Long,
and Rudolph, further, find evidence of an asymmetric “trait polarization,” where partisans
are more likely to ascribe negative personality traits towards outparty candidates (2016).
Issues still do matter; otherwise, it would be difficult to explain how individuals are
increasingly sorting into the “correct” party ideologically (Levendusky 2009). But a
social identity perspective on polarization allows one to see how the public is
increasingly divided beyond ideology or issues.
4.2 THEORY
The general expectation is that, for both Democrats and Republicans, partisan
social identity salience produces anti-deliberative attitudes. Instead of relying on
Habermas's “unforced force of the better argument,” I expect those with strong partisan
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social identity (PSI) salience to condition their response to disagreement based on party
cues. “High PSI” partisans, as opposed to “Low PSI” partisans, will be less likely to
evince reciprocal attitudes towards outparty argumentation and more likely to evince
reciprocal attitudes towards inparty argumentation. This connects to the insight from SIT
that, for salient group identities, one finds outgroup bias and anger, ingroup homophily
and activism, and exaggeration of differences across groups. It also connects to recent
research on partisan psychology that suggests that, far from open-mindedness, one’s
partisanship conditions the quality and hue of information that he or she receives from
their environment (Iyengar and Hahn 2009; Ramsay et al. 2010), how that information is
processed and interpreted (Gaines et al. 2007; Lodge and Taber 2013), and the attitude
that results (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013). The project here extends the
theoretical purview of SIT and partisan psychology research by positing a negative
connection to deliberative democratic ideals.
I also expect High PSI respondents to be less likely to support an inparty
representative if she displays an attitude of reciprocity across the aisle. The focus is on
inparty representatives here because the theoretical expectations are much clearer than
they are for outparty representatives. SIT suggests that those with strong social
attachments to their inparty would be loathe to see a member of their ingroup cooperating
with or affording mutual respect to an outgroup member. For those with outparty
representatives, they may support their representative trying to engage in cross party
deliberation or work across the aisle (and potentially incorporating inparty views), but
they may also be generally opposed to an outparty member trying to work with “their
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team.” Thus, I do not establish theoretical expectations for respondent attitudes to
outparty representatives.
Much previous research has primarily focused on negative outparty attitudes
produced by partisan social identity salience (e.g. Iyengar et al. 2012; Lelkes and
Westwood 2015; Hetherington, Long, and Rudolph 2016). Iyengar and Westwood (2015)
attributes this outparty effect to the absence of partisan egalitarian norms. While explicit
expression of racial or gender prejudice are often discouraged through social norms,
negative campaigning and candidate rhetoric remove such barriers to outparty prejudice.
However, with SIT, the theoretical motivation for group identity formation is self-esteem
created by positive intergroup differentiation. Thus, much of the psychological literature
on SIT suggests that salient identities primarily produce ingroup bias (Tajfel 1971;
Brewer 1999), although the presence of intergroup conflict creates both positive ingroup
and negative outgroup attitudes (Brown et al. 2001). This is different from other group
theories. For example, in his canonical work on prejudice, Allport argues that social
group stereotyping is an inevitable human process which leads to outgroup prejudice.
For him, social categorization “dominates our entire mental life…A new experience must
be redacted into old categories,” (1954, 20). SIT also differs from theories of group
conflict, such as realistic conflict theory (Sherif 1966) and integrated threat theory
(Stephan and Stephan 2000). With these theories, the presence of competition over
scarce resources or symbolic threats to values and beliefs produce outparty prejudice and
hostility. Further, other research emphasizes that outgroups are often perceived as more
homogenous than ingroups (Mullen and Hu 1989), and that people associate negative
outcomes related to outgroups as caused by dispositional rather than situational factors
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(Pettigrew 1979). If it is true that partisan social identity salience solely or primarily
produces outparty, as opposed to positive inparty, bias, perhaps one of these theories, and
not SIT, is more appropriate for studying the effects of partisanship on deliberation.
This being said, and while much research on partisan social identity has focused
on outparty bias, there are some studies that have found inparty effects. Huddy et al.
argues that partisan identification should be understood as fundamentally expressive in
nature, where partisans “wish to defend or elevate their party’s political position,” and the
party’s “failures and victories become personal” (2015, 3). The authors assess this claim
through four surveys, two of which contain experimental manipulations of partisan threat
and reassurance of success; they find that partisan social identity salience is strong
associated with past and current inparty campaign activity. They also find that
reassurance of party status produces enthusiasm and greater commitment to future inparty
campaign involvement. Other studies have also likely social identity and inparty
activism (Mason 2015) as well as positive inparty emotions (Suhay 2015). As such, and
in line with social identity theory, I expect partisan social identity to have both an inparty
and outparty effect on reciprocal attitudes.


H1a: “High PSI” partisans will hold less reciprocal attitudes towards outparty
disagreement, as well as more reciprocal attitudes towards inparty disagreement,
as compared to “Low PSI” Partisans.



H1b: “High PSI” partisans will be less likely than “Low PSI” Partisans to support
displays of reciprocity from inparty representatives
I expect separate effects for both the social identity and ideological dimensions of

one’s partisan identification. Given the strong role that party stereotyping and party-based
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affect plays in political cognition (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Achen and
Bartels 2016), I expect partisan social identity salience to have the strongest effect on
reciprocity. However, since self-stereotyping is also an indicator of social identity
salience (Mackie 1986; Mason 2015), I expect one’s "ideological partisanship" (as an
indicator of adopting prototypical in-group norms) to have a secondary effect on
reciprocal attitudes. Thus, for more conservative Republicans and more liberal
Democrats, I expect to see less reciprocal attitudes towards their outparty and more
reciprocal attitudes towards their inparty.


H2a: All else equal, both more conservative Republicans and more liberal
Democrats (“High Ideology” partisans) will hold less reciprocal attitudes towards
outparty disagreement and more reciprocal attitudes towards inparty
disagreement.



H2b: “High Ideology” partisans will also be less likely than “Low Ideology”
partisans to support displays of reciprocity from inparty representatives

4.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
As discussed in Chapter Three, the hypotheses above are primary tested through
experiments embedded in two survey instruments – an Online Survey, and a Telephone
Survey that seeks to replicate key results. The two surveys samples, in some ways,
contain similar sets respondents; both the Online and Telephone Survey have samples
that are whiter and more educated than the nation as a whole. However, as the Appendix
indicates, the samples have stark differences in partisanship. Mirroring past research on
mTurk survey respondents (Krupnikov and Levine 2014), Online Survey respondents are
more liberal and prefer the Democratic Party more than the country’s population writ
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large. The Telephone Survey sample, reflecting the state of South Carolina as a whole,
skews Republican. Individually, the proportion of partisans in each survey may raise
concerns of external validity. Together, though, a consistent effect across both sets of
surveys would attest to the robustness of the results across parties.
Table 4.1 indicates what proportion of respondents fall into each of four
subgroups in the Online Survey. As one can see, partisans are allayed across the range of
social and ideological attachment, and there is a low correlation between the two
measures. Given the prevalence of partisan ideological sorting (Levendusky 2009), one
may have expected fewer “High PSI, Low Ideology” and “Low PSI, High Ideology”
respondents. This may, though, highlight the line of research suggesting that, even for
partisans, the public does not have ideologically consistent or polarized attitudes
(Converse 1964; Fiorina 2011).
Table 4.1 Distribution of Respondents among Partisan Subgroups, Online Survey
High PSI

Low PSI

N

High Ideology

29.8%

20.2%

661

Low Ideology

24.2%

25.8%

661

721

615

N

Total N = 1336 for PSI, 1322 for Ideology; r = 0.17

The Online Survey contains questions on emotions towards the Democratic and
Republican parties. As Figure 4.1 demonstrates, partisans scoring above the median on
the social identity measure have uniformly stronger emotional reactions to the two
parties. High PSI partisans, as opposed to Low PSI partisans, are much more likely to
report feeling pride and hope towards their inparty “most of the time” or “always.” There
are also more likely to feel anger and fear towards their outparty “most of the time” or
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“always.”14 This difference is statistically significant at p < 0.05 in all cases, and it is
consistent with intergroup emotion theory (Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000; Suhay
2015), which suggests that salient social identities produce positive emotions towards one
in-group and negative emotions towards one out-group. It also serves as a robustness
check for the PSI measure used in this project, confirming that it in fact taps into
respondents’ social identity salience.

Figure 4.1 Partisan Emotion, by Social Identity Salience
Even though non-representativeness in the sample compels one to focus primarily
on the experimental results, some non-experimental statistics concerning attitudes toward
deliberation are worth noting. Table 4.2 provides results from partisan respondents for
the series of “forced choice” questions in the survey. As one can see, High PSI partisans
are more likely than Low PSI partisans to believe that political discussion can lead to
finding common ground. However, High PSI partisans are also more likely to see issue
14

This difference is consistent for both Democratic and Republican respondents.
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stances as clearly right or wrong, as opposed to believe that intelligent people can
disagree. This seems to suggest that those with a strong social attachment to their party
are more likely to feel that consensus is possible, but are also more likely to demand
consensus on their terms.
Table 4.2 Partisan Respondents’ Attitudes Towards Deliberation, by Social Identity
Prompt
On important issues facing America today…
Politicians should work towards compromise
Politicians should stand firm

Low PSI

High PSI

80.87%
19.13%

80.27%
19.73%

When people discussion issues of the day…
They tend to find common ground
It tends to highlight their differences

20.99%*
79.01%*

27.57%*
72.43%*

When I vote for a politician…
It is important for her to stick to her platform
It is fine for him or her to have a change in mind

55.09%
44.91%

56.93%
43.07%

On most political issues…
There is a clear right and wrong
It is reasonable for people to be on opposing sides

20.78%*
79.22%*

29.45%*
70.55%*

n = 1338; *significant χ2 statistic at p < 0.01

There were no significant differences between High and Low PSI partisan
respondents for the two forced choice questions from the survey asking about attitudes
towards representatives’ willingness to compromise. This, though, belies different
dispositions towards compromise across parties, as suggested by Figure 4.2. Democrats
in the sample are much more likely than Republicans to want a representative to work
toward compromise, and they are much more likely to tolerate a change in mind from
their representative. These group differences are significant with a χ2 test at p < 0.01.
This may be, in part, due to differences in values underlying the parties, but it also may
be due to the politics of the day. For Republicans in 2015, representative “compromise”
might simply imply the Republican Congress working with the Obama administration
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(and thus forgoing policy priorities). Likewise, for Democrats in 2015, “compromise”
might simply mean moving parts of a Democratic agenda through Congress. The desire
for compromise in one’s representative, in other words, may well reverse with a
Republican president and a Democratic Congress.

Figure 4.2 Attitudes toward Deliberation by Party, Online Survey
4.4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
4.4.1 FRAMING EXPERIMENT
As discussed in Chapter Three, the Online Survey included three sets of
experiments—a framing experiment, a set of interpersonal vignette experiments, and a
representative vignette experiment. The Telephone Survey replicated the interpersonal
vignette that focused on the issue of civil liberties as well as the representative vignette.
While the framing experiment in the Online Survey produced some interesting nonexperimental statistics discussed above, there were no significant results from
experimentally manipulating the frame one received. This is, in part, likely do to the
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weak treatment that a frame on an online survey screen (which one can easily click
through) provides. The concern over processing of the frame is redoubled by the nature
of mTurk respondents. Often “mTurkers” take surveys as a source of supplemental
income; while in this survey they have a remarkably high per question response rate (no
question with a response rate less than 99%), they are nonetheless motivated to move
through a question-less screen quickly. In addition, many of these questions ask about
the respondents’ general disposition to argument and disagreement; as such, there may be
an inherent desire to “appear deliberative” that washes out any treatment effect from the
frames provided.
4.4.2 INTERPERSONAL VIGNETTES
Table 4.3 displays key results for the interpersonal vignette focused on the issue of
immigration. Two models were run for both the question that asks if the counterargument
is “reasonable” and the question that asks if the counterargument is “worth considering.”
Both “base” and “interactions” models include binary indicators for whether the
counterargument comes from an inparty or outparty interlocutor, but the latter models
also includes terms interacting these indicators with a dummy variable for a PSI score
above the median. Negative coefficients indicate a more reciprocal response (i.e. – a
greater inclination to find the counterargument reasonable or worth considering). As the
base models show, partisan respondents overall are significantly more likely to find
disagreement on immigration reasonable and worth considering if it comes from an
inparty arguer. There is not a statistically significant outparty effect. This, however,
belies differing responses based on partisan social identity, as the outparty interaction
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terms are positive and significant. This indicates that partisans who have a stronger social
attachment to their party are significantly more likely to respond to outparty treatment.
Table 4.3 Immigration Vignette Results, Online Survey
Reasonable
Base Model
-0.29**
(0.13)

Reasonable
Interactions
-0.29
(0.131)

Considering
Base Model
-0.22*
(0.13)

Considering
Interactions
-0.31*
(0.19)

0.06
(0.14)

-0.28
(0.20)

0.14
(0.14)

-0.13
(0.20)

Inparty x PSI

-

-0.01
(0.26)

-

0.17
(0.26)

Outparty x PSI

-

0.61**
(0.27)

-

0.50*
(0.27)

PSI

0.05
(0.11)

-0.14
(0.18)

0.09
(0.11)

-0.13
(0.18)

White

0.23
(0.14)

0.24*
(0.14)

0.59***
(0.03)

0.59***
(0.14)

Age

0.01**
(0.00)

0.01**
(0.00)

0.01**
(0.01)

0.01**
(0.01)

Male

0.07
(0.11)

0.08
(0.11)

0.16
(0.11)

0.16
(0.11)

College

0.05
(0.11)

0.05
(0.11)

0.02
(0.11)

0.03
(0.11)

South

0.11
(0.11)

0.12
(0.11)

-0.03
(0.12)

-0.03
(0.12)

(cutpoint)

-1.68
(0.24)

-1.76
(0.25)

-1.00
(0.25)

-1.11
(0.26)

(cutpoint)

1.27
(0.23)
1314

1.20
(0.24)
1314

2.01
(0.26)
1314

1.90
(0.27)
1314

Inparty
Outparty

N

Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity
*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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High PSI partisans thus respond to outparty immigration arguments with less
reciprocity, while Low PSI partisans do not. This is illustrated by Figure 4.3, which
shows predicted proportions for the interactions models. Displayed are the proportions of
respondents stating that the counterargument is “not at all” reasonable or worth
considering, by their treatment group and partisan social identity. While Low PSI
respondents view inparty arguments more favorably than neutral arguments for both
questions, High PSI respondents are both more likely to view inparty arguments
favorably and less likely to view outparty arguments favorably. For this subset, the
predicted proportion responding “not at all” reasonable jumps from 0.35 in the neutral
condition to 0.43 in the outparty condition, and the predicted proportion responding “not
at all” worth considering jumps from 0.25 in the neutral condition to 0.32 in the outparty
condition.

Figure 4.3 Online Immigration Vignette Results, by Social Identity
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There are also differences in response to the civil liberties interpersonal vignette
by partisan social identity salience. The base models in Table 4.4 indicate that partisans
overall are significantly less likely to view outparty civil liberties arguments as
reasonable or worth considering, but they are not significantly more likely to view inparty
arguments as reasonable or worth considering. The interactions models, though, indicate
that High PSI partisans are more likely than Low PSI partisans to respond to the inparty
vignette. For the “reasonable” model, this difference in response is statistically
significant; while the difference is not significant for the “considering” model (p = 0.15),
the inparty interaction term is in the same direction and nearly as substantively large as
for the “reasonable” model. The differences in response across PSI subgroups are
illustrated in Figure 4.4. All partisans are more likely to state that a civil liberties
counterargument is “not at all” reasonable or worth considering if it comes from an
outparty, as opposed to a neutral, interlocutor. High PSI partisans, though, are also less
likely to state that the argument is not at all reasonable or worth considering if it comes
from an inparty interlocutor.
In sum, High PSI partisans consistently use party cues when deciding whether to
respond to disagreement with an attitude of reciprocity. This is true across the two issue
domains examined. What’s more, this is true for both inparty as well as outparty vignette
groups; this runs counter to much of the extant literature on partisanship and social
identity, which focuses primarily on outparty biases (Iyengar et al. 2012; Lelkes and
Westwood 2015). It accords with social identity theory, however, as SIT suggests that
salient group identities produce both ingroup boosterism and outgroup bias 15.

15

Results are consistent when looking at solely Democrats or Republicans. For details, see Appendix.
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Table 4.4 Civil Liberties Vignette Results, Online Survey
Reasonable
Base Model
-0.06
(0.14)

Reasonable
Interactions
0.31
(0.20)

Considering
Base Model
-0.12
(0.13)

Considering
Interactions
0.11
(0.20)

0.35**
(0.13)

0.28
(0.20)

0.30**
(0.13)

0.24
(0.20)

Inparty x PSI

-

-0.67**
(0.28)

-

-0.41
(0.27)

Outparty x PSI

-

0.13
(0.27)

-

0.10
(0.27)

-0.36***
(0.11)

-0.18
(0.20)

-0.28***
(0.11)

-0.17
(0.20)

White

0.14
(0.14)

0.11
(0.14)

0.32**
(0.14)

0.30**
(0.14)

Age

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

Male

0.31***
(0.11)

0.29***
(0.11)

0.28***
(0.11)

0.27**
(0.11)

College

0.01
(0.11)

0.02
(0.11)

0.08
(0.11)

0.09
(0.11)

South

-0.05
(0.11)

-0.02
(0.11)

-0.02
(0.12)

0.00
(0.11)

(cutpoint)

-2.13
(0.23)

-2.08
(0.24)

-1.47
(0.23)

-1.43
(0.25)

(cutpoint)

0.74
(0.21)
1314

0.81
(0.23)
1314

1.09
(0.23)
1315

1.13
(0.24)
1315

Inparty
Outparty

PSI

N

Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity
*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure 4.4 Online Liberties Vignette Results, by Social Identity
There are also interesting nonexperimental results with regards to the
demographic variables. Across conditions for the immigration vignette, white
respondents, as well as older respondents, are more likely to take an anti-deliberative
stance towards the counterargument offered. Part of this may be due to the more
conservative positions taken by older and white individuals in the sample. As those
higher in age and whites are statistically more likely to take a conservative stance, they
are more likely to receive a pro-immigration counterargument. Group-based racial
biases, thus, may be in play as these respondents consider their counterargument
(although more research will need to be done to confirm this suspicion).
For the liberties vignette, across treatment conditions males are more likely to
take an anti-deliberative stance. Similarly, this may be due to the specific pro-liberty
stance that, in the sample, is statistically more likely to be taken by males than females.
If males are more ardent in their beliefs concerning civil liberties, then may be apt to
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respond less deliberatively if they receive a pro-data collection counterargument. As
these are nonexperimental results with a convenience sample, though, at best this is
speculative. More research will need to be done to assess if and how age, race, and
gender bias deliberative attitudes, and if the same insights from social identity theory
used in this project can apply to these groups. Or, conversely, more research will be
needed to confirm whether these differences in attitude toward deliberation are driven by
specific issue positions taken, rather than an overall approach to argumentation.
While the questions asking whether the counterarguments are reasonable or worth
considering elicited a response to treatment, none of the vignettes produced a significant
difference in whether respondents changed their opinion. In fact, for both vignettes, only
roughly 20% of respondents changed their mind in the direction of the counterargument
when asked of their opinion a second time. It is perhaps not surprising given that the
argument is a one-sentence statement displayed on a computer screen. However, the lack
of demonstrated persuasive power suggests that the vignette treatment is weak. This
makes presence of a significant effect for the “reasonable” and “worth considering”
questions all the more remarkable.
What about ideology? Table 4.5 displays treatment effects across subgroups based
on ideological partisanship, focusing on the “reasonable” question. There are no
statistically significant differences in effects between respondents based on their
commitment to their party’s ideological platform. Both interaction terms do run in the
theoretically expected direction for the immigration vignette. However, for the civil
liberties vignette, those with weaker, not stronger commitments to their party’s ideology
are more likely to respond to the outparty vignette. This is illustrated with Figure 4.5; the
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right side shows that Low Ideology partisans are more likely to state that the civil
liberties counterargument is not at all reasonable if it comes from an outparty, as opposed
to a neutral, interlocutor. This is not true, though, for High Ideology partisans. This could
be because Low Ideology respondents may be less politically sophisticated than High
Ideology respondents (Zaller 1992). Civil liberties may also be a more complex issue
domain than immigration. If these are both the case, Low Ideology respondents may be
relying on party cues as an informational shortcut with the civil liberties question,
whereas High Ideology respondents have less need to do so. More research would be
needed to confirm exactly why different issue domains produce different patterns of
responses across ideological partisanship. But in sum, while partisan social identity
consistently produces stronger responses to both inparty and outparty treatment
(confirming H1a), differences in response to treatment based on ideological partisanship
are insignificant and mixed (disconfirming H2a).
The civil liberties vignette was moreover reproduced through a telephone survey
of a representative sample of South Carolina adults. Table 4.6 displays these results,
which incorporate survey weights and account for weighting loss using the Kish method
(1965). As with the Online Survey, the results from the Telephone Survey suggest
primarily an outparty effect. Although only the “reasonable” model is close to
conventional statistical significance (p = 0.052), the outparty terms for both base models
indicate that partisans as a whole are less likely to view outparty, as compared to neutral,
arguments as reasonable or worth considering. Moreover, the lack of significance for the
outparty term in the “worth considering” model belies a difference in response between
High PSI and Low PSI partisans. This is illustrated with the predicted probabilities
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displayed in Figure 4.6. While both High PSI and Low PSI respondents are more likely to
view a counterargument as “not at all” reasonable if it comes from the outparty, only
Table 4.5 Vignette Response by Ideological Partisanship, Online Survey
Immigration
Base Model
-0.30**
(0.13)

Immigration
Interactions
-0.23
(0.19)

Liberties
Base Model
-0.05
(0.14)

Liberties
Interactions
0.03
(0.18)

0.08
(0.14)

-0.09
(0.19)

0.36**
(0.13)

0.55***
(0.18)

Inparty x Ideo

-

-0.13
(0.26)

-

-0.16
(0.27)

Outparty x Ideo

-

0.34
(0.27)

-

-0.39
(0.27)

Ideology

0.69***
(0.11)

0.62***
(0.19)

0.31***
(0.11)

0.50**
(0.20)

White

0.11
(0.14)

0.11
(0.14)

0.08
(0.14)

0.08
(0.14)

Age

0.01**
(0.00)

0.01**
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

Male

0.07
(0.11)

0.08
(0.11)

0.32***
(0.11)

0.33***
(0.11)

College

-0.01
(0.11)

-0.01
(0.11)

-0.02
(0.11)

-0.03
(0.11)

South

0.12
(0.11)

0.12
(0.12)

-0.08
(0.11)

-0.07
(0.11)

(cutpoint)

-1.56
(0.24)

-1.59
(0.25)

-1.87
(0.22)

-1.78
(0.23)

(cutpoint)

1.46
(0.23)
1300

1.43
(0.25)
1300

1.00
(0.21)
1300

1.09
(0.22)
1300

Inparty
Outparty

N

Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity
*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure 4.5 Online Vignette Results, by Ideology
High PSI respondents are more likely to view outparty arguments as “not at all” worth
considering. For this subgroup, the predicted probability of responding “not at all” worth
considering jumps from 0.17 in the neutral condition to 0.26 in the outparty condition.
Due to the weighting loss as well as a sample size smaller than the Online Survey, the
interaction term in this model is not significant. However, while they cannot offer a
complete confirmation, the results from the Telephone Survey are in line with the Online
Survey results.
4.4.3 REPRESENTATIVE VIGNETTE
The final experiment is a 2x2 vignette analyzing the impact of partisanship impact
on respondents’ willingness to support efforts towards consensus by representatives.
Figure 4.7 displays the percentage of partisan respondents from the Online Survey stating
that they would be “more likely to support” a Congressperson, broken out by treatment
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group. The graph on the left contains results for High PSI partisan respondents, and the
graph on the rights contains results for Low PSI partisan respondents. Here, the results
Table 4.6 Liberties Vignette Response by PSI, Telephone Survey
Reasonable
Base Model
0.05
(0.26)

Reasonable
Interactions
0.20
(0.33)

Considering
Base Model
0.09
(0.27)

Considering
Interactions
0.17
(0.35)

0.44*
(0.27)

0.45
(0.31)

0.23
(0.27)

-0.03
(0.30)

Inparty x PSI

-

-0.34
(0.52)

-

-0.19
(0.54)

Outparty x PSI

-

-0.01
(0.54)

-

0.63
(0.56)

-0.64***
(0.22)

-0.53***
(0.39)

-0.32
(0.23)

-0.44
(0.37)

White

-0.01
(0.25)

0.01
(0.26)

0.16
(0.26)

0.19
(0.26)

Age

0.01*
(0.01)

0.01*
(0.01)

0.01**
(0.01)

0.01**
(0.00)

Male

0.12
(0.22)

0.13
(0.21)

0.23
(0.24)

0.23
(0.23)

College

0.33
(0.21)

0.32
(0.21)

0.19
(0.22)

0.19
(0.22)

(cutpoint)

-1.09
(0.46)

-1.05
(0.46)

-0.63
(0.42)

-0.70
(0.43)

(cutpoint)

1.47
(0.46)
466

1.52
(0.46)
466

2.20
(0.42)
472

2.15
(0.43)
472

Inparty
Outparty

PSI

N

Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity
*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure 4.6 Telephone Vignette Results, by Social Identity
are in line with hypothesis 1b. While High PSI partisans are not significantly more likely
to support an inparty representative if she works “across the aisle” as opposed to alone to
change policy (χ2 p value of 0.25), Low PSI partisans are more likely to offer support for
representatives working across the aisle (p = 0). High PSI, but not Low PSI, partisans
are significantly more likely to support an outparty congressperson working across the
aisle as opposed to alone (p = 0 for High PSI respondents; p = 0.47 for Low PSI
respondents). These results are replicated with the results from the Telephone Survey
displayed in Figure 4.8. For Low PSI, but not High PSI, respondents in this survey, there
is a marginally significant inparty effect in the same direction as the Online Survey
(survey weighted χ2 p = 0.07).
Figure 4.8 also provides non-experimental evidence that partisan social identity
produces both positive inparty bias and negative outparty bias. Here, High PSI partisans
in the Telephone Survey are uniformly and substantively much more likely than Low PSI
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partisans to offer support to representatives in both inparty conditions. High PSI
partisans are also less likely in both conditions to offer support to outparty representatives
than Low PSI partisans, but the substantive difference is smaller. Finally, Figure 4.9
suggests that the differences in response to treatment between High and Low PSI
partisans may be driven primarily by Democratic Party norms. The figure breaks down
results of the experimental vignette by Democratic and Republican respondents. Partisan
identity still clearly matters most, as both sets of partisan respondents are less likely to
support a Congressperson’s policy efforts if she is from the outparty as opposed to the
inparty. Democrats, moreover, are also less likely to support a Congressperson if she
worked alone as opposed to “worked across the aisle.” This is true for both inparty and
outparty representatives, with the strongest effects being with the inparty. Republicans
do not respond to treatment in a similar way, however. For them, we find similar
percentages of support comparing a Congressperson who “worked across the aisle” to a

Figure 4.7 Online Representative Vignette Results, by Social Identity
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Figure 4.8 Telephone Representative Vignette Results, by Social Identity
Congressperson who simply “worked” to pass legislation. This difference in partisan
response could be fueled by Democratic norms supporting compromise and consensus,
less prevalent with the Republican Party. This explanation is in line with social identity
theory’s prediction that group salience drives in-group norm adoption. It could also be
fueled by the current political context; Republicans may well be the ones seeking
legislative consensus if Democrats gain control of Congress. More research needs to be
done to explain this differential response to treatment across parties. The takeaway,
though, is that the negative impact of partisan social identity on support for inparty
representative consensus building is consistent across surveys.
4.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Does partisanship, and in particular partisan social identity salience, impact the
possibility of a more deliberative democracy? The survey experiments discussed here
suggest that it does. As opposed to following Habermas's “unforced force of the better
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Figure 4.9 Telephone Representative Vignette Results, by Party
argument,” partisans take into account party cues when considering whether to approach
disagreement with an attitude of reciprocity. The effects of partisanship on reciprocity are
particularly pronounced for the subset for whom partisan social identity salience is high.
Diverging from past research on partisan social identity that primarily focuses on
outparty effects (Iyengar et al. 2012; Lelkes and Westwood 2015), “High PSI” partisans
both display less reciprocity towards outparty arguments and more reciprocity toward
inparty arguments. These results for social identity are moreover consistent across issue
domains and across both online and telephone survey experiments. Partisan ideological
attachment, though, has at best a secondary effect on reciprocal attitudes, one that is
statistically insignificant and hinges on the specific issue being considered.
In addition to a disinclination to afford reciprocity in interpersonal disagreement,
partisans with strong social attachments are also less likely to look for attitudes of
reciprocity in their representative. The results show that this subset of partisans did not
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condition their support for an inparty representative based on whether or not she works
“across the aisle,” Partisans with less strong social attachments, though, were more likely
to support consensus building inparty representatives. What’s more, the results from the
representative vignette also suggest that partisan social identity produces positive inparty
bias as well as negative outparty bias; regardless of whether or not she looks to build
consensus across the aisle, “High PSI” partisans are both more likely to support an
inparty Congressperson, as well as less likely to support an outparty Congressperson,
than “Low PSI” partisans.
While the experimental approach used maximizes the internal validity of the
findings, a lack of external validity is a potential limitation to this study. For one, while
results are replicated across different samples and survey modes, neither the Online nor
Telephone Surveys are completely demographically representative of the U.S. population
as a whole. Another concern with external validity is with the use of a survey approach
more broadly. For example, it can be questioned as to whether receiving a
counterargument statement through a computer screen or telephone interviewer adequate
simulates encountering “real world” political argument. Also, it can be questioned
whether a small set of survey questions can adequate tap into nuanced, multifaceted
concepts such as reciprocity, ideological partisanship, and/or partisan social identity. This
latter limitation is fundamental to the survey experimental approach. Future research
could thus continue this exploration of the relationship between partisanship and
deliberation through, for example, embedding an experimental design in deliberative
forum (see Barabas 2004 or Mendelberg and Karpowitz 2007 for examples), or analyzing
deliberation in field settings (see Bryan 2004 or Mansbridge 1980 for examples).
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Limitations aside, the results nonetheless help us to understand the impact of
partisan polarization in the 21st century. Recall from Figure 4.1 that partisans with higher
social identity salience are more likely to express positive emotion towards their inparty
as well as negative emotion towards their outparty; Figures 4.8 and 4.9 show that this
affective response that characterizes “Social Partisans” has only amplified in the past two
decades. This ANES data are from questions that probe partisans’ emotions towards
Democratic and Republican presidential candidates. It is an imperfect substitute for
emotion towards the parties, and electoral and candidate context adds considerable
variability to this measure. However, since 1996, there is a clear secular trend; a majority
of partisans now feel anger and fear “most of the time” to their outparty candidate, as
well as hope and pride “most of the time” to their inparty candidate 16. These graphs
support the notion that the public is indeed splitting along partisan lines, but it is a social
and affective, not ideological, split. The experimental results in this study, in turn,
illustrate how this social polarization is impacting political discourse. In everyday
interpersonal talk, it makes good faith discussion and efforts at forging consensus across
party lines more difficult. Moreover, social polarization may have a “trickle up” effect
on Congressional deliberation, as the experimental results suggest that partisans are
becoming less likely to demand attitudes of reciprocity with their representative. In sum,
to the extent that democracy demands political discourse at the elite and mass level
guided by tolerance, mutual respect, and open-mindedness, the results show that our
current era of polarization makes this ideal increasingly more difficult to obtain.

16

The graphs begins at 1996 as this is the first year the ANES asks how often respondents feel these
emotions. Response wording changed in 2012. For 2012, graphs reflect percentage of partisans feeling
emotion “most of the time” or “always;” prior data reflects percentage of partisans feeling emotions
“fairly” or “very often.”
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Figure 4.10 Partisan Emotion Over Time, Democrats

Figure 4.11 Partisan Emotion Over Time, Republicans
The goal of this study is empirical—to examine how partisanship impacts the
attainment of ideals of deliberative democracy, not to examine those ideals as such.
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Nonetheless, this study can contribute to the normative assessment of modern democracy
in the United States. This assessment hinges on the yardstick one is using. If one hews to
a procedural or minimal view of democracy, the results here are not terribly problematic.
If, however, one takes the deliberative ideals of Dryzeck, Gutmann and Thompson, and
others seriously, the results here are more troubling. If the ideal of deliberative
democracy requires an engaged public adhering to norms of reciprocity—participating in
political talk with an open mind, offering arguments that all could see as legitimate, and
working towards a final consensus—mass social polarization is driving us away from this
ideal.
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CHAPTER 5
CAN WE TALK? DELIBERATION, PARTISANSHIP, AND SOCIAL
CONTACT
“Civilized men have gained notable mastery over energy, matter, and inanimate nature
generally, and are rapidly learning to control physical suffering and premature death.
But, by contrast, we appear to be living in the Stone Age so far as our handling of human
relationships is concerned.”
-

Gordon Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (1954, xv)

The previous chapter painted a bleak picture for the possibility of deliberative
public discourse in the United States. As the social and affective distance between
partisans has increased over the past quarter century (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012),
the chapter demonstrated that stronger social identity ties to one’s party are related to
stronger and more consistent anti-deliberative biases when encountering disagreement, as
well as a disinclination to support deliberative behavior in one’s representative. If
research on the benefits of ideal deliberation—better decision making, citizen learning,
tolerance and empathy, etc.—are to be believed, citizens are now in a particularly poor
position to reap these benefits. What’s more, mass social polarization and the resultant
unwillingness to engage in good faith, reciprocal discourse has become increasingly
untethered from debates on issues or ideology (Hill and Tausanovitch 2015). Thus, as
elected leaders occupy the extremes of the ideological spectrum, there is a disconnect in
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representation and an inability of the partisan public to hold leaders accountable to their
interests (Fiorina 2009). Normatively, this is troubling.
But what should be done? One option is a radical reconceptualization of
American democracy based on the empirical realities of 21 st century political behavior.
For example, many deliberative theorists have focused on developing structured forums
where only a small sample of citizens participate. These forums, it is argued, can serve
as bridging institutions between citizens and representatives (Warren and Gastil 2015);
with a small group, ideals of deliberation can be approximated and the irrationalities that
come with partisanship can be mitigated. Achen and Bartels, moreover, argue that
normative theorists should walk away from democracy as the “justifying political
ideology of our era,” (2016). They instead call for a rethinking of democracy based
primarily on group identity and power, and they make the normative call for providing
roughly equal power between groups through reducing social and economic inequality as
well as implementing campaign finance reform. Brennan calls for an even stronger move
away for democracy, claiming that citizens should have “the right to competent
government” and that democracy, as a broad class, fails in this regard (2016, 140). He
contends that epistocratic changes—providing more political power to an educated
elite—can make government more just.
Empowering forums or moving towards epistocracy can make government
decision making more deliberative or reasoned, but it also makes it less democratic. As
such, a second option is to develop strategies to better encourage an attitude of
reciprocity in the mass public, so that government is both more deliberative and more
democratic (or at least not less democratic). It is not obvious that this is possible; past
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research suggests that there is an inherent conflict between deliberative and participatory
democratic ideals (Mutz 2006), and social polarization has only encouraged greater
participation at the expense of citizen deliberation (Huddy et al. 2015; Ch. 4 in this
project). One potential solution, though, is through a process of social contact.
Interpersonal contact theory has consistently shown that building relationships with
outgroups can reduce prejudice towards that group and even other groups with whom one
is not in contact (Pettigrew 1997; Allport 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). Perhaps
outparty social contact can encourage individuals to engage in cross-party discussion
with an attitude of reciprocity. If so, it presents an opportunity for policymakers to
encourage deliberative discourse by providing opportunities for citizens to develop
relationships with those from “the other side.”
This chapter explores the potential for cross-party social contact to promote
deliberative attitudes in the electorate. Focusing on the interpersonal vignettes in the
Online Survey discussed previously, the chapter examines whether one particular form of
contact—regularly discussing politics with a member of the outparty—mitigates partisan
biases against deliberation. Overall, experimental results do not demonstrate a direct
effect on bias. However, nonexperimental results, corroborated by data from a 2008
representative national survey, do show that those with cross-party social contact have
weaker social identity attachments to their party. This suggests that contact may have an
indirect positive effect on attitudes of reciprocity through weakening partisan social
identity salience. Given the non-representative nature of the Online Survey as well as
inherent limits to causality in the research design (discussed in the conclusion), this claim
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is only tentative. More research is needed to disentangle when, where, and how social
contact can promote deliberation by reducing strong partisan social ties.
5.1 SOCIAL CONTACT AND THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE
Chapter Four demonstrated that partisans with strong social identity attachments
to their party harbor a prejudice that prevents them from engaging in disagreement with a
deliberative attitude. In his canonical work on the subject, Allport contends that this and
other group-based prejudices are “natural and common capacities of the human mind”
([1954] 1979). He explores a variety of historical, material, social, and psychological
theories associated with both “love” and “hate” prejudice formation, but he contends that
a key cognitive component that maintains prejudice is the process of stereotyping.
Stereotypes both justify discriminatory thinking about a group as well as maintain a
process of motivated reasoning about the group and group members. However, for
Allport, social contact disrupts stereotyping by providing a richer picture. It helps
individuals engages in more nuanced thinking about the outgroup. This, however, is not
an automatic process; Allport reviews a series of studies that show that, while casual or
superficial contact can actually increase prejudice, prejudice decreases with deeper and
more sustained contact. Ultimately, for contact to create a generalized reduction in group
prejudice (beyond egalitarian feelings specific to a particular person or situation), it must
be 1) between individuals of equal status 2) working together 3) sharing common goals
and interests, 4) supported by laws, customs, and other aspects of the institutional
environment ([1954] 1979, Ch. 16).
Many scholars have built on Allport’s insights and examined both the conditions
in which intergroup contact reduces prejudice as well as the mechanisms by which
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contact can work. For the latter, Pettigrew (1998) suggests that intergroup contact works
through both cognitive and affective processes, affecting both outgroup and ingroup
perceptions. Allport originally stressed the cognitive ignorance reduction that comes
with learning about an outgroup member. More recent research, though, stresses the
importance of positive affective ties. Stephan and Stephan, for example, find that higher
levels of social contact among Hispanic students is related to lower levels of anxiety in
interacting with other non-Hispanic students (1985). In a study of Europeans attitudes
toward immigration and immigrants, moreover, Pettigrew (1997) finds that friendship
with members of outgroup nationalities produces empathy and reduces affective
prejudice towards immigrants. The end product of improved affective ties are both a
reduction in negative feeling and trait prescription toward the outgroup as well as a
reconceptualization—a broadening—of one’s ingroup identity (Pettigrew 1998).
As Allport argues, not all contact results in prejudice reduction. However,
intergroup contact theory has proven remarkably resilient across a number of conditions
and contextual factors. Contact has been found to reduce racial and ethnic prejudice
(Works 1961; Ellison, Shin, and Leal 2011), foster support for pro-LGBT laws such as
military inclusion and anti-discrimination policies (Barth and Parry 2009), and reduce the
effects of stereotype threat for the elderly (Abrams et al. 2008). Outgroup contact can
also reduce prejudiced attitudes towards other groups (Pettigrew 1997; Wright et al.
1997), and even simply imaging positive outgroup member interactions can have a
beneficial effect (Crisp and Turner 2009). Exhaustively surveying the subfield, Pettigrew
and Tropp (2006) conduct a quantitative meta-analysis of 515 studies, spanning 60 years,
testing Allport’s contact hypothesis. They find that contact is a “practical, applied means
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of improving intergroup relations” (766). Not only does prejudice reduction consistently
generalize to an entire outgroup through contact, but prejudice against other outgroups is
consistently reduced as well. The authors even find prejudice reduction in situations that
do not meet Allport’s four criteria, leading them to conclude that they facilitative, not
necessary, conditions.
5.2 COMPARING TWO TYPES OF PARTISAN CONTACT
This being said, Pettigrew and Tropp do find the strongest prejudice reductions in
situations where contact is between cooperating members of equal status, working toward
common interests with institutional support. These four conditions “provide the
participant (of research) the opportunity to become friends,” (Pettigrew 1998, 76).
Without this deeper relationship and potential for friendship, prejudice reduction is less
likely. The importance of deeper, positive contact can be seen by contrasting two strains
of political psychology literature. The first, on partisan motivated reasoning, shows the
potential negative effects of superficial cross-party contact. These studies are often
experimental, and they often employ a short term partisan prime—for example, a news
story about the Democratic or Republican party (Jerit and Barabas 2012), written
statements or lists of candidates’ policy positions (Lodge and Hamil 1986; Druckman,
Peterson, and Slothuus 2013), televised statements or advertisements from candidates
(Rahn 1993; Dowling and Wichowsky 2015), or implicit measures designed to assess
automaticity (Iyengar and Westwood 2014; Lodge and Taber 2013), among many other
similar types of stimuli. The consensus from these studies is that short term exposure to a
partisan stimulus produces prejudicial cognition. Partisan primes encourages reasoning
based on directional, rather than accuracy, goals (Taber and Lodge 2006), so that “the
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brain converges on solutions that minimize negative and maximize positive affect states,”
(Westen et al. 2006, 1947). The move toward one’s inparty and away from one’s
outparty influences many aspects of the reasoning process, including exposure and
retention of information (Zaller 1992; Jerit and Barabas 2012), the interpretation of
information (Gaines et al. 2007), and resultant attitude adoption (Druckman, Peterson,
and Slothuus 2013). Motivated reasoning through partisan stimuli has also been
demonstrated with implicit measures of bias (Iyengar and Westwood 2014), and it even
produces markedly different neural processing patterns than non-motivated reasoning
(Westen 2006).
To be fair, these studies were not designed to assess intergroup contact theory, nor
do they compare results to partisan contact that is longer or more substantial. They
nonetheless reflect the key insight from Allport that not just any contact can serve to
reduce prejudiced thinking. In fact, minimal outgroup exposure (i.e., a partisan stimulus
found in an experiment) can exacerbate bias. Contrast these results to research on crossparty political networks. Here, scholars assess when and how long relationships with
outparty members influence one’s own partisanship, issue stances, tolerance, and
behaviors such as voting or donating to campaigns. One’s political network is measured
in a variety of ways; for examples, the earliest studies used similar group ties, such as
being a businessperson or being a Catholic, as proxies for shared political network
(Berelson, Lazarfield, and McPhee 1954). Other studies use geography as a proxy for
social connectedness—for example, a shared census tract (Cho, Gimpel, and Dyck 2006)
or a shared household (Nickerson 2008). Sinclair, moreover, uses a shared behavior,
donating to the same political campaign within a Congressional district, as a proxy (2012,
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Ch. 3). Many studies, though, use “name generator” procedures in survey instruments,
where respondents are asked to name individuals with which they discuss politics or
“important matters” on a regular basis (Mutz 2002; Klofstad, Sokhey, and McClurg 2013;
Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004; Parsons 2015). While subject to measurement
error with regard to respondents’ perceptions and recollections, these studies have the
advantage of directly assessing with whom one talks politics, as opposed to relying on an
inevitably imperfect proxy. The names elicited here are likely to be established
relationships, not simply passing acquaintances. This procedure also allows the
researcher to tap into individuals’ network members that do not live close by, or perhaps
do not share similar group affiliations.
As a whole, research on interpersonal political networks suggests that established
relationships with the outparty produce attitudes and behaviors distinct from those
created by short-term partisan primes. For example, rather than hardening one’s attitude,
diverse political networks help maintain dynamic, diverse opinions and voting behaviors.
Both observational (Huckfeldt 2001) and experimental (Ahn et al. 2013) research shows
that as individuals develop political discussion networks, they seek out those with
expertise primarily, and those with shared preferences only secondarily. As a result,
individuals can and do develop political communication networks that maintain opinion
diversity (Huckfeldt et al. 2004). Diverse networks, in turn, exert social influence;
Sinclair (2012) shows that, cerertis paribus, one is more likely to vote for an outparty
candidate if she discusses politics regularly with an outparty member. One is also more
likely to identify less strongly with their party (by close to a full point on the traditional
seven-point ANES scale) if she has an outparty discussant.
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In a somewhat similar vein, Mutz (2002) finds that those with heterogenous
political networks register greater ambivalence in vote choice. This ambivalence,
combined with social “cross-pressure,” depresses respondents’ likelihood of voting or
engaging in other forms of participation. However, in a later work Mutz (2006)
demonstrates that cross-party networks also encourage greater awareness of and tolerance
for perspectives with which one disagrees, leading her to conclude that there is a
“fundamental tradeoff” (2) between normative values of tolerance and participation.
Huckfeldt and colleges (2004), though, are more sanguine about the value of diverse
political networks. They find that those with cross-party political discussion networks
are more ambivalent about their vote choice and modestly less interested in politics (akin
to Mutz), but they do not find that they are less likely to vote.
Klofstad, Sokhey, and McClurg (2013) suggests that the discrepancy between
Mutz and Huckfeldt et al. can be attributed to different standards for measuring intranetwork disagreement. While Mutz uses a measure that heavily weights deep perceived
disagreement between respondent and discussant, Huckfeldt et al. employ a measure
which takes disagreement as simply not voting for the same 2000 Presidential candidate
(a weaker measure). Klofstad et al. apply both of these measures to a 2008 ANES Panel
Study data set, finding that those with politically heterogenous networks based on Mutz’s
measure express more ambivalence and less political interest than those with
homogenous networks. Based on Huckfeldt’s weaker measure, though, disagreement
does not produce these effects. Interestingly, neither measure of network disagreement
has a significant effect on respondents’ likelihood of voting.
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5.3 THEORY
Overall, the differences between experimental research on partisan motivated
reasoning and research on political networks highlight the point that intergroup contact is
much more likely to reduce prejudice if the contact has a strong relationship. The
difference between a regular discussion partner versus a short-term exposure through a
partisan stimulus is the difference between tolerance, ambivalence, and open-mindedness
versus selective exposure and directional reasoning goals. Moreover, as Sinclair (2012)
demonstrates, the strongest effects of sustained contact are for our strongest
relationships—family members and close friends, as opposed to co-workers and
acquaintances. Based on these insights, I argue that meaningful cross-party social contact
likewise facilitates possibilities for citizen deliberation, reducing the bias against
reciprocity partisans displayed in the previous chapter. Instead of relying on party cues
to determine whether disagreement is “reasonable” or “worth considering,” partisans who
have meaningful contact with outparty members should instead see less difference in
their response based on whether disagreement comes from an inparty, neutral, or outparty
interlocutor. Social contact reduces prejudice by both fostering positive assessment of
the outgroup as well as a reconceptualization of the ingroup (Gaertner et al. 1993); thus, I
expect to see a mitigating effect on both inparty and outparty bias.


H1: Partisans who have social contact with an outparty member are less likely to
harbor an implicit anti-deliberative bias toward both inparty and outparty
disagreement, compared partisans who do not have outparty contact.
Social contact can impact prejudice through both cognitive and affective means

(Pettigrew 1998). While the cognitive route—ignorance reduction through learning—has
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been shown at times to reduce prejudice (Stephan and Stephan 1984), overall the primary
mechanism is through generating positive affective ties to one’s outgroup and
deemphasizing ingroup identity (Pettigrew 1997; Gaertner et al. 1993). I expect to find
evidence of the primacy of this affective route to bias reduction in my project. If this is
the case, those with outparty social contact will have lower scores for partisan social
identity salience than those without contact. It would suggest that social contact
mitigates anti-deliberative indirectly, by reducing strong partisan social ties.


H2: Partisans with outparty contact will register lower scores for inparty social
identity salience
Finally, I expect those with stronger relationships to outparty members, as well as

more outparty relationships, to have the strongest reduction in anti-deliberative bias as
compared to those without outparty social contact. With stronger or multiple
relationships, one is more likely to have a relationship that satisfy Allport’s four
conditions for prejudice reduction.


H3: Partisans with stronger relationships to outparty members, as well as
partisans with multiple outparty relationships, will exhibit a stronger mitigation in
treatment effect as compared to partisans with weaker, or just one, relationship

5.4 DATA AND METHOD
Data for this analysis primarily comes from the interpersonal vignettes in the
Online Survey, outlined at length in Chapter Three. As discussed in the previous chapter,
with these vignettes, partisans respond to a policy counterargument with greater
reciprocity if the argument came from an inparty interlocutor, and they respond with less
reciprocity to an outparty interlocutor. This effect is strongest for those with stronger
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social identity attachments to their party (High PSI partisans). This makes it a natural
place to test whether response to treatment is conditional not only on social identity, but
on social contact with an outparty member as well. The independent variables,
dependent variables, and covariates used for statistical control are the same as those in
Chapter Four.
Information on outparty social contact is gathered in the Online Survey through a
name generator procedure similar to that used in recent research on political networks
(Mutz 2006; Huckfeldt et al. 2004; Klofsted et al. 2013). In an iterated series of
questions, respondents are asked who they “generally talk with most about politics,” and
they can type in up to three names or initials, one at a time. If they cannot name a person
they talk politics with for their first, second, or third name, they are then asked to name
the person “with whom [they] were most likely to have informal conversations” 17. Thus,
every respondent is encouraged to name at least one, and up to three, contacts. Table 5.1
shows the number and percentages of discussant contacts for all partisan and leaning
partisan respondents.
Table 5.1 Number of Named Members of Discussion Network
Number Named

All

High PSI

Low PSI

0 (skipped)

0.1%

0.0%

0.1%

1

20.3%

19.3%

21.5%

2

17.9%

17.5%

18.4%

3

60.2%

63.1%

61.8%

n

1,336

721

615

17

Discussants are included in the measures of outparty social contact regardless if they “talk about politics”
or “have informal conversations” with the respondent. Klofstad, McClurg, and Rolfe (2009) find that
political and non-political name generators like these generate very similar sets of names.
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For each contact named, respondents are asked two questions with regard to their
political leanings. Each respondent is first asked, on a three-point scale, if the
discussant’s views are “much the same,” “somewhat different,” or “very different” than
her views. The respondent is then asked which party the respondent normally favors—
Republicans, Democrats, “both,” or “neither.” The analysis will lean on the latter
question, as the focus of this chapter is on how cross-party contact, not just contact across
difference, impacts deliberative attitudes. Research using a similar name generator
procedure has shown that respondents are generally accurate in their perception of
discussion partner political attitudes. With a 1992 survey that followed up by surveys
respondents’ named discussants, Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) find that respondents are
accurate in their perceptions 78% of the time. Regardless, what is more relevant for a
contact effect is the perception of outparty contact, not that the discussant actually be a
member of the outparty. Full text for the name generator procedure and questions that
follow can be found in the Appendix.
Based on this set of questions, analysis compares differences of treatment
response across two groups—those that have an outparty member in their named
discussion network, and those that do not18. As stated earlier, the questions ask with
whom the respondent “generally” talks about politics or important matters; as such, the
names given are not likely to be mere passing acquaintances. It is more likely that the
respondent has a deeper, standing relationship with these individuals, and thus they are
more likely to satisfy the conditions of equal status, working together, common interests,
18

Other research on political networks makes use of scales based on information from all named
discussants. As one example, Mutz (2006) creates a dissimiliarity index that weights both the extent of
disagreement as well as the closeness of the relationships. Here, though, I opt for a simpler test—reported
contact versus no reported contact. Future research can assess the marginal impact of different numbers,
and types of relationships, of cross-party contact.
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and the “potential for friendship” that Allport (1954) and Pettigrew (1998) argue are
facilitative of prejudice reduction. Again following Gerber and Green (2012), the
differences in treatment response between these two groups will be assessed formally
through ordered logistic regression with the use of interaction terms.
Table 5.2 shows that around seven in ten respondents do not have an outparty
member as part of their discussion network. Less than one in ten have more than one
outparty discussant. The finding that partisans are more likely than not to have an
outparty discussant is not isolated to the Online Survey sample. Table 5.3 shows a
similar result from three different representative national surveys that employ a name
generator procedure. While all three surveys ask a slightly different set of questions, they
all ask for either the perceived vote choice or the perceived partisanship of the
respondents’ discussion partners19. Across years and surveys, the table suggests that
engaging in cross-party discussion is the exception, rather than the norm.
Table 5.2 Number of Outparty Members in Discussion Network, Online Survey
Number in Network

All

High PSI

Low PSI

0

69.6%

71.8%

67.0%

1

23.1%

21.4%

25.0%

2

6.3%

5.7%

7.0%

3

1.1%

1.1%

1.0%

n

1,336

721

615

19

The 1992 CNES and 2000 ANES surveys both collect data on more than three discussion partners; Table
5.2 reflects information only for the first three discussion partners named by the respondent. For the 1992
and 2000 surveys, an “outparty discussant” is defined as someone who voted for the major party candidate
that is not in the respondent’s party. For the 2008 survey, an “outparty discussant” is someone that is
perceived as an outparty identifier by the respondent.
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Table 5.3 Number of Outparty Members in Discussion Network, Past US Surveys
Number in Network

1992 CNES

2000 ANES

2008 ANES

0

65.8%

73.0%

71.7%

1

24.9%

19.7%

20.1%

2

7.0%

6.2%

6.5%

3

2.3%

1.1%

1.7%

n

1,205

1,807

2,086

5.5 RESULTS
Tables 5.4 shows the general effect (or lack thereof) of having an outparty
network member on whether one harbors anti-reciprocal bias when facing disagreement
on the issue of immigration. As illustrated in the previous chapter, the base models in
Table 5.4 show a significant inparty treatment effect; partisan respondents are more likely
overall to say that an immigration counterargument is “reasonable” and “worth
considering” simply if it comes from an inparty, as opposed to neutral, interlocutor. The
theory outlined above calls for a significant positive effect for the interaction between the
inparty treatment indicator and outparty contact, as well as a significant negative effect
for the interaction between the outparty treatment indicator and outparty contact. This is
not reflected in the table. While the sign is in the correct direction for both the
“reasonable” and “worth considering” inparty interactions, it is nowhere near statistical
significance. The outparty interactions have differing signs between the “reasonable”
model and “worth considering” model; both coefficients, though, are not significant.
Similarly, there is no interactive effect evident for the civil liberties vignette, as
shown in Table 5.5. As the base models indicate, partisans as a whole are less likely to
consider a liberties counterargument “reasonable” or “worth considering” if it comes
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Table 5.4 Immigration Vignette Response by Network Composition
Reasonable
Base Model
-0.29**
(0.13)

Reasonable
Interactions
-0.35**
(0.16)

Considering
Base Model
-0.22*
(0.13)

Considering
Interactions
-0.26*
(0.16)

0.06
(0.14)

-0.05
(0.16)

0.13
(0.14)

0.21
(0.16)

Inparty x Network

-

0.17
(0.27)

-

0.12
(0.28)

Outparty x Network

-

0.38
(0.29)

-

-0.31
(0.32)

Network

0.05
(0.12)

-0.13
(0.19)

-0.24*
(0.12)

-0.19
(0.20)

White

0.23
(0.14)

0.22
(0.14)

0.60***
(0.14)

0.61***
(0.14)

Age

0.01**
(0.00)

0.01**
(0.00)

0.01**
(0.01)

0.01**
(0.01)

Male

0.07
(0.11)

0.07
(0.11)

0.16
(0.11)

0.15
(0.11)

College

0.05
(0.11)

0.05
(0.11)

0.03
(0.11)

0.03
(0.11)

South

0.12
(0.11)

0.12
(0.11)

-0.02
(0.12)

-0.02
(0.12)

(cutpoint)

-1.70
(0.24)

-1.77
(0.25)

-1.10
(0.25)

-1.07
(0.25)

(cutpoint)

1.26
(0.23)
1,314

1.18
(0.24)
1,314

1.91
(0.25)
1,314

1.94
(0.26)
1,314

Inparty
Outparty

N

Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity
*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

from an outparty, as opposed to neutral, source. This outparty effect holds up whether
one has outparty social contact or not; the outparty interaction terms are statistically and
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substantively insignificant. The inparty interaction term in the “considering” model
comes closest to statistical significance (p = 0.20), but the sign is wrong; it suggests that
social contact exacerbates, not mitigates, the bias produced by inparty treatment. Overall,
the results suggest a lack of a direct effect for outparty social contact. The biases
partisans display against deliberation appear to not differ whether they regularly discuss
politics with an outparty member or not.
Further, as indicated by Figures 5.1 and 5.2 (which focus on the “reasonable” set
of questions), there is a similar lack of effect for social contact whether one looks
specifically at High PSI or Low PSI partisans. In Figure 5.2, there is a slight suggestion
of a weaker response to treatment in the High PSI subgroup if one has, as opposed to
does not have, an outparty discussant. There, respondents without outparty social contact
react both more favorably to inparty counterarguments and less favorably toward
outparty counterarguments; this is not true for discussants with outparty social contact.
In contrast, for Low PSI respondents, the effect of social contact is the opposite of what is
theorized. In particular, those with an outparty discussant in their network respond less
deliberatively to the outparty vignette as compared to the control group, while those
without an outparty discussant respond more deliberatively to outparty treatment. For the
liberties vignette results displayed in Figure 5.3, it is clear there are no strong differences
in vignette response based on social contact for either High PSI or Low PSI partisans.
None of the interaction effects for either vignette, moreover, are statistically significant
for either High or Low PSI subgroups.
To assess whether the closest relationships are more likely to produce a contact
effect, though, Table 5.6 compares the differences in vignette treatment response between
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Table 5.5 Liberties Vignette Response by Network Composition
Reasonable
Base Model
-0.07
(0.14)

Reasonable
Interactions
-0.06
(0.16)

Considering
Base Model
-0.13
(0.13)

Considering
Interactions
0.00
(0.15)

0.34**
(0.13)

0.33**
(0.16)

0.28**
(0.13)

0.29*
(0.16)

Inparty x Network

-

-0.02
(0.31)

-

-0.43
(0.31)

Outparty x Network

-

0.03
(0.28)

-

-0.02
(0.29)

Network

-0.06
(0.12)

-0.06
(0.21)

-0.12
(0.12)

0.03
(0.22)

White

0.16
(0.14)

0.16
(0.14)

0.35**
(0.14)

0.35***
(0.14)

Age

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

Male

0.33***
(0.11)

0.33***
(0.11)

0.30***
(0.11)

0.31***
(0.11)

College

0.01
(0.11)

0.01
(0.11)

0.09
(0.11)

0.09
(0.11)

South

-0.07
(0.11)

-0.07
(0.11)

-0.03
(0.11)

-0.03
(0.11)

(cutpoint)

-1.93
(0.22)

-1.93
(0.23)

-1.32
(0.22)

-1.26
(0.23)

(cutpoint)

0.92
(0.21)
1,314

0.92
(0.22)
1,314

1.23
(0.22)
1,315

1.30
(0.22)
1,315

Inparty
Outparty

N

Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity
*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure 5.1 Response to Immigration Vignette, by Social Contact and Identity

Figure 5.2 Response to Liberties Vignette, by Social Contact and Identity
those that name an outparty member first in the name generator procedure versus those
who do not name an outparty member at all in the name generator. The first name
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Table 5.6 Vignette Response if First Person Mentioned is Outparty Member
Immigration
Reasonable
-0.34***
(0.15)

Immigration
Considering
-0.26
(0.16)

Liberties
Reasonable
-0.06
(0.16)

Liberties
Considering
-0.00
(0.16)

Outparty

-0.05
(0.16)

0.22
(0.16)

0.33**
(0.16)

0.30*
(0.16)

Inparty x Network

0.48
(0.39)

0.30
(0.38)

0.00
(0.42)

-0.63
(0.45)

Outparty x Network

0.18
(0.44)

-1.12***
(0.44)

0.15
(0.39)

-0.03
(0.43)

Network

-0.22
(0.29)

-0.10
(0.28)

-0.40
(0.29)

-0.09
(0.33)

White

0.13
(0.15)

0.53***
(0.14)

0.10
(0.15)

0.32**
(0.15)

Age

0.01***
(0.00)

0.02***
(0.01)

0.00
(0.01)

0.00
(0.01)

Male

0.08
(0.12)

0.13
(0.12)

0.36***
(0.12)

0.29**
(0.12)

College

0.05
(0.12)

0.05
(0.12)

0.00
(0.12)

0.03
(0.12)

South

0.10
(0.12)

-0.04
(0.13)

-0.01
(0.12)

0.00
(0.12)

(cutpoint)

-1.64
(0.26)

-1.03
(0.27)

-1.88
(0.24)

-1.23
(0.25)

(cutpoint)

1.21
(0.25)
1,090

2.02
(0.28)
1,090

0.99
(0.23)
1,091

1.35
(0.24)
1,091

Inparty

N
*

Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

generated is the individual with whom the respondent “generally talks with most about
politics;” if there is any effect of outparty contact on deliberative bias, it should be here.
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Table 5.6 displays only the interaction model results for both the immigration and civil
liberties vignettes, and both the “reasonable” and “worth considering” questions. Here,
again, the results do not suggest a great difference in response between subgroups. For
the immigration vignette, the interaction coefficients are substantively larger than they
were in Table 5.4. Moreover, there is a significant difference in response in outparty
treatment in the “considering” model; those with an outparty individual as their first
named discussant are more likely to say that an outparty counterargument is “worth
considering,” as compared to individuals who do not have any outparty discussants.
However, given the fact that this is an “easy test” for intergroup contact theory and it is
the only of four coefficients that are significant, one cannot take too much stock in this
result. With the liberties vignette, there are no significant interaction coefficients; as with
Table 5.5, the only term even approaching statistical significance has the opposite sign of
what is theoretically expected.
Similarly, with Table 5.7 there appears to be little difference in treatment response
when one looks specifically at individuals with more than one outparty discussant. Here,
both the inparty and outparty treatment indicators are interacted with two dummy
variables—one indicating whether the respondent names one outparty discussant, and
another indicating whether the respondent names two or more outparty discussants. The
“2+ Discussants” interaction, thus, compares differences in treatment response between
those with zero outparty discussants and those with either two or three outparty
discussants. The table shows that in only one of the interactions is there a significant
difference between those with two or more outparty discussants and those with none.
The remainder of interactions with inparty and outparty treatment indicators, across
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Table 5.7 Vignette Response by Number of Outparty Discussants
Immigration
Reasonable
-0.35**
(0.16)

Immigration
Considering
-0.26*
(0.16)

Liberties
Reasonable
-0.06
(0.16)

Liberties
Considering
-0.01
(0.15)

Outparty

-0.05
(0.16)

0.21
(0.16)

0.33**
(0.16)

0.29*
(0.16)

Inparty x 1 Discussant

0.20
(0.29)

0.13
(0.31)

0.10
(0.34)

-0.53
(0.35)

Outparty x 1 Discussant

0.52*
(0.31)

-0.10
(0.35)

-0.01
(0.31)

-0.10
(0.32)

Inparty x 2+ Discussants

-0.08
(0.55)

-0.02
(0.51)

-0.26
(0.54)

-0.08
(0.54)

Outparty x 2+ Discussants

-0.16
(0.61)

-1.06*
(0.60)

0.11
(0.54)

0.18
(0.54)

1 Discussant

-0.24
(0.20)

-0.30
(0.22)

0.01
(0.23)

0.17
(0.24)

2+ Discussants

0.33
(0.44)

0.23
(0.38)

-0.31
(0.39)

-0.43
(0.39)

White

0.21
(0.14)

0.62***
(0.14)

0.16
(0.14)

0.36***
(0.14)

Age

0.01**
(0.00)

0.01**
(0.01)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

Male

0.07
(0.11)

0.15
(0.11)

0.33***
(0.11)

0.31***
(0.11)

College

0.05
(0.11)

0.03
(0.11)

0.01
(0.11)

0.08
(0.11)

South

0.13
(0.11)

-0.02
(0.12)

-0.06
(0.11)

-0.03
(0.11)

(cutpoint)

-1.78
(0.25)

-1.08
(0.25)

-1.92
(0.23)

-1.24
(0.23)

Inparty

(cutpoint)
N

1.17
1.91
0.94
1.31
(0.24)
(0.26)
(0.22)
(0.23)
1,314
1,314
1,314
1,315
Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity
*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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models, are insignificant. In sum, the results suggest that neither the strength of one’s
outparty member relationship nor the number of outparty members in one’s network
make a direct difference in mitigating partisan biases toward deliberation.
5.5.1 COGNITIVE VERSUS AFFECTIVE MECHANISMS
Social contact, though, can potentially work in two ways; it can mitigate partisan
bias through a cognitive process of learning, or it can serve to produce positive affect
towards the outparty and deemphasize inparty salience. If the latter mechanism is at
work, prejudice reduction would occur through a weakening of partisan social identity
salience (which, as the last chapter shows, produces biases against deliberation). Thus,
partisans with outparty network members would register lower social identity salience
scores. Figure 5.3 shows evidence that, indeed, this is the case. While there is not a
significant difference between those with one versus multiple outparty discussants, a ttest comparing those with zero outparty members versus those with at least one outparty

Figure 5.3 Mean PSI Score by Outparty Network Size, Online Survey
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member shows that the difference in PSI score between the two groups is significant (p <
0.01).

Figure 5.4 Feeling Toward the Parties, by Outparty Social Contact
This should be taken with a grain of salt, though, as it is merely descriptive data
of the non-probability sample gathered for the Online Survey. More weight, though, can
be place on Figure 5.4, which shows differences in feeling towards the parties for a
representative sample of US Adults based on whether they have zero, or at least one,
outparty member in their discussion network. This data comes from the September and
November 2008 waves of the 2008-2009 ANES Panel Survey, and respondents’
discussion networks are generated in a similar way to the method used in the Online
Survey20. In this survey, respondents are asked if they have any favorable, and then
unfavorable, feelings towards the Democratic, then Republican party. Figure 5.4 shows
20

The ANES Panel survey allows respondents to name up to eight discussants. Perceived party affiliations,
though, are only asked for the top three discussants named.
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that, if a partisan respondent names an outparty member as one of their first three named
discussants, they are more likely to have positive feelings toward their outparty (χ 2 p =
0.00), as well as are more likely to have unfavorable feelings toward their inparty (χ 2 p =
0.01). These results, like the non-representative results in Figure 5.3, suggest that
outparty social contact mitigates social and affective attachment to one’s party, thus in
turn indirectly effecting respondents’ anti-deliberative bias. It is too much to ask of the
Online Survey, though, to untangle the causal relationship between social contact, social
identity, and deliberative attitudes. This conclusion is thus only speculative. Further
research that directly assess this question of causality needs to be done.
5.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter assesses whether one particular form of social contact—regularly
discussing politics with members from one’s outparty—serves to mitigate partisan bias
against an attitude of reciprocity. Results suggests that having outparty interpersonal
contact does not appear to have a direct effect on reciprocal attitudes towards
disagreement. Partisans in the Online Survey exhibited the same patterns of bias when
assessing counterarguments regardless of whether they regularly discussed politics with a
member from “the other side” or not. What’s more, the bias was not significantly
diminished when one looks at partisans who have the strongest cross-party relationships,
nor was it diminished when focusing on those with multiple cross-party relationships.
Further, the effect of outparty contact is null regardless of whether one has weak or
strong social identity ties to their party.
This being said, some of the nonexperimental data still suggest that outparty
social contact may have an indirect effect on partisan biases against deliberation. Recall
from Chapter Four that those for whom party is a stronger part of their social identity
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were more likely to display systematic partisan biases when considering a policy
counterargument, and they were less likely to seek out deliberative attitudes in their
representative. Results from this chapter, in turn, show that partisans in the Online
Survey are more likely to have higher partisan social identity salience if they do not have
an outparty member as part of their discussion network. This descriptive finding was
validated from data through a representative national survey. Thus, even though there
does not appear to be a direct effect, social contact could still play a role in encouraging
deliberative public attitudes by reducing partisan social identity salience. This results is
also in line with other research on social contact, which suggest contact reduces prejudice
primarily through producing positive outparty affect and deemphasizing inparty identity
salience (Pettigrew 1997, 1998).
The possibility for significant social contact, be it through a regular political
discussion partner or another type of relationship, to foster deliberative ideals in the
public is intriguing and warrants future research. It is warranted not in the least due to
limitations of the study and the claims that can be made from it. Results that rely on
treatment effect heterogeneity must be treated with caution, as they are a step removed
from the causal framework provided by experiments (Gerber and Green 2012; Kam and
Trussler 2016). In this chapter, the non-null findings are two steps removed, with social
contact having its effect on treatment through a reduction in social identity salience.
Moreover, unlike in Chapter Four, key experimental results were not replicated with a
representative sample. Thus, one cannot say for certain whether results generalize
outside of the Online Survey sample, or if a confounding variable is driving the
relationship between social contact, social identity, and deliberative bias. Moreover, if
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there is a relationship between social contact and social identity salience, the results
presented in this chapter are confounded by a difficult problem facing all social contact
research—the issue of homophily. Does outparty social contact reduce partisan social
identity salience, or does lower partisan social identity salience cause people to form
outparty contacts?
The results are at this point exploratory and point to a future research agenda. For
the issue of homophily, one cannot produce long-standing relationships as part of an
experimental treatment. The issue could be addressed through either longitudinal
research, or an experimental design where the response to treatment is measured for the
respondents’ network members. Sinclair (2012) employs both strategies to demonstrate
that social networks effect voting behavior. Moreover, the results from this experiment
could be replicated through a representative sample, such as the Time-Sharing
Experiments for the Social Sciences (TESS) program. With a planning document and
theoretical expectations registered in advance, such an experiment would address issues
of external validity as well as appearances of “p-hacking.” It would also offer the
opportunity to more deeply investigate what types of relationships produce a contact
effect. For example, do close friendships and family relationships have a stronger effect
than coworker or acquaintance relationships? Does the frequency of discussion, or
whether the perception of discussions is positive or negative, matter? Do close
relationships through social media produce the same effect as close in-person
relationships, or does the medium matter? Finally, can imagined contact, if constructed
correctly, have an effect, as Crisp and Turner (2009) suggest.
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Further, a population-based survey experiment could establish in what ways cross
party contact mitigates anti-deliberative bias. For example, some critics suggests that
while contact reduces an individual’s prejudice, it does not change attitudes towards
policies or systems that maintain group inequality (Dixon, Durrheim, and Tredoux 2005).
Thus, it could be the case with this project that having an outparty discussant mitigates
general negative feeling toward the outparty, but does not cause one to reconsider
partisan cuetaking in forming a policy attitude. A future survey instrument, then, could
have a series of experimental and non-experimental components that distinguish between
contact’s effect on individual-level prejudice versus policy decision making.
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CHAPTER 6
PERSONALITY AND THE PROSPECTS FOR DELIBERATION
“Some citizens are better than others at articulating their arguments in rational,
reasonable terms. Some citizens, then, appear already to be deliberating, and, given the
tight link between democracy and deliberation, appear already to be acting
democratically…In this way, taking deliberation as a signal of democratic practice
paradoxically works undemocratically, discrediting on seemingly democratic grounds the
views of those who are less likely to present their arguments in ways that we recognize as
characteristically deliberative.”
-

Lynn M. Sanders, “Against Deliberation” (1997, 347-8)

Even from a casual observation of public political discourse, it is clear that some
people are more predisposed to discussing politics than others. Take me, for example.
As a general rule, I am adverse to conflict. I seek to steer conversations with friends and
family members away from hot-button political issues; when conversations go in that
direction, I often seek to establish common ground rather than taking an adversarial
stand. Compare this behavior to a particular family member of mine. She is very vocal
on multiple platforms of social media, and she is not shy about taking a controversial
stand. Her ideological outlook is clear to all in the family, and it has even strained
relationships with other family members. There are many potential reasons why my
family member is more vocal than I am; some if it may be due to my more politically
moderate outlook, and some of it may be due to the social and environment context in
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which we were raised and currently inhabit. It is reasonable to suspect, though, that
differences in personality may play a role in our different approaches to discourse.
Perhaps she is fundamentally more apt to vocal, certain, and at time adversarial political
communication than I am.
While my family experience is purely anecdotal, it points to the possibility that
attitudes towards deliberative democracy vary systematically with one’s personality.
This is the possibility that this chapter explores. After a discussion of recent advances in
personality psychology and their applicability to political behavior, this chapter tests
whether two of the core “Big Five” personality traits advanced by psychology
literature—openness to experience and conscientiousness—are mitigating factors for the
partisan bias against deliberation that Chapter Four establishes. Running counter to what
previous research would suggests, the results show that those scoring higher in openness
to experience exhibit less deliberative attitudes towards political disagreement. They are
more likely to follow partisan cues, as opposed to the substance of argument, when
determining whether to approach a counterargument with an attitude of reciprocity. The
results suggest a potential limitation to a “public” or “systematic” approach to
deliberation. It suggests that some individuals, because of personality differences rooted
in biology, are less apt to participate in discussion with ideals of deliberative democracy
in mind.
6.1 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PERSONALITY
It is a banality to state that political behavior has many motivations. At a surface
level, individual factors such as attitudes or material conditions, as well as environmental
factors such as economic or demographic changes, can influence how one votes or
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whether one attends protest rallies. At a deeper level, many argue that social or groupbased elements of one’s identity, such as one’s race or partisanship, guide behavior
across the range of opportunities for political action. Personality, though, runs even
deeper than stable partisan or racial attachments. Personality is a “a biologically
influenced and enduring psychological structure that shapes behavior,” (Mondak 2010,
6). This structure includes a package of traits, needs, values, and self-beliefs (Caprara
and Vecchione 2013)—components that cannot be directly observed (although they can
be measured). While not completely fatalistic, these components make us “who we are,”
setting boundaries and producing reliable patterns of behavior. Specific political attitudes
that are formed, then, are byproducts of personality and social context (Gerber et al.
2010). Personality also appears early in one’s life and is stable through the course of
one’s adult life (Costa and McCrae 1988). Thus, while stable identities do consistently
inform political behavior, even more stable personality characteristics influence the
formation of identities.
There is some debate as to from where one’s personality comes. Caprara and
Vecchione (2013) ask for caution in ascribing too much genetic determinism to
personality, arguing instead that it arises through a combination of genetics, environment,
and human agency. Mondak (2010, Ch. 2), however, makes a compelling argument that
personality should be understood as primarily having biological origins. He points to
twin studies designed to disaggregate the influence of inherited genetics and environment
in the development of personality traits; these studies demonstrate that the majority of
subjects’ trait variance can be explained by genetics, and only little can be explained by
subjects’ shared or unshared environment. This research also falls in line with other
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research on the genetic basis of political attitude and ideology formation (Alford, Funk,
and Hibbing 2005; Smith et al. 2011). As such, cautions from Caprara and Vecchione
aside, personality should be thought of as primarily rooted in biology (see also Matthews,
Deary, and Whiteman 2003, Ch. 6). This perspective, moreover, absolves issues of
endogeneity in research; one can be confident that personality influences political
behavior, not the other way around.
Although one’s personality encompasses a wide array of needs, value, selfbeliefs, and other components, much research simplifies the study of personality to the
exanimation of traits. Traits are “endogenous basic tendencies to exhibit consistent,
stable patterns of experience and action across situations” (Caprara and Vecchione 2013,
24-5). They thus influence behavior and can be measured (Mondak 2010, 7). Even if
they present a stylized picture of one’s inner personality, they more amenable to research
than needs, values, or self-beliefs. Taking a trait approach to personality has functional
value.
There are a host of potential traits that can comprise one’s personality, including
many that have been used to study political behavior—racial resentment,
authoritarianism, need to evaluate, and need for cognition are prominent examples. Until
recently, the myriad of possible traits left researchers with a “bewildering array of
personality scales from which to choose, with little guidance and no overall rationale in
hand” (John and Srivastava 1999). To better facilitate progressive personality research,
researchers have sought to summarize and simplify the battery of personality descriptors;
since the 1990’s, personality psychologists have settled on a “Big Five” Taxonomy (John
and Srivastava 1999; McCrae and Costa 1990). The Big Five—extraversion,
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agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness to experience—
represent “core traits” according to this approach, rooted in biology and stable through
one’s life. Other traits are “characteristic adaptations” (McAdams and Pals 2006) or
“surface traits” (Asendorpf and Van Aken 2003), and are products of the interaction
between core traits and social/environmental context. These include traits long of interest
to political scientists, such as authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (Akrami
and Ekehammar 2006). John and Srivastava (1999, 121) describe the “Big Five”
personality traits as such:
Extraversion implies an energetic approach to the social and material world and
includes traits such as sociability, activity, assertiveness, and positive emotionality.
Agreeableness contrasts a prosocial and communal orientation toward others with
antagonism and includes traits such as altruism, tender-mindedness, trust, and
modesty. Conscientiousness describes socially prescribed impulse control that
facilitates task- and goal-directed behavior, such as thinking before acting, delaying
gratification, following norms and rules, and planning, organizing, and prioritizing
tasks…emotional stability [refers to an even-temperedness and contrasts with]
negative emotionality, such as feeling anxious, nervous, sad, and tense. Openness to
Experience (versus closed-mindedness) describes the breadth, depth, originality, and
complexity of an individual’s mental and experiential life (italics in original).
These five traits were discovered through lexical analysis—studies where
respondents are given sets of adjectives and asked to assess how well those words apply
to them or someone they know. Decades of studies have used this approach, where
researchers seek to find a few key factors to simplify the myriad of potential trait
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adjectives. This research has identified the five broad factors above as encompassing the
wide swath of potential personality descriptors, and the five-factor model is now the
consensus for trait researchers (John and Srivastava 1999; McCrae and Costa 1990;
McCrae, Gaines, and Wellington 2013). As political scientists increasingly employ this
model, it also allows for progressive research on the connection between personality and
politics (whereas an ad-hoc trait approach does not).
6.2 PERSONALITY AS APPLIED TO POLITICS
There is a rich history of personality research in political science. For example,
many past (Lasswell 1977 [1930]) and modern (Thoemmes and Conway 2007) studies
have employed personality concepts to psychoanalyze individual political leaders. There
is also a rich history of studying the personality trait of authoritarianism and its relation to
political attitudes and behavior (Adorno et al. 1950; Hetherington and Weiler 2009).
Since the “Big Five” approach came predominant in personality research during the
1990’s, and brief measures made data collection easier (Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann
2003), a number of studies have researched the connection between personality traits and
political ideology (e.g. - Barbaranelli et al. 2007; Jost 2006; Mondak 2010; Mondak and
Halperin 2008; Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann 2003). Most of these studies find strong
correlations between openness to experience and liberalism, as well as contentiousness
and conservatism. This connection is strongest for political elites (Caprara et al. 2003),
but it is still present for the mass public.
There are less consistent relationships between the other three traits and ideology.
Gerber et al. (2010), however, contend that this is partially due to the fact that the effect
of dispositional traits varies across issue domain and social context. For these authors,
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while the “Big Five” are stable, genetically-produced traits, they do not directly shape our
political attitudes. They instead shape how we respond to political stimuli, and how
political stimuli is perceived varies based on issue and social context. As such, through a
large national survey, they find that, for example, agreeableness is strongly associated
with liberal economic views as well as conservative social views. Using race as a proxy
for social context, they also find that blacks, as opposed to whites, who rate higher on
openness to experience are much more likely to hold liberal views. They also find that
whites, as opposed to blacks, who rate high on contentiousness are more likely to hold
conservative views. Their study highlights both the importance of considering contexts
in studying the political effects of personality as well as the fact that the effects of
personality can easily be masked by contextual differences.
One of the most thorough works on the implications of the Big Five framework
for politics comes from Mondak (2010). He argues that people do not encounter the
political world as “blank slates,” but that “important differences gain shape long before
we encounter the political world,” (18). Using three surveys of different populations and
employing different measures of personality, he finds that each of the Big Five traits has
an effect on ideology as well as other politically relevant attitudes and behaviors. For
example, he finds that people that are open to experience and extraverted seek out
political information more through the media, have more discussion partners, and are
more knowledgeable. They are also more prone to political participation broadly;
extraversion leads to more “social” or “group” forms of participation (such as attending
rallies), which openness to experience is related to individualistic forms of participation
(like contacting a representative). Mondak also finds interactive effects between traits, as
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well as between traits and other attitudes. For example, he finds that those that are low
on conscientiousness and high on openness to experience have the highest levels of
political knowledge. He also shows that the relationship between conscientiousness and
participation hinges on external efficacy; if high conscientiousness individuals feel like
they can be efficacious, they are more likely to participate. While offering rich and
varied analysis of the connection between personality and political behavior, Mondak
acknowledges that there is much more to be done. He states that “in many instances, it
seems like the influence of personality will operate through mediating factors,” and he
calls for more theory building and research to discover these conditional relationships
(2010, 185).
Some past research suggests that personality may influence whether one adopts
deliberative attitudes to a discussion setting. Marcus et al. (1995), for example, finds that
those that are high in emotional stability and openness to experience, as well as those low
on extraversion, are more likely to be tolerant of political expression for outgroups. Mutz
(2006) uses survey data from a representative national sample to show that those who
have a high civil orientation to conflict are more likely to learn of rationales for opposing
views through exposure to political disagreement. She also shows through a lab
experiment that those predisposed to higher perspective taking ability are more likely to
exhibit political tolerance. Further, Mondak (2010) finds that those that score high on
openness to experience tend to have an aversion to moral traditionalism and moral
judgement. He also finds a curvilinear relationship between contentiousness and a desire
for representative compromise, with those scoring lowest and highest on this trait being
the least desirous of compromise.
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This work suggests a way that deliberation could be exclusionary and normatively
troubling. As detailed in Chapter Two, deliberative democracy has long been criticized
for excluding various groups and perspectives; this includes socioeconomically
disadvantaged groups that may be less likely to be versed in rational norms of discussion
(Young 2000), those with claims rooted in religious faith (Fish 2000), or those who wish
to make a radical claim more generally (that may be perceived to be out of the bounds of
reciprocity) (Sanders 1997). If certain personality traits are also related to a diminished
capacity for deliberation, that implies that, to the extent that U.S. political discourse
demands a deliberative ideal at a systems level (Mansbridge et al. 2012), individuals with
these traits will be less likely to offer their opinion or influence debate. In other words,
large numbers of individuals, because of their biologically-determined personality, are
more likely to be left out of the democratic process 21. For advocates of a deliberative
system, where ideals of reciprocity extend beyond small-group deliberative polls or elite
political institutions, there will need to be a consideration of how to limit differences in
discursive participation due to the psychology of personality.
6.3 HYPOTHESES
My hypotheses focus on how a few key personality traits impact the likelihood
that one will adopt a deliberative attitude toward political disagreement. First, I posit that
those scoring higher on openness to experience will display more reciprocity than those
scoring lower on this trait. This is due to the fact that those scoring high on this
personality trait tend to be information-seeking (Heinstrom 2003) and seek out a diversity
of cultural activities (Kraaykamp and Eijck 2005). Mondak (2010) also finds that those
21

This normatively troubling conclusion, though, holds for the U.S. political system as it is today, as
research shows that individuals vary in their level of political participation currently based on personality
traits (Mondak 2010).
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high on openness are less likely to expose moral traditionalism or make moral judgments.
If individuals high on openness are less judgmental and seek out a variety of information,
it stands to reason that they will be more likely to treat disagreeing information with
mutual respect.
Conversely, I expect that those scoring higher on the conscientiousness
personality trait will exhibit less reciprocity towards political disagreement. This
personality trait implies a respect for order, personal responsibility, and traditionalism.
Those high on conscientiousness also tend to be risk-adverse (Kowert and Hermann
1997). With regards to political behavior, conscientiousness tends to have the opposite
effect of openness to experience. It is positively related to ideological conservatism,
Republican identification, and moral traditionalism and judgement (Gerber, Huber,
Doherty, Dowling, et al. 2010; Mondak 2010). If this trait is related to order, risk
aversion, and traditionalism, it stands to reason that it will be related to respondents not
offering open-minded consideration to political disagreement, as well.
With regards to openness and conscientiousness, I expect to find a direct effect of
these personality traits on attitudes of reciprocity. Given the effect that personality, and
in particular openness to experience, have on partisan identification broadly (Mondak
2010; Gerber, Huber, Doherty, and Dowling 2010), I also expect to find evidence of
indirect effects, with the two traits examined having an effect on deliberative attitudes
through influencing partisan social identity salience.
Finally, I expect that the effect of openness and conscientiousness on deliberative
bias is not reducible to the differences in partisanship and ideology that previous studies
have shown. As such, I expect to find consistent effects when one looks at only
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Democrats or only Republicans, and consistent effects based on the issue positions
respondents take.
6.4 DATA AND METHOD
Data for this analysis comes from the Online Survey; again, the focus of analysis
in this chapter will be with the interpersonal immigration and civil liberties vignettes,
where the strongest evidence of deliberative bias based on partisan social identity can be
found. Respondent personality is measured through the Ten Item Personality Inventory
(TIPI) developed by Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann (2003). In developing their measure,
Gosling et al. compare results from the TIPI to an established, 44-item Big Five
personality measure. They find that the TIPI is closely correlated to the longer measure
of personality on self, observer, and peer assessments, has a high level of intrarespondent correlation when respondents are retested six weeks later, and is nearly as
closely related to external correlates of personality as the longer measure. While longer
measures are best, they recommend the TIPI when a brief measure is needed, or when
personality is not a primary focus of research. The TIPI has since been adopted in much
research on personality and political behavior, and it has been included in “goldstandard” national political surveys such as the American National Election Study.
Each of the ten items that comprise the TIPI consist of a pair of adjectives by
which the respondent is asked to assess herself; for example, the first item states “I see
myself as EXTRAVERTED, ENTHUSIASTIC” (capitalization present in text of Online
Survey). For each item, the respondent is asked whether she agrees or disagrees based on
a seven-point scale. There are two items that correspond with each of the Big Five traits.
To prevent an acquiescence bias, they are oriented in opposite directions; for one item,
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agreeing implies a higher score on the trait, and for the other item, disagreeing implies a
higher score. Responses are coded from one to seven (with seven indicating a higher
score on the trait), and the scores for the two items for each trait are averaged to produce
a final score for the trait. Text for all ten items can be found in the Appendix.
The focus of analysis, again, is on the openness to experience and
conscientiousness personality traits. Average respondent scores for these two traits,
based on partisanship and self-reported ideology, can be found in Table 6.1. As one can
see, Democrat identifiers and leaners score higher on the openness score, and lower on
the conscientiousness score, than Republican identifiers and leaners. Self-identified
liberals (those that are “slightly liberal” to “strongly liberal”) are also higher on openness
and lower on conscientiousness than self-identified conservatives. For both traits, the
differences between both Democrats and Republicans, and liberals and conservatives, are
significant at p < 0.01 based on t-tests. This is what previous research on personality and
politics would expect, and it serves as an indicator of measurement validity for the TIPI.
Table 6.1 Personality Scores, by Partisanship and Self-Reported Ideology
Democrats

Republicans

Liberals

Conservatives

Openness

5.26

4.93

5.32

4.85

Conscientiousness

5.37

5.72

5.33

5.78

N

955

381

851

311

As with previous chapters, respondents are divided into binary subgroups, divided
at the median score for the two personality traits. In addition to assessing differences in
overall response between groups, following Gerber and Green (2012), the differences in
experimental treatment response between these two groups will be assessed formally
through ordered logistic regression with the use of interaction terms.
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6.5 RESULTS
Table 6.2 displays differences in treatment response for both vignettes based on
the openness to experience personality trait, focusing on the question of whether the
counterargument is “reasonable.” As a whole, it appears that whether one responds to a
counterargument with an attitude of reciprocity hinges on this trait. However, the
relationship is the opposite of what is hypothesized, as those higher in openness to
experience systematically display weaker attitudes of reciprocity. For the immigration
model, openness does not condition how one responds to the treatment conditions. The
standalone trait indicator, however, is significant, suggesting that those who score higher
on openness to experience are less likely to respond deliberatively regardless if they are
in the inparty, neutral, or outparty condition. For the liberties vignette in Table 6.2,
however, openness does condition how individuals respond to outparty treatment. Those
high on openness to experience are significantly (p = 0.06) more likely than those low on
the trait to respond with less reciprocity to a counterargument simply because it comes
from the outparty. These results are displayed graphically in Figure 6.1. As one can see,
for both vignettes respondents across the board are more likely to state that the
counterargument is “not at all reasonable” if they score high on openness to experience.
With the liberties vignette, they are also more likely to respond to outparty treatment with
a diminished reciprocal attitude. In the outparty condition, the predicted probability of
stating that a liberties argument is not at all worth considering rises from 0.31 for those
low on openness to 0.47 for those high on openness.
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Table 6.2 Response to “Reasonable” Question, by Openness to Experience
Immigration
Base Model
-0.30**
(0.13)

Immigration
Interactions
-0.21
(0.18)

Liberties
Base Model
-0.08
(0.14)

Liberties
Interactions
-0.13
(0.20)

Outparty

0.04
(0.14)

-0.04
(0.19)

0.35***
(0.13)

0.10
(0.18)

Inparty x
Openness

-

-0.19
(0.26)

-

0.11
(0.28)

Outparty x
Openness

-

0.16
(0.27)

-

0.50*
(0.27)

Openness

0.40***
(0.11)

0.41**
(0.18)

0.40***
(0.11)

0.19
(0.20)

White

0.21
(0.14)

0.21
(0.14)

0.13
(0.14)

0.13
(0.14)

Age

0.01**
(0.00)

0.01**
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

Male

0.08
(0.11)

0.08
(0.11)

0.33***
(0.11)

0.34***
(0.11)

College

0.04
(0.11)

0.04
(0.11)

0.01
(0.11)

0.01
(0.11)

South

0.11
(0.11)

0.10
(0.11)

-0.08
(0.11)

-0.09
(0.11)

(cutpoint)

-1.53
(0.24)

-1.52
(0.24)

-1.72
(0.23)

-1.82
(0.24)

(cutpoint)

1.45
(0.23)
1314

1.46
(0.24)
1314

1.15
(0.22)
1314

1.06
(0.23)
1314

Inparty

N

Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity
*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure 6.1 Differences in Response to Counterargument, by Openness to Experience
There are not similar differences in response, though, for contentiousness and
agreeableness. Results for these two traits can be found in the Appendix; none of these
models has a statistically significant interaction between trait and treatment. Nor are
there significant interaction effects for the other two personality traits for which a
hypothesis was not generated, extraversion and emotional stability. Thus, personality
does appear to have an effect on one’s capacity for deliberation, but openness to
experience is the only trait out of the Big Five that matters. What’s more, further
predictive margins displayed in the Appendix suggest that while the effect of this
personality trait on deliberative attitudes is strongest for Democrats, there is an effect for
both Democrats and Republicans.
There is a possibility that the surprising result for openness to experience is driven
by the specific questions. Previous research has demonstrated that those high in openness
to experience tend to be more liberal (Jost 2006) and are less likely to express moral
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judgement (Mondak 2010). The anti-deliberative attitudes evinced by those high on this
personality trait, particularly with the immigration vignette, could thus be driven by a
socially liberal attitude. In this case, respondents are not willing to accept an argument
against their tolerant position toward undocumented immigrants. To test this possibility,
Table 6.3 compares the immigration vignette results for those initially giving a proimmigration response (and thus receiving an anti-immigration counterargument) and
those initially giving an anti-immigration response (and thus receiving a pro-immigration
counterargument). As one can see, there is a clear difference in responses between the
two subgroups. The coefficient for the openness indicator shows that those that are proimmigration, and receiving the anti-immigration counterargument, are across the board
less likely to view the argument as reasonable if they score high on this trait. Those that
are anti-immigration do not have that same across-the-board response based on openness
to experience. However, anti-immigration respondents do vary in how they respond to
experimental treatment based on whether or not they score how on openness to
experience. Those opposed to liberal immigration policy are more likely to view a
counterargument to their position as reasonable if it comes from an inparty member, and
less likely to do so if it comes from an outparty member. While these interaction terms
for the anti-immigration subgroup are not statistically significant (due to a small N), there
are substantively large. Thus, both subgroups are reacting less deliberatively to their
counterargument, by either discounting it across the board (for pro-immigration
respondents) or by conditioning their response based on party cues (for anti-immigration
respondents).
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Table 6.3 Differences in Response to Immigration Vignette, by Argument
Received and Openness to Experience
“Pro”
Argument
-0.10
(0.32)

“Anti”
Argument
-0.32
(0.21)

Outparty

-0.02
(0.36)

-0.02
(0.30)

Inparty x
Openness

-0.42
(0.52)

-0.02
(0.30)

Outparty x
Openness

0.73
(0.56)

-0.03
(0.32)

Openness

0.01
(0.38)

0.56***
(0.18)

White

0.57**
(0.29)

0.05
(0.16)

Age

0.02***
(0.01)

0.00
(0.01)

Male

0.28
(0.21)

-0.03
(0.13)

College

-0.27
(0.21)

0.19
(0.13)

South

0.18
(0.22)

0.08
(0.13)

(cutpoint)

-1.31
(0.43)

-1.76
(0.30)

(cutpoint)

2.08
(0.43)
375

1.13
(0.30)
939

Inparty

N

Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity
*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

A key question, though, is whether this effect for openness to experience is a
direct effect, or if it works indirectly by reducing partisan social identity salience. Table
147

6.4 suggests that it may be the former rather than the latter. As it indicates, both high and
low openness to experience subgroups have similar PSI scores. Figure 6.2, however, tells
a different story. This figure displays predictive margins for the liberties vignette by
social identity subgroup (regression results are available in the Appendix); here, there is a
significant difference in outparty treatment response based on openness to experience for
Low PSI partisans, but not for High PSI partisans. This being said, Figure 6.3 suggests
that both High and Low PSI partisans are, across the board, less likely to respond
deliberatively to an immigration counterargument if they score high on openness to
experience. Taken as a whole, Figures 6.2 and 6.3 suggest that personality may have the
largest effect for those with lower partisan social identity attachments, but openness to
experience encourages deliberative attitudes regardless of one’s social identity
attachment to one’s party.
Table 6.4 Mean PSI Score, by Openness to Experience
Openness to
Experience
Low

Mean PSI
Score
2.97

659

2.98

677

High

N

6.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter demonstrates that personality has an impact on whether partisans
adopt a deliberative attitude toward political disagreement; the impact, though, is
somewhat surprising. Counter to what past research would suggest, partisans scoring
high on the openness to experience trait responded less deliberatively to disagreement
than those scoring low on the trait. This difference manifested in two ways; for the
immigration vignette, those scoring high on the trait were less likely, across the board, to
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Figure 6.2 Response to Liberties Vignette, by PSI and Openness to Experience

Figure 6.3 Response to Immigration Vignette, by PSI and Openness to Experience
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view disagreement as reasonable or worth considering. For the liberties vignette, those
high on openness were more likely to follow partisan cues as opposed argumentative
substance (the latter being more desirable from a deliberative standpoint) when
determining whether to view disagreement as reasonable or worth considering.
Moreover, while there are differences in response patterns based on partisanship or
respondents’ issue position, the impact of openness to experience on attitudes of
reciprocity is not reducible to partisanship or issue attitude alone. There were not
significant difference in respondents’ attitudes towards deliberation, though, based on the
other four traits that comprise the Big Five.
It is surprising that those more open to experience adopt less deliberative
attitudes. Adjectives that are associated with this personality trait include “imaginative,”
“curious,” and “prefer variety” (McCrae and Costa 1990, 3). As discussed earlier, those
scoring on this trait are information-seeking (Heinstrom 2003), seek out a diversity of
cultural activities (Kraaykamp and Eijck 2005), and are more likely to suspend moral
judgement (Mondak 2010). That there are less likely to respond to policy disagreement
with an open mind is perplexing. More research needs to be done to assess whether these
results replicate. Research done with a representative national survey would be
particularly valuable, as some of the conclusions drawn here are based on
nonexperimental differences in responses (and thus raise questions of how far the
conclusions extend beyond the non-representative Online Survey sample). Moreover,
perhaps the quixotic results are driven by the specific issues studied; would these results,
for example, hold with an issue that has less of a clear relationship to feelings of political
tolerance, such as tax policy? The results in this chapter, in sum, provide a spark to
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thinking about the connection between openness to experience and deliberation, and they
invite more research.
Cautiousness of the conclusions aside, this chapter does point to an important
normative concern for deliberative democracy that proponents, particularly proponents of
a “deliberative system” that extends to mass public spaces of discussion, need to address.
While reciprocity is a guiding norm for deliberative political discourse, most theorists
would argue that democracies should actively ensure that deliberation is as inclusive as
possible as well (e.g. – Young 2000). If the results are correct in implying that there are
differences in the propensity for deliberation based on personality, this implies that a
certain population, because of biologically produced differences, are less able to
participate in decision making in an ideal deliberative democracy22.
The number less likely to engage in deliberation may be large. For instance,
Figure 6.4 shows a histogram of the U.S. adult population based on how they score on the
TIPI openness to experience scale. The median score (5.5) for Online Survey
respondents is given with the dotted line; the figure shows that 37% of the U.S. adult
population would score at or above the median Online Survey score on this measure, and
would thus be coded in the “high openness to experience” subgroup. Theorists have in
the past have raised concerns that deliberative democracy may be exclusionary based on
socioeconomic status, religiosity, or ideological stance. The results of this chapter and
Figure 6.4 suggest that biology (via personality) may also make deliberation
exclusionary. This is less of a concern for deliberative polls or other minipublics, where
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It is not just deliberative democracies, though, that are subject to this critique. Mondak (2010), for
example, finds systematic differences in the likelihood of voting or erstwhile participation in politics based
on Big Five personality traits. The raises normative concerns of biological exclusion for modern U.S.
democracy, not simply ideal deliberative democracy.
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a random sample of the population participates. If, however, our society aspires to a
“deliberative system,” where discursive norms such as reciprocity imbue media
communication, everyday interpersonal discussion, or other more “public” sites of
discourse, differences based on personality need to be addressed. Future theoretical and
empirical research, then, should tackle the question of how, in a system where
deliberation extends beyond minipublics, all voices regardless of personality can engage.

Figure 6.4 Distribution of Openness to Experience Score for U.S. Adults
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
“Through talk among formal and informal representatives in designated public forums,
talk back and forth between constituents and elected representatives or other
representatives in politically oriented organizations, talk in the media, talk among
political activists, and everyday talk in formally private spaces about things the public
ought to discuss…people come to understand better what they want and need,
individually as well as collectively. The full deliberative system encompasses all of these
strands”
-

Jane Mansbridge, "Everyday Talk in the Deliberative System" (1999, 211)
This concluding chapter will accomplish three tasks. First, it will summarize the

key results of the project, and it will situate the findings within larger discussions on
deliberative democracy and partisan polarization. Second, the chapter will highlight both
short term and long term directions for future research that build directly from this
project. Finally, the chapter will make a normative argument for deliberative democracy
and the ideal of reciprocity in guiding both “empowered” and “everyday” spaces of
political discourse.
7.1 SUMMARY OF PROJECT AND FINDINGS
This project illustrates the impact of partisan polarization on attitudes towards
deliberative ideals of discourse. It speaks to the potential for the U.S. to establish a more
deliberative democracy. As opposed to other democratic theory that focuses on elections,
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rights, representation, or other concepts, deliberative democratic theory focuses on the
processes of decision making and justification in which governments engage. With its
roots in Aristotle’s exultation of the Athenian assemblies, deliberative theorists idealize
decision making that is preceded by discussion characterized by inclusiveness, publicity,
and rational argumentation, among other values. A key discursive norm for nearly all
deliberative theorists is a norm of reciprocity, which can be briefly summarized as a
mutual respect in argument. It requires arguers to offer reasons that others, at least
minimally, see as legitimate, and it requires those receiving arguments to keep an open
mind and change their opinion with evidence if appropriate. With reciprocity, there is a
goal of, but not an absolute mandate for, consensus. Gutmann and Thompson (1996),
thus, place reciprocity in between a demand for complete consensus on moral values and
self-interested (even if tolerant) political bargaining.
Since the 1980’s, deliberative democratic theory has been a central theoretical,
empirical, and practical focal point in the study of democracy. Critics have asserted that
deliberative political decision making, guided by reciprocity, is exclusionary (Sanders
1997; Fish 2000), unrealistic (Shapiro 2000), or simply not good social science theory
(Mutz 2008). Proponents (Habermas 1983; Mansbridge 1980; Gutmann and Thompson
1996; Dryzeck 2010), however, argue that ideal deliberation leads to a host of benefits,
such as greater legitimacy for political decisions, better and more consensual decisions,
and learning and empathy for those who participate in the process. While there is not a
complete consensus (see, for example, Jackman and Sniderman 2006), many empirical
researchers have validated these supportive claims (Fishkin 1995; Barabas 2004; List et
al. 2012; Druckman and Nelson 2003). What normative and empirical researchers on
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deliberation have failed to do, though, is fully explore the conditions by which one will
adopt the deliberative ideal of reciprocity when one enters political discussion. The
question for the conditions for deliberation is particularly important, moreover, given the
increasing normative attention to “deliberative systems” (Mansbridge et al. 2012). If, in
these systems, some form of reciprocity needs to be present in media communication,
public advocacy, interpersonal citizens discussion, and other public or “everyday” sites of
discourse, it is important for researchers to assess in what context citizens will be willing
to adopt reciprocal norms outside a deliberative poll or other small-scale, formally
deliberative setting.
This project makes an important contribution to this regard, assess how
partisanship and polarization impact the public’s propensity to adopt an attitude of
reciprocity. Drawing on social identity theory, in Chapter Four I argue that partisan
social identity attachment—in other words, the extent to which one views being a
Democrat or being a Republican as an important part of “who one is”—weakens one
commitment to deliberative ideals in a variety of ways. Through a series of survey
experiments focused on policy vignettes, I show that, as opposed to following Habermas
“unforced force of the better argument” (1993, 163), partisans heed party cues in
considering whether to afford reciprocity towards political disagreement. The effects of
partisanship on reciprocity are particularly pronounced for those whom partisan social
identity salience is especially high. Diverging from past research on partisan social
identity that primarily focuses on outparty effects (Iyengar et al. 2012; Lelkes and
Westwood 2015), this subset of partisans both display less reciprocity towards outparty
arguments and more reciprocity toward inparty arguments. “Social” partisans, moreover,
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are also less likely to support an inparty political representative compromising with the
other party. Research shows that the U.S. partisan public has increasingly polarized not
based on ideology, but on social distance (Mason 2015; Huddy et al. 2015). Thus, results
in Chapter Four show that this mass “social” polarization is creating a fundamental
barrier to the possibility of a deliberative system idealized by Mansbridge and others,
with discourse at all levels characterized by a commitment to reciprocity.
Other chapters explored the conditions by which the deliberative bias created by
partisan social identity varies. Chapter Five examined whether outparty social contact
mitigates biases that occur with deliberation amongst partisans. Drawing on
interpersonal contact theory (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998) as well as research on
political networks (Mutz 2002; Klofstad, Sokhey, and McClurg 2013), it was
hypothesized that having regular political discussions with outparty members would
soften the effect of partisan cues on whether one evinces reciprocity. The results show,
though, that the deliberative bias partisans exhibit is not directly influenced by whether
they have discussions with outparty members. However, nonexperimental results are
suggestive that outparty social contact can have an indirect effect on deliberative attitudes
through reducing partisan social identity salience. This conclusion should be further
explored through experimental and/or representative observational research.
Finally, Chapter Six explores how the deliberative bias produced by partisan
social identity varies by one’s personality. Drawing on a “Big Five” trait
conceptualization of personality (McCrae and Costa 1990), the chapter shows that those
scoring high on one particular personality trait—openness to experience—react less
deliberatively towards partisan policy disagreement than those scoring low on this trait.
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This difference, moreover, is not reducible to differences in partisanship or issue attitude.
These results are surprising, given that adjectives such as “curious” and “imaginative” are
used to characterize individuals high on the openness to experience trait (McCrae and
Costa 1990, 3). More theoretical thinking and empirical research will need to be done to
validate and explain the effect of the trait on deliberative attitudes such as reciprocity.
However, an effect of personality, generally, on attitudes towards reciprocity points to a
normative concern that those making an argument for a “deliberative system” need to
address. Personality is primarily rooted in one’s genetics and is largely unchanging
through one’s life (Costa and McCrae 1988; Matthews, Deary, and Whiteman 2003, Ch.
6). As such, the results of this chapter suggest that an ideal deliberative system may
exclude a certain population because their biologically-determined personality leaves
them less apt to deliberate.
7.2 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This project only represents a start of inquiry into the relationships between
polarization, social identity, and deliberative democracy. For one, future research could
push results found in this project further. One way this could be done would be to
examine a wider array of issue domains with the interpersonal vignettes. The two issues
used were selected for concerns of face validity; immigration and civil liberties, it was
argued, are issues where it is plausible that both Republicans and Democrats could take a
variety of positions. While partisan social identity informs whether or not one took a
deliberative approach to both issues, the patterns of responses differs across issues.
Future theoretical and empirical work could thus explore why these differing patterns
exist. Which types of issues (social, economic, racial, etc.) are most likely to produce
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anti-deliberative attitudes amongst partisans? Is the effect of partisan social identity
stronger for “easy” issues that map on clear partisan divides? Or is it stronger for “hard”
issues, where respondents are more likely to look for a partisan cue in considering how to
approach disagreement? Likewise, future research could manipulate argumentative
strength, seeing if partisans with strong social identity attachments are just as likely to not
evince reciprocity towards good arguments as bad ones. Some of the results from this
study, as well as past research (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Carmines and
Stimson 1980), would suggest that partisan deliberative bias is stronger for “easy” issues,
and the effects of partisan social identity would hold up regardless of argumentative
strength. These intuitions, though, need to be developed into a fully formed theory,
subsequently tested through empirical research.
Another way to expand on the results from this project is to validate the findings
concerning outparty social contact and personality found in Chapters Five and Six. Both
of these chapters presented suggestive results concerning the direct and indirect effects of
contact with an outparty member, as well as the openness to experience personality trait,
on whether one approaches partisan disagreement with an attitude of reciprocity. These
results, however, are not completely conclusive, as they rely heavily on the nonrepresentative Online Survey. What’s more, many of the results in these two chapters
focus on respondents’ (nonexperimental) overall attitudes toward counterarguments, not
differences in attitudes based on experimental treatment group. These two chapters, thus,
invite replication with a survey experiment on a representative sample. This replication,
moreover, could ask additional questions that explore the nuances in the relationships
between social contact, personality, and deliberation. For instance, the Online Survey

158

only asked a few basic questions with regard to outparty social contact. A future survey
instrument could ask additional questions that do not simply address whether contact
matters, but the specific characteristics of cross-party relationships that are likely to be
associated with anti-deliberative attitudes. These questions could also assess the extent to
which the medium (e.g., social media versus face-to-face) matters in producing a contact
effect.
The results of this project speak ill for the prospect of deliberation in “mass
public” or “organic” sites of discourse—social media, interpersonal discussions, public
meetings, etc. Defenders of deliberative minipublics, though, may argue that social
identity biases melt away when one is put in a fully deliberative setting. Whether they
actually would or not is not immediately clear. While past research relying on
deliberative polls, forums, and other minipublics has found greater likelihood of
consensus (Fishkin 1995; Barabas 2004), the mechanism through which this materializes
is often not identified (see Mutz 2008 for an elaboration of this critique). It is thus not
clear that deliberative forums produce consensus by deemphasizing competing social
identities. In fact, Mendelberg and Karpowitz (2007) show that group identity norms do
not disappear in deliberative forums, but can inform the decision making process. A task
left for future research, then, is to assess whether and how the bias against reciprocity
produced by partisan social identity holds up outside of a survey poll, in a structured
deliberative forum. If biases are not reduced, it emphasizes the importance of further
research how group identities inhibit deliberation, as well as how group identity salience
can be mitigated in service of deliberation. If partisan biases are reduced in deliberative
forums, it augurs for the important place of these structured minipublics in a deliberative
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democratic system. It also invites research into how “everyday” sites of political
discussion can adopt features of the minipublic to promote higher quality discourse.
Further, future research could assess whether other social identities; such as
racial, gender, or class identity, influence attitudes towards deliberation. This research
could also examine whether these other identities serve as antecedent, or intervening,
factors in the relationship between partisan social identity and deliberation. Finally,
future research could address the question of what is to be done, given the effect of
polarization and partisan social identity on deliberative discourse. What can academics,
policymakers, and practitioners do to foster better public deliberation? Are there ways to
foster healthy deliberation, or at least a healthy deliberative system with a division of
discursive labor, without reversing the course of polarization or reducing strong partisan
identities? If not, what would it take to reverse the course of mass social polarization,
and would that be normatively desirable? What tradeoffs are involved?
7.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF (FULLY) PUBLIC DELIBERATION
The goal of this project is primarily empirical—to assess the relationship between
partisan social identity and deliberative ideals, not to pass judgment on these ideals as
such. However, the fact that I am focusing my research on the conditions for productive
public deliberation means I do think deliberative democracy has something to offer for
our society. The goals many would like government to achieve—mitigating climate
change, equitable and affordable health care, vibrant and just economic growth, reducing
the national debt, and others—have become increasingly complex and difficult to write
good policy for. The state is also increasingly intertwined in our economic, social, and
personal lives; small government and anti-regulation rhetoric aside, most citizens, when
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asked directly, prefer these government interventions and the benefits they can bring.
Given these two realities, good decision making should be a key value government
aspires to. Competent leaders, making competent policy, needs to be the norm.
Some democratic theorists argue achieving this norm, given what we know about
citizen competence as it stands today, can only come by severely circumscribing public
participation (Schumpeter [1942] 2003; Brennan 2016). However, this would take away
from a norm of equality, which is also something governments should aspire to. It is
possible that rule by technocracy or epistocracy may produce better (for some, or even
for many) policymaking. Indeed, some deferral to experts and administrators is
necessary for any modern democracy, not matter how participative. This being said, even
well-intentioned elite decision making, without wide ranging public input, runs the risk of
excluding marginalized groups and voices from decision making. What can result is, at
best, a “tyranny of the majority,” where majority interests are catered to and minority
interests are excluded or subjugated. At worst, decision making that over-emphasizes
competence at the expense of democratic equality can have systematic blind spots; it can
cater to narrow or parochial interests as opposed to the public as a whole. This is a
potential for even “good faith” political decision making, assuming an absence of
corruption or lack of interest in generality.
Deliberative democratic ideals also place a focus on quality of political decision
making; ideal deliberation, though, can balance both a norm of competence and a norm of
equality for government decisions. By incorporating and seriously considering a variety
of perspectives with a discursive process, decisions that are made after deliberation draw
on a wider array of information than individualistic decision making processes. The
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deemphasizing of power and goal of following the “unforced force of the better
argument” also makes ideal deliberation less susceptible to biased or narrow thinking.
These components encourage competent decision making. At the same time,
requirements of reciprocity and inclusion in argument and decision justification
encourage individuals to offer equitable policymaking, or policy that can be seen as
legitimate by those that disagree and in the general interest of all. As such, decisions are
more likely to attend to all affected groups, not simply a “tyrannical” majority. In sum,
deliberative democracy, at its ideal, achieves the competent decision making our times
demand as well as values of political equality that democracy has long demanded.
Of course, according to the public opinion literature, citizens are very far from the
mutual respect that ideal deliberative democracy calls for. This literature paints a picture
of citizens that are incompetent, non-participative, and irrational; many point to this
literature to suggest that deliberative democracy is an unrealistic ideal (Mutz 2008;
Brennan 2016; Achen and Bartels 2016). Further, some argue that deliberative
democracy is fundamentally unrealistic because it removes the unremoveable role of
power in discussion and government decision making (Shapiro 2000). But this is what
makes deliberation so valuable as a critical ideal. It would be wrong to think of it in
binary terms, where we either have ideal deliberation or a failure to deliberate (and thus a
failure of normative theory). Even with less-than-ideal discourse, we can have better or
worse adherence to deliberative values. For example, the 2016 Presidential election
campaign arguably marked a move away from rhetoric based on reciprocity and
accountability and towards manipulative and exclusionary rhetoric. Reversing this
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development, even short of a perfect ideal, should be seen as normatively positive from
the standpoint of deliberative democracy.
Given the unimpressive picture of citizen competence drawn by public opinion
scholars, some argue that deliberative theorists should think less about public or
“everyday” spaces of discourse, and focus more on deliberation in “empowered” forums
such as deliberative minipublics or legislative bodies. There is an argument for this.
With the key requirement that deliberative speech being empowered or consequential
(Dryzeck 2010), it may not matter that reciprocity is not evinced in social media or
workplace discussions, as long as its evinced in citizens’ juries or in Congressional
committees. If that is the case, it may not be a problem for deliberative democracy if
partisan social identity disrupts deliberative attitudes in the public, as long as structured
deliberative spaces temper identity-produced biases. However, as argued in Chapter
Two, this line of thinking about deliberative democracy is not very democratic. A
tension between deliberative political bodies and an anti-deliberative public, moreover,
cannot be sustainable. Policymakers come from the same social and cultural zeitgeist
that all citizens inhabit, and research shows that aggregate citizen opinion can influence
the actions of policymakers (Erikson et al. 2002). If citizens do not value reciprocity,
accountability, publicity, or other deliberative values with “everyday” political
discussion, it is not likely that representatives will adopt these values in making policy.
If, instead, citizens respond to partisan appeals, outgroup marginalization, and ideological
rigidity and brinkmanship, representatives have incentive to adopt these characteristics in
policy debate. A deliberative democratic system thus needs a citizenry that, at least to
some extent, accepts the value of reciprocity.
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Deliberation, thus, a) is valuable for competent and equitable government
decision making, b) is a critical ideal that is worth moving towards even if it is never
perfectly achieved, and c) needs to extend beyond legislative bodies or empowered smallscale settings like deliberative forums. With all of this in mind, it behooves us to think
about under what conditions citizens will want to adopt deliberative ideals organically.
Without the structure of a deliberative forums, or the political and financial connections
necessary to win a Congressional seat, when will citizens adopt values such as
reciprocity, publicity, accountability, inclusion, or other values in their political rhetoric?
This project is a start, but this is a question normative theorists, empirical researchers,
and practitioners of deliberative democracy need to address. If we can, deliberative
democratic ideals may be able to have a lasting impact on how the mass public thinks
about politics, talks about politics, and acts on political beliefs.
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APPENDIX A
PARTISAN SOCIAL IDENTITY AND IDEOLOGICAL PARTISANSHIP
MEASURES
For the ideological partisanship measure, the Online Survey gives the respondent
11 declarative statements concerning an array of policy issues, allowing for a close-ended
response set which includes “Strongly Agree,” “Agree,” “Neither Agree nor Disagree,”
“Disagree,” and “Strongly Disagree.” These items draw directly from ANES Time Series
surveys. Six of the items have been in every iteration of the ANES since 1982; using
these items will allow me in the future to attest to the import of the result of this project,
given changes in ideological partisanship over time. An additional five policy items in
this survey are drawn from the 2012 ANES Time Series survey. An exploratory factor
analysis (EFA) using every policy question in the 2012 ANES was conducted, and five
items that loaded clearly on either the first or second factors were included. The 11
policy items range in topic from social welfare to offshore drilling to gay marriage. They
are all, however, policies that have a clear liberal vs. conservative dimension. Following
a technique employed by Carsey and Layman (2002) as well as Iyengar, Sood, and
Lelkes (2012), the 11 policy items were put on the same scale (from one to five, with
lower values indicating more liberal responses), and then they were used to create
ideology scores for each respondent using one-dimension confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA) and extracting factor scores. The CFA model produced an RMSEA of 0.103 and a
CFI of 0.850. Both indicate a less than ideal model fit, which may be expected given the
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variety of issue items included into the sole factor. However, the scores produced
incorporate information from each of the item into a single indicator of ideology, as
opposed to focusing on, for example, solely economic or solely social issues. For the sole
purpose of dividing respondents into simple subgroups, these scores thus suffice.
The statements are listed below, with the proportion of variance of each item that
is explained by the CFA model:


The government should provide fewer services even in areas such as
infrastructure and education in order to reduce spending (R 2 = 0.407)



The government should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard
of living (R2 = 0.315)



All people’s medical expenses should be paid by individuals through private
insurance plans, not the government (R2 = 0.519)



By law, abortion should never be permitted (R2 = 0.279)



The government should spend much less money for national defense than it
currently does (R2 = 0.184)



In order to protect the environment and create jobs, the government needs to
regulate business (R2 = 0.420)



The government should allow more offshore drilling for oil and natural gas in
U.S. waters (R2 = 0.366).



The government should make every effort to improve the social and economic
position of African-Americans (R2 = 0.352)



The government should repeal the Affordable Care Act (the health care reform
law passed in 2010) (R2 = 0.578)
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Gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to legally marry (R 2 = 0.299)



The government should make it more difficult for people to buy a gun (R 2 =
0.328)
Next, the scores were inverted for Democratic respondents, so that higher scores

for Democrats mean more liberal respondents, while higher scores for Republicans mean
more conservative respondents. Thus, for all partisan respondents, a higher ideological
partisanship score means a stronger commitment to one's party platform (liberalism for
Democrats, conservatism for Republicans). Respondents were then placed in “High
Ideology” and “Low Ideology” subgroups based on these scores. “High Ideology”
Democratic respondents are more liberal than the median scoring Democratic identifier
or leaner on the ideological partisanship score (0.50), and “High Ideology” Republican
respondents are more conservative than the median scoring Republican identifier or
leaner on this measure (0.51). Out of the 1,336 partisan and leaning respondents, only 14
had missing data on the issues questions and thus did not receive a score.
Partisan Social Identity (PSI) is operationalized differently by the two survey
instruments; in the Online Survey, the measure is based on the following three
statements, where the respondent is asked for their extent of agreement on a five-point
scale:


When I talk about Democrats (Republicans), I usually say “we” rather than “they”



When someone criticizes Democrats (Republicans), it feels like a personal insult



I don’t have much in common with most Democrats (Republicans)
Each item was put on the same one to five scale, with higher scores indicating

higher social identity salience. The PSI score is an average of partisans' responses on
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these three measures, with missing items not included in the average. Out of 1,336
partisan identifiers and leaners, 1,327 answered all three questions, and no respondents
did not answer any questions.
For the Telephone Survey, a different set of questions as follows, based on the
work of Huddy, Mason, and AarøE (2015) was used to create PSI scores, using different
five-point scales for responses:


How important is being a Democrat (Republican) to you?



How well does the term Democrat (Republican) describe you?



When talking about Democrats (Republicans), how often do you use “we” instead
of “they”?



To what extent do you think of yourself as being a Democrat (Republican)?
The PSI score is an average of partisans' responses on these four measures, with

missing items not included in the average. Lower scores, here, indicate higher social
identity salience. Out of 515 partisan respondents, 482 answered all four questions, and
only one respondent did not answer any questions. For both the Online and Telephone
Survey respondents, partisans were divided into “High PSI” and “Low PSI” subgroups.
For the Online Survey, “High PSI” partisans have scores at or above the median for all
partisans and leaners (3.0). For the Telephone Survey, “High PSI” partisans have scores
below the median for all partisans (2.5).
As the box plots that follow suggest, the majority of respondents are clumped
toward the median of both the PSI and ideological partisanship measure in the Online
Survey, as opposed to being evenly distributed across the range of scores. For the PSI
measure, the 25th percentile respondent has a score of 2.3, and the 75th percentile
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respondent has a score of 3.7. For the ideological partisanship measure, the 25th
percentile respondent has a score of 0.2, and the 75th percentile respondent has a score of
0.8. Similar clustering at the median is found in the Telephone Survey for the PSI
measure; here, the 25th percentile respondent has a score of 1.75, and the 75th percentile
respondent has a score of 3. This clustering at the median for all of these measures lends
credence to dividing respondents into subgroups at the median, as opposed to treating the
variables as continuous (and assuming linear effects across the entire range of these
measures).

Figure A.1 Distribution of PSI Measure, Online Survey
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Figure A.2 Distribution of Ideological Partisanship Measure, Online Survey

Figure A.3 Distribution of PSI Measure, Telephone Survey
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APPENDIX B
SURVEY TEXT
B.1 IMMIGRATION INTERPERSONAL VIGNETTE
Next, I would like to ask you for your opinion on some more current issues.
Imagine a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 stands for “strongly disagree,” 10 stands for
“strongly agree” and 5 stands “neither agree nor disagree.” Where would you place
yourself, from 0 to 10, in response to the following statement?
“Unauthorized immigrants in the United States should have a path towards
qualifying for US citizenship.”
(SCALE)
The branch the respondent goes down from here for the next two questions
depends on his or her answer to the question above. If the respondent chooses 0-4,
proceed to branch #1 below. If the respondent chooses 6-10, choose branch #2 below. If
the respondent chooses #5, randomize the branch he or she follows
Branch #1: Others have a different perspective. Some
(Democrats/Republicans/no identifier) have argued that many unauthorized immigrants
are hard-working and contribute to the economy and their communities. They suggest
that denying these individuals an opportunity for citizenship would be unfair.
What do you think of this argument? Is it a very reasonable, somewhat
reasonable, or not at all reasonable opinion to have on the issue?
A. VERY REASONABLE (1)
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B. SOMEWHAT REASONABLE (2)
C. NOT AT ALL REASONABLE (3)
Responses were coded 1-3, as indicated above, for the analysis that is in the main text.
Do you think this argument is worth considering a good deal, somewhat, or not at
all in forming your own view on the issue?
A. A GOOD DEAL WORTH CONSIDERING (1)
B. SOMEWHAT WORTH CONSIDERING (2)
C. NOT AT ALL WORTH CONSIDERING (3)
Now, I would like for your opinion again. Imagine a scale from 0 to 10, where 0
stands for “strongly disagree,” 10 stands for “strongly agree” and 5 stands “neither agree
nor disagree.” Where would you place yourself, from 0 to 10, in response to the
following statement?
Unauthorized immigrants in the United States should have a path towards
qualifying for US citizenship
(SCALE)
{NEW PAGE}
Branch #2: Others have a different perspective. Some
(Democrats/Republicans/no identifier) have argued that unauthorized immigrants, if
given a path towards citizenship, would compete with American workers for jobs.
Offering a path towards citizenship would thus be unfair to workers who are in the
country legally.
What do you think of this argument? Is it a very reasonable, somewhat
reasonable, or not at all reasonable opinion to have on the issue?
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A. VERY REASONABLE (1)
B. SOMEWHAT REASONABLE (2)
C. NOT AT ALL REASONABLE (3)
Do you think this argument is worth considering a good deal, somewhat, or not at
all in forming your own view on the issue?
A. A GOOD DEAL WORTH CONSIDERING (1)
B. SOMEWHAT WORTH CONSIDERING (2)
C. NOT AT ALL WORTH CONSIDERING (3)
Now, I would like for your opinion again. Imagine a scale from 0 to 10, where 0
stands for “strongly disagree,” 10 stands for “strongly agree” and 5 stands “neither agree
nor disagree.” Where would you place yourself, from 0 to 10, in response to the
following statement?
Unauthorized immigrants in the United States should have a path towards
qualifying for US citizenship
(SCALE)
{NEW PAGE}
B.2 CIVIL LIBERTIES VIGNETTE, FOR BOTH SURVEYS
Again, imagine a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 stands for “strongly disagree,” 10
stands for “strongly agree” and 5 stands “neither agree nor disagree.” Where would you
place yourself, from 0 to 10, in response to the following statement?
The government’s collection of telephone and internet data is necessary as part of
its anti-terrorism efforts.
(SCALE)
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The branch the respondent goes down from here for the next two questions
depends on his or her answer to the question above. If the respondent chooses 0-4,
proceed to branch #1 below. If the respondent chooses 6-10, choose branch #2 below. If
the respondent chooses 5, randomize the branch he or she follows
Branch #1: Others have a different perspective. Some
(Democrats/Republicans/no identifier) have argued that government collection of
telephone and internet data has made our country safer, and it is needed to stop the next
terrorist attack.
What do you think of this argument? Is it a very reasonable, somewhat
reasonable, or not at all reasonable opinion to have on the issue?
A. VERY REASONABLE (1)
B. SOMEWHAT REASONABLE (2)
C. NOT AT ALL REASONABLE (3)
Do you think this argument is worth considering a good deal, somewhat, or not at
all in forming your own view on the issue?
A. A GOOD DEAL WORTH CONSIDERING (1)
B. SOMEWHAT WORTH CONSIDERING (2)
C. NOT AT ALL WORTH CONSIDERING (3)
Now, I would like for your opinion again. Imagine a scale from 0 to 10, where 0
stands for “strongly disagree,” 10 stands for “strongly agree” and 5 stands “neither agree
nor disagree.” Where would you place yourself, from 0 to 10, in response to the
following statement?
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The government’s collection of telephone and internet data is necessary as part of
its anti-terrorism efforts.
(SCALE)
{NEW PAGE}
Branch #2: Others have a different perspective. Some
(Democrats/Republicans/no identifier) have argued that government collection of
telephone and internet data violates the liberties that our founding fathers gave us and is
unconstitutional.
What do you think of this argument? Is it a very reasonable, somewhat
reasonable, or not at all reasonable opinion to have on the issue?
A. VERY REASONABLE (1)
B. SOMEWHAT REASONABLE (2)
C. NOT AT ALL REASONABLE (3)
Do you think this argument is worth considering a good deal, somewhat, or not at
all in forming your own view on the issue?
A. A GOOD DEAL WORTH CONSIDERING (1)
B. SOMEWHAT WORTH CONSIDERING (2)
C. NOT AT ALL WORTH CONSIDERING (3)
Now, I would like for your opinion again. Imagine a scale from 0 to 10, where 0
stands for “strongly disagree,” 10 stands for “strongly agree” and 5 stands “neither agree
nor disagree.” Where would you place yourself, from 0 to 10, in response to the
following statement?
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The government’s collection of telephone and internet data is necessary as part of
its anti-terrorism efforts
(SCALE)
{NEW PAGE}
B.3 REPRESENTATIVE VIGNETTE
During the course of the 2016 congressional campaign, you hear a speech from a
(Democratic/Republican) congressman in your state running for re-election. The speech
focuses on energy policy, and it touts how the congressman (worked with both parties to
increase domestic energy production/worked to increase domestic energy production).
Upon hearing this, how would it affect your likelihood of supporting for this
congressman?
A. I WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO SUPPORT THE CONGRESSMAN (1)
B. I WOULD BE NEITHER MORE OR LESS LIKELY TO SUPPORT THE
CONGRESSMAN (2)
C. I WOULD BE LESS LIKELY TO SUPPORT THE CONGRESSMAN (3)
B.4 DISCUSSANT NAME GENERATOR QUESTIONS
Next, I’d like to know the first names or just the initials of people with whom you
discuss government, elections, or politics. These people might be from your family, from
work, from the neighborhood, from some other organization you belong to, or they might
be from somewhere else.
Who is the person you generally talk with most about politics? Please write their
name or initials in the field below.
BLANK FIELD
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(HAVE AN “DO NOT DISCUSS POLITICS WITH OTHERS” OPTION)
Aside from this person, who is the person you generally talk with most about
politics? Please write their first name or initials in the field below.
BLANK FIELD
(HAVE AN “DO NOT DISCUSS POLITICS WITH ANYONE ELSE” OPTION)
Aside from anyone you have already mentioned, is there anyone else you talk
with about politics. Please write their first name or initials in the field below.
BLANK FIELD
(HAVE AN “DO NOT DISCUSS POLITICS WITH ANYONE ELSE” OPTION)
If the “Don’t discuss” option is selected in any of the three questions above, end
with the following question:
In that case, can you give me the first name of the person with whom you were
most likely to have informal conversations during the course of the past few months?
Please write their first name or initials in the field below
BLANK FIELD
{NEW PAGE}
Repeat the following two questions for all names given
Compared with (NAME), would you say that your political views are much the
same, somewhat different, or very different?
A. MUCH THE SAME (1)
B. SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT (2)
C. VERY DIFFERENT (3)
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Do you think (NAME) normally favors Republicans or Democrats, or both, or
neither?
A. REPUBLICANS (1)
B. DEMOCRATS (2)
C. BOTH (3)
D. NEITHER (4)
{NEW PAGE}
B.5 TEN-ITEM PERSONALITY INDEX (TIPI) MEASURE
In the following ten statements, a number of personality traits will appear that
may or may not apply to you. Please select a response next to each statement to indicate
the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. You should rate the extent
to which each of the pair of traits applies to you individually, even if some apply more
strongly than others.
For these next ten personality questions, the response will all range from one to
seven, with higher numbers indicating more agreement. For each question, the
respondent will see all of the choices below:
1. STRONGLY AGREE
2. MODERATELY AGREE
3. AGREE A LITTLE
4. NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
5. DISAGREE A LITTLE
6. MODERATELY DISAGREE
7. STRONGLY DISAGREE
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I see myself as EXTRAVERTED, ENTHUSIASTIC (note here that these traits,
as with the following ones, will appear in all caps to the respondent)
I see myself as CRITICAL, QUARRELSOME
I see myself as DEPENDABLE, SELF-DISCIPLINED
I see myself as ANXIOUS, EASILY UPSET
I see myself as OPEN TO NEW EXPERIENCES, COMPLEX
{NEW PAGE}
I see myself as RESERVED, QUIET
I see myself as SYMPATHETIC, WARM
I see myself as DISORGANIZED, CARELESS
I see myself as CALM, EMOTIONALLY STABLE
I see myself as CONVENTIONAL, UNCREATIVE
{NEW PAGE}
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APPENDIX C
CHAPTER FOUR ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS
Table C.1 Demographic Data for Both Surveys
% Non-Hispanic White
% Female
% College Educated (18+)
% Identifying or Leaning Dem.
% Liberal or Strongly Liberal
% Identifying or Leaning Rep.

Online
75.9%
46.8%
50.6%
59.0%
39.4%
23.5%

Telephone
66.8%
52.7%
36.7%
35.3%
45.9%

US Population*
62.8%
50.8%
26.7%
46.3%
13.1%
39.2%

*US Population data comes from the 2014 American Community Survey as well as the 2012 ANES
Time Series Study

Below are descriptions of the variables used in the regression analyses throughout
this text (as well as below in this section):


inparty: indicator of same-party treatment group



outparty: indicator of different-party treatment group



PSI: dummy indicator for social identity salience, respondent scores above the
median for all partisan respondents on the PSI measure



ideology: dummy indicator for ideological partisanship, respondent scores above
the median for all partisans on this measure



white: dummy indicator, respondent is non-Hispanic white



age: age of respondent, continuous



male: dummy variable, respondent is male



college: dummy variable, respondent has a bachelor's degree or higher



South: dummy variable, respondent lives in South census region
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Table C.2 Immigration Vignette Results for Democrats Only, Online Survey
Reasonable
Base Model
-0.33**
(0.13)

Reasonable
Interactions
-0.23
(0.24)

Considering
Base Model
-0.16
(0.16)

Considering
Interactions
-0.20
(0.24)

0.13
(0.16)

-0.16
(0.24)

0.25
(0.16)

-0.04
(0.24)

Inparty x PSI

-

-0.16
(0.24)

-

0.09
(0.32)

Outparty x PSI

-

0.48
(0.32)

-

0.51
(0.33)

PSI

0.05
(0.13)

-0.06
(0.22)

0.10
(0.13)

-0.09
(0.22)

White

0.20
(0.15)

0.22
(0.16)

0.51***
(0.16)

0.52***
(0.16)

Age

0.00
(0.01)

0.00
(0.01)

0.00
(0.01)

0.00
(0.01)

Male

-0.03
(0.13)

-0.02
(0.13)

-0.05
(0.14)

-0.05
(0.14)

College

0.08
(0.13)

0.08
(0.13)

0.11
(0.14)

0.10
(0.14)

South

-0.01
(0.14)

0.00
(0.14)

-0.01
(0.14)

-0.01
(0.14)

(cutpoint)

-2.16
(0.29)

-2.20
(0.30)

-1.32
(0.31)

-1.41
(0.33)

(cutpoint)

0.88
(0.28)
942

0.86
(0.29)
942

1.81
(0.32)
942

1.72
(0.33)
942

Inparty
Outparty

N

Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity
*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table C.3 Immigration Vignette Results for Republicans Only, Online Survey
Reasonable
Base Model
-0.35
(0.24)

Reasonable
Interactions
-0.52
(0.33)

Considering
Base Model
-0.51**
(0.24)

Considering
Interactions
-0.75**
(0.32)

-0.16
(0.27)

-0.53
(0.39)

-0.20
(0.27)

-0.41
(0.34)

Inparty x PSI

-

0.35
(0.48)

-

0.51
(0.48)

Outparty x PSI

-

0.77
(0.54)

-

0.44
(0.53)

PSI

0.09
(0.21)

-0.28
(0.36)

0.09
(0.20)

0.44
(0.53)

White

0.46
(0.37)

0.44
(0.36)

0.85**
(0.36)

0.84**
(0.36)

Age

0.03***
(0.01)

0.03***
(0.01)

0.02**
(0.01)

0.02**
(0.01)

Male

0.30
(0.20)

0.31
(0.21)

0.59***
(0.21)

0.60***
(0.21)

College

-0.09
(0.21)

-0.07
(0.22)

-0.20
(0.21)

-0.20
(0.21)

South

0.47**
(0.21)

0.43**
(0.22)

-0.02
(0.21)

-0.06
(0.21)

(cutpoint)

-0.55
(0.51)

-0.74
(0.52)

-0.49
(0.49)

-0.66
(0.51)

(cutpoint)

2.26
(0.51)
372

2.11
(0.53)
372

2.29
(0.52)
372

2.13
(0.53)
372

Inparty
Outparty

N

Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity
*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table C.4 Liberties Vignette Results for Democrats Only, Online Survey
Reasonable
Base Model
-0.12
(0.16)

Reasonable
Interactions
0.17
(0.25)

Considering
Base Model
-0.13
(0.16)

Considering
Interactions
0.04
(0.25)

0.37**
(0.16)

0.24
(0.24)

0.24
(0.16)

0.10
(0.25)

Inparty x PSI

-

-0.49*
(0.32)

-

-0.29
(0.32)

Outparty x PSI

-

0.24
(0.32)

-

0.25
(0.32)

-0.40***
(0.13)

-0.32
(0.23)

-0.37***
(0.13)

-0.35
(0.24)

White

0.27*
(0.15)

0.25*
(0.15)

0.42***
(0.15)

0.41***
(0.15)

Age

0.00
(0.01)

0.00
(0.01)

-0.01
(0.01)

-0.01
(0.01)

Male

0.42***
(0.13)

0.41***
(0.13)

0.36***
(0.13)

0.35***
(0.13)

College

-0.04
(0.13)

-0.03
(0.13)

0.07
(0.13)

0.08
(0.13)

South

-0.09
(0.14)

-0.04
(0.14)

0.04
(0.13)

0.08
(0.14)

(cutpoint)

-2.14
(0.26)

-2.13
(0.28)

-1.57
(0.27)

-1.57
(0.29)

(cutpoint)

0.74
(0.25)
941

0.78
(0.26)
941

0.99
(0.27)
942

0.99
(0.29)
942

Inparty
Outparty

PSI

N

Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity
*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table C.5 Liberties Vignette Results for Republicans Only, Online Survey
Reasonable
Base Model
0.15
(0.28)

Reasonable
Interactions
0.66*
(0.37)

Considering
Base Model
-0.06
(0.27)

Considering
Interactions
0.31
(0.34)

0.36
(0.26)

0.28
(0.35)

0.45*
(0.25)

0.47
(0.32)

Inparty x PSI

-

-1.22**
(0.58)

-

-0.89
(0.56)

Outparty x PSI

-

0.05
(0.54)

-

-0.10
(0.50)

PSI

-0.33
(0.21)

0.06
(0.44)

-0.20
(0.21)

0.13
(0.41)

White

0.08
(0.43)

-0.23
(0.44)

0.37
(0.40)

0.31
(0.40)

Age

0.00
(0.01)

0.00
(0.01)

0.01
(0.01)

0.01
(0.01)

Male

0.08
(0.21)

0.03
(0.21)

0.10
(0.20)

0.06
(0.20)

College

0.08
(0.21)

0.12
(0.21)

0.13
(0.21)

0.15
(0.21)

South

0.06
(0.22)

0.09
(0.22)

-0.13
(0.21)

-0.11
(0.21)

(cutpoint)

-1.82
(0.56)

-1.80
(0.57)

-0.83
(0.52)

-0.75
(0.52)

(cutpoint)

1.10
(0.54)
373

1.17
(0.54)
373

1.82
(0.52)
373

1.91
(0.53)
373

Inparty
Outparty

N

Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity
*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table D.1 Regression Table for Figures 5.2 and 5.3
Immigration
High PSI
-0.44**
(0.22)

Immigration
Low PSI
-0.20
(0.23)

Liberties
High PSI
-0.32
(0.22)

Liberties
Low PSI
0.32
(0.24)

Outparty

0.29
(0.22)

-0.49**
(0.25)

0.45**
(0.23)

0.23
(0.24)

Inparty x
Contact

0.51
(0.39)

-0.24
(0.39)

-0.19
(0.45)

0.00
(0.43)

Outparty x
Contact

0.21
(0.41)

0.69
(0.43)

-0.13
(0.41)

0.19
(0.41)

Contact

-0.40
(0.29)

0.16
(0.27)

-0.01
(0.32)

-0.12
(0.30)

White

0.21
(0.19)

0.30
(0.21)

0.34*
(0.20)

-0.17
(0.20)

Age

0.01
(0.01)

0.01
(0.01)

0.00
(0.01)

0.01
(0.01)

Male

-0.12
(0.15)

0.37**
(0.16)

0.40***
(0.15)

0.18
(0.16)

College

0.16
(0.15)

-0.08
(0.16)

0.12
(0.15)

-0.09
(0.16)

South

-0.06
(0.16)

0.36**
(0.17)

0.05
(0.16)

-0.10
(0.17)

(cutpoint)

-1.86
(0.33)

-1.61
(0.38)

-1.47
(0.31)

-2.64
(0.35)

(cutpoint)

1.21
(0.32)
709

1.30
(0.37)
605

1.51
(0.30)
710

0.17
(0.32)
604

Inparty

N

Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity
*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table E.1 Vignette Response by Contentiousness
Immigration
Reasonable
-0.16
(0.17)

Immigration
Considering
-0.21
(0.16)

Liberties
Reasonable
-0.24
(0.18)

Liberties
Considering
-0.30*
(0.18)

Outparty

0.00
(0.19)

-0.02
(0.18)

0.26
(0.18)

0.21
(0.19)

Inparty x
Trait

-0.25
(0.26)

0.00
(0.26)

0.36
(0.27)

0.35
(0.27)

Outparty x
Trait

0.13
(0.27)

0.32
(0.28)

0.14
(0.27)

0.15
(0.27)

Trait

0.46**
(0.18)

0.25
(0.18)

-0.18
(0.20)

-0.14
(0.20)

White

0.23
(0.14)

0.58***
(0.14)

0.16
(0.14)

0.34**
(0.14)

Age

0.01*
(0.00)

0.01
(0.01)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

Male

0.07
(0.11)

0.15
(0.11)

0.33***
(0.11)

0.30***
(0.11)

College

0.04
(0.11)

0.01
(0.11)

0.01
(0.11)

0.08
(0.11)

South

0.10
(0.11)

-0.03
(0.12)

-0.07
(0.11)

-0.03
(0.11)

(cutpoint)

-1.59
(0.25)

-1.03
(0.25)

-2.00
(0.23)

-1.37
(0.23)

(cutpoint)

1.39
(0.24)
1314

2.00
(0.26)
1314

0.85
(0.22)
1314

1.18
(0.23)
1315

Inparty

N

Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity
*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table E.2 Vignette Response by Agreeableness
Immigration
Reasonable
-0.11
(0.19)

Immigration
Considering
-0.06
(0.18)

Liberties
Reasonable
-0.07
(0.20)

Liberties
Considering
-0.16
(0.20)

Outparty

0.18
(0.20)

0.16
(0.20)

0.27
(0.20)

0.12
(0.20)

Inparty x
Trait

-0.35
(0.25)

-0.29
(0.26)

0.01
(0.27)

0.06
(0.27)

Outparty x
Trait

-0.22
(0.27)

-0.04
(0.28)

0.13
(0.27)

0.30
(0.27)

Trait

0.13
(0.19)

0.15
(0.19)

-0.13
(0.20)

-0.27
(0.20)

White

0.22
(0.14)

0.58***
(0.14)

0.14
(0.14)

0.33**
(0.14)

Age

0.01**
(0.00)

0.01**
(0.01)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

Male

0.06
(0.11)

0.16
(0.11)

0.32***
(0.11)

0.28***
(0.11)

College

0.04
(0.11)

0.02
(0.11)

0.01
(0.11)

0.08
(0.11)

South

0.11
(0.11)

-0.03
(0.12)

-0.07
(0.11)

-0.04
(0.11)

(cutpoint)

-1.63
(0.26)

-0.97
(0.25)

-1.98
(0.24)

-1.43
(0.24)

(cutpoint)

1.32
(0.25)
1314

2.03
(0.26)
1314

0.88
(0.22)
1314

1.13
(0.24)
1315

Inparty

N

Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity
*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure E.1 Openness to Experience Results Across Parties, Immigration Vignette

Figure E.2 Openness to Experience Results Across Parties, Liberties Vignette
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Table E.3 Response to “Reasonable” Question, by Openness and PSI
Immigration
High PSI
-0.37
(0.25)

Immigration
Low PSI
-0.05
(0.25)

Liberties
High PSI
-0.51*
(0.27)

Liberties
Considering
0.31
(0.29)

Outparty

0.10
(0.26)

-0.24
(0.28)

0.26
(0.27)

-0.05
(0.26)

Inparty x
Trait

0.19
(0.37)

-0.50
(0.38)

0.26
(0.39)

0.00
(0.40)

Outparty x
Trait

0.45
(0.37)

-0.15
(0.41)

0.29
(0.38)

0.83**
(0.39)

Trait

0.09
(0.27)

0.73***
(0.26)

0.04
(0.29)

0.34
(0.28)

White

0.22
(0.19)

0.25
(0.21)

0.33*
(0.20)

-0.23
(0.20)

Age

0.01**
(0.01)

0.01
(0.01)

0.00
(0.01)

-0.01
(0.01)

Male

-0.14
(0.15)

0.36**
(0.16)

0.40***
(0.15)

0.22
(0.16)

College

0.15
(0.15)

-0.10
(0.16)

0.12
(0.15)

-0.10
(0.16)

South

-0.08
(0.15)

0.34*
(0.17)

0.04
(0.16)

-0.16
(0.17)

(cutpoint)

-1.69
(0.33)

-1.28
(0.37)

-1.45
(0.33)

-2.44
(0.36)

(cutpoint)

1.39
(0.32)
709

1.66
(0.37)
605

1.53
(0.32)
710

0.44
(0.34)
604

Inparty

N

Ordered logit regression with robust errors reported; positive β’s indicate less reciprocity
*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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